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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Polycentric Information Commons: A Theory Development and Empirical Investigation 
 
BY 
 
VITALI MINDEL 
 
11/26/2018 
 
 
Committee Chair: Lars Mathiassen & Arun Rai 
 
Major Academic Unit: Center for Process Innovation & Computer Information Systems 
 
 
Decentralized systems online—such as open source software (OSS) development, online 
communities, wikis, and social media—often experience decline in participation which threatens 
their long-terms sustainability. Building on a rich body of research on the sustainability of physical 
resource systems, this dissertation presents a novel theoretical framing that addresses the 
sustainability issues arising in decentralized systems online and which are amplified because of 
their open nature. The first essay develops the theory of polycentric information commons (PIC) 
which conceptualizes decentralized systems online as “information commons”. The theory defines 
information commons, the stakeholders that participate in them, the sustainability indicators of 
information commons and the collective-action threats putting pressure on their long-term 
sustainability. Drawing on Ostrom’s factors associated with stable common pool resource systems, 
PIC theory specifies four polycentric governance practices that can help information commons 
reduce the magnitude and impact of collective-action threats while improving the information 
commons’ sustainability. The second essay further develops PIC theory by applying it in an 
empirical context of “digital activism”. Specifically, it examines the role of polycentric governance 
in reducing the threats to the legitimacy of digital activism—a type of information commons with 
an overarching objective of instigating societal change. As such, it illustrates the applicability of 
PIC theory in the study of digital activism. The third essay focuses on the threat of “information 
pollution” and its impact on open collaboration, a type of information commons dedicated to the 
creation of value through open participation online. It uncovers the way polycentric governance 
mechanism help reduce the duration of pollution events. This essay contributes to PIC theory by 
expanding it to the realm of operational governance in open collaboration.  
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CHAPTER 1: DISSERTATION OVERVIEW  
1.1 Introduction 
Decentralized systems online—such as open source software (OSS) development, online 
communities, wikis, and social media—are highly accessible, dispersed and propelled by 
voluntary participation that varies in its intensity and stability (von Krogh and Spaeth 2007). The 
openness and decentralization of these systems has been shown to spur incredible outcomes 
(Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006; Tapscott and Williams 2008). Software created by volunteers and 
openly distributed online propels private and government organizations around the world and is 
used by private individuals daily. Online communities and social media platforms connect people 
and improve their well-being in countless ways, ranging from providing entertainment and 
professional functionality to offering emotional support and information. Wikis provide content 
on all sorts of topics, and are increasingly widely used as a source of information for lay people as 
well as a wide range of professionals, including academics, healthcare professionals, journalists, 
lawyers, and judges (Brokowski and Sheehan 2009; Brown 2011; Lim and Simon 2011; Miller 
and Murray 2010; Peoples 2009). The impact that decentralized systems online have on our 
everyday lives cannot be overstated; they impact how we spend our leisure time, connect, learn, 
absorb news and cultural trends, shop and find other transaction opportunities, and much more.  
In addition to affecting the everyday lives of anyone with an internet connection, the openness and 
connectivity-potential of decentralized systems online has become a major catalyst for new 
business models. Some of the most valued companies today started not so long ago as simple 
platforms on which individuals from all walks of life were invited to freely participate. At first, in 
the mid-90s, websites such as eBay and Craigslist invited individuals and small businesses to 
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advertise all sorts of goods and services with little restrictions. At the same time, online dating was 
born and Match.com invited individuals to advertise themselves to others to promote a different 
type of transaction. In the early 2000s, the internet’s openness and connectivity gave rise to social 
media websites such as Myspace and Facebook, where people can freely share personal 
information, photos, and videos with anyone they choose to include in their virtual social circle. 
Social media’s value proposition is similar to that of transaction-oriented websites such as eBay 
and Craigslist and even Match; all are based on the notion of virtuous network effects (although 
the revenue model has shifted from charging brokerage and platform usage fees to selling eyeballs 
to advertisers). Half a decade later, the multisided platform business model progressed with the 
advent of smartphone technologies that incorporate global positioning systems (GPS) to allow 
people to coordinate transactions in real time. Multisided platform services driving the emerging 
sharing economy is exemplified by Uber and Lyft, which—with few restrictions—allow people 
with cars to offer rides for a fee to people needing a ride in real time. Similarly, Airbnb, also with 
little restrictions, allows individuals with extra living space to offer it for a fee to those looking for 
a place to stay. The idea of using decentralized online technologies to invite people to freely 
transact with each other or simply exchange information proved to be business gold; as of Summer 
2018, the companies mentioned above are estimated to be worth collectively more than half a 
trillion dollars.1  
The increase in the importance of decentralized systems online is well reflected in IS research, 
which shifted its focus in the past decade from “traditional” business systems such as enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) to the various “new” emerging systems online. In 2005, only three 
research papers on decentralized systems online were published in the top two IS journals—
                                                          
1 Yahoo Finance 
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Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ) and Information Systems Research (ISR); 10 
years later, in 2014, the same two journals published 26 research papers on the subject, reflecting 
a steady trend (see Table 1.1).  
Table 1.1. Published Papers on Decentralized Systems Online 
Year MISQ ISR MISQ+ISR 
2014 13 13 26 
2013 5 17 22 
2012 6 6 12 
2011 4 4 8 
2010 3 2 5 
2009 3 0 3 
2008 0 8 8 
2007 3 2 5 
2006 3 4 7 
2005 2 1 3 
Total 42 57 99 
Although existing research has made some important theoretical contributions to the study of 
decentralized systems online (Bateman et al. 2011; Butler et al. 2014; Howison et al. 2014; Kane 
et al. 2012; Levina et al. 2014), most studies in this area are light on theory. To the extent that 
researchers use theories, those theories are typically longstanding frameworks developed in other 
social science fields. Borrowing established “outside” theories for framing research is a common 
practice in the IS field. Still, the lack of new theories is problematic for two main reasons: (i) it 
limits the cross-fertilization of insights, which contributes to (ii) theoretical stagnation in an 
increasingly mature field. The shortage of new theories on decentralized systems online is 
noticeable, and several prominent researchers have called for their development (Johnson et al. 
2014; Majchrzak 2009; Singh et al. 2011; Von Krogh et al. 2012). New theories are needed to 
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consolidate the many empirical insights generated shortly after the emergence of decentralized 
systems online and to serve as a stepping stone for future research in the field. 
In response to the identified need, this dissertation advances the theoretical understanding of 
governance of decentralized systems online to help address the challenges that arise due to their 
high degree of openness to participation (Table 1.2 summarizes the dissertation essays). The 
dissertation presents a novel theoretical framework for examining the systems’ sustainability in 
the face of degenerative threats. In addition, it exemplifies the theory’s versatility and applicability 
by providing evidence from two distinct research contexts and research methods. The dissertation 
then leverages the distinctive aspects of these contexts, coupled with different modes of inquiry, 
to further advance theory regarding decentralized information systems online. The first empirical 
research study—an explanatory case study—aims to contribute to the understanding of how 
decentralized systems online may be harnessed for promoting institutional change. The second 
empirical research—a quantitative study—aims to contribute to our understanding of how open 
collaboration (OC) systems online resolve arising information pollution problems. The developed 
theory, coupled with the two empirical investigations that build upon it, contribute to a better 
understanding of governance of decentralized systems online. 
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Table 1.2. Summary of Context, Theory, and Methods 
 Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 
Context 
Technological 
Context 
Online communities, 
social media, 
multisided platforms, 
online reviews, wikis, 
crowdsourcing 
Smartphone-based 
crowdsourcing and 
social media 
Open collaboration 
(OC) systems online 
Area of 
research 
Theory development 
on the governance of 
decentralized systems 
online 
Digital activism for 
promoting institutional 
change 
OC systems 
governance against 
information pollution 
Target 
audience 
Researchers of 
decentralized systems 
online; firms using 
decentralized systems 
online as part of their 
business model 
Researchers of 
technology and social 
activism; organizers 
of social activism 
Researchers of OC 
systems; participants 
in OC systems  
Theory 
Informing 
theoretical 
perspectives  
Tragedy of the 
commons; common 
pool resources (CPR) 
governance  
Polycentric 
information 
commons; legitimacy 
and institutional 
change  
Polycentric 
information commons 
Method 
Data source Coding papers 
published in MISQ and 
ISR between 2005 and 
2014 
Interviews with key 
informants; electronic 
communications, and 
official and media 
reports 
Wikipedia data 
release processed 
with a Python script 
developed by 
coauthor Aleksi 
Aaltonen 
Sample 72 articles 18 interviews, 95 
emails, 43 Facebook 
communication 
streams, 439 
Facebook posts, 621 
media stories, 7 
official reports 
4,325 pollution 
events and the 
editing activities in 
Wikipedia between 
the posting of a 
“cleanup” tag and its 
removal 
Analysis 
approach 
Manual coding  Episodes and 
encounters analysis 
of qualitative data 
Hierarchical linear 
regression modeling 
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1.2 Essay 1 
To add to the body of theories on decentralized information systems online, Essay 1 focuses on 
the theoretical question of how these systems may be governed to achieve sustainability in the face 
of threats arising from within because of their openness to participation.2 At present, the literature 
examining the question of sustainability of decentralized systems online is limited and focused 
mostly on online communities. This stream of research finds that an increase in the community’s 
size reduces the efficiency of communication, and that participants are generally sensitive to 
barriers that raise the opportunity cost of engagement; it also identifies an inherent tension between 
the need to attract new members while also avoiding alienating old-timers that might be 
dissatisfied with the changes that new participants bring (Butler 2001; Butler and Wang 2012; 
Butler et al. 2014). The theory development essay seeks to further advance our understanding 
about the sustainability of decentralized information systems online by identifying the threats 
impacting them and the conditions under which these threats may be addressed.  
Drawing on the well-established paradigms of tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) and 
polycentric governance of common pool resource (CPR) systems (Ostrom 1990), in Essay 1, we3 
analyze a sample of 72 research articles published in MISQ and ISR on decentralized systems 
online. We appropriate the Hardin and Ostrom terminologies to code the literature and create a 
“common language” repository of insights that we subsequently use, in conjunction with Ostrom’s 
findings on CPR governance in the physical world, to develop a novel theoretical framework. 
Conceptualizing decentralized systems online as “information commons” because of their high 
                                                          
2 Mindel, V., Mathiassen, L. and Rai, A., 2018. “The Sustainability of Polycentric Information Commons,” MIS 
Quarterly (42:2), pp 607-631. 
3 The paper was coauthored with Lars Mathiassen and Arun Rai  
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degree of openness to participation, the theory of polycentric information commons (PIC), 
theorizes on the categories of actors deriving value from participating in information commons; 
the factors associated with their sustainability; the collective-action threats that arise from within 
and threaten their sustainability; and the polycentric governance practices that may help them 
reduce the prevalence of threats and strengthen them in the long run.  
Understanding the sustainability conditions for the various web-based decentralized information 
systems is important for theory for two reasons: (i) these systems represent a novel mode of 
information production and governance that is distinctly different from past hierarchical models 
(Benkler 2006; Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006), and (ii) they impact societal outcomes, ranging 
from affecting markets (Dellarocas 2005; Xu and Zhang 2013) and economic displacement (Chan 
and Ghose 2014) to outcomes in politics (Gibson and McAllister 2011; Wattal et al. 2010), health 
(Barak et al. 2008; Chan and Ghose 2014) and education (Agazio and Buckley 2009; Burke et al. 
2009). Hence, it is important to understand theoretically what differentiates successful systems 
from the numerous systems that become unsustainable. Moreover, understanding practically how 
decentralized information systems may be governed to improve their sustainability odds becomes 
increasingly important for companies relying on these systems as part of their business model; 
those companies include YouTube, Airbnb, Uber, eBay, Waze, Facebook, Yelp, TripAdvisor, 
Twitter, and Craigslist, all of which rely on self-selecting volunteers to provide the bulk of their 
content. 
1.3 Essay 2 
Decentralized systems online share the characteristic of open access to participants, but otherwise 
differ in their overarching goals. Increasingly, researchers from various disciplines examine how 
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decentralized systems online are being used to promote social change (Agarwal et al. 2014; 
Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Bennett and Segerberg 2011; Edwards et al. 2013). The literature 
demonstrates that the use of online communities, social media, crowdsourcing, and crowdfunding 
online can be useful for fundraising and promoting awareness for various causes, but they are not 
very impactful beyond these narrow objectives (Bimber et al. 2005; DeLuca et al. 2012). Digital 
activism online also suffers from the negative perception that it is simply an easy way for people 
to feel as if they are doing something without actually engaging with the issues beyond cyberspace 
(Butler 2011). Even when decentralized systems online enable mobilization offline in the real 
world, the resulting impact is typically disappointing (Friedersdorf 2015; White 2016). This is 
typically because the congregation of people sharing similar views feeds the echo-chamber effect 
of continuous reinforcement of agitation among activists (Garrett 2009), which alienates non-
activists, while the lack of strong leadership makes it hard for social movements born online to 
articulate a clear and unified agenda (White 2016, 2017). Thus, despite their rising profile in 
promoting social change, we still do not fully understand how decentralized systems online can be 
effectively harnessed to achieve lasting institutional change.  
Drawing on PIC theory (Essay 1) and legitimacy in institutional change theory (Suchman 1995), 
Essay 2 examines how harnessing digital activism online and offline can effectively promote 
institutional change. Unlike most information commons, digital activism is less concerned about 
its long-run sustainability and more about achieving a result, whether it be raising money, signing 
people on a petition, passing a new legislation or reversing an existing one, pressuring an 
organization to change its practices, or even changing practices across institutions. In our research, 
we examine the case of Cabotagestudien (CS), a research initiative in Sweden in which researchers 
used smartphone crowdsourcing and social media to collect data. The generated data, to the 
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surprise of many, impacted large-scale institutional change, including noticeably shifting public 
opinion, shifting political alliances, passing new legislations, and changing industry practices. In 
Essay 2, we analyze CS through the prism of PIC and legitimacy theories. We find that for digital 
activism to achieve noticeable institutional change, it must establish its pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive legitimacy, which is difficult when facing collective-action threats arising from within 
as well as attacks from opposing actors. By adopting more of a polycentric approach to managing 
the decentralized systems facilitating it, digital activism is more likely to overcome such treats and 
achieve the needed legitimacy to impact change.  
 
Essay 2 contributes to the literature on digital activism by showing how it can be harnessed for 
institutional change. Drawing on the prisms of PIC and legitimacy theories, Essay 2 uses the 
empirical findings to formulate broad theoretical propositions on the relationship between digital 
activism and institutional change. In addition, Essay 2 contributes to PIC theory by illustrating its 
applicability for examining decentralized systems online and for qualitative research in general. 
Finally, Essay 2 contributes to practice by outlining the problems social movement organizers are 
likely to encounter in digital activism and how those problems can be lessened by incorporating 
polycentric practices in the governance and design of their initiatives.  
1.4 Essay 3 
OC systems online are a type of information commons in which providers of information build on 
each other’s work to create value for appropriators in the form of a knowledge repository or 
software that is made freely available as an open-access alternative to professionally created retail 
products (Tapscott and Williams 2008). Much has been written about the OC model’s novelty—
specifically, how products created by mostly uncoordinated and unpaid volunteers often prove to 
have quality that is equivalent to products produced by paid specialists (Benkler 2006; Benkler 
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and Nissenbaum 2006; von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). This fact stands in stark contrast to 
traditional economic theories. No theory of production could have predicted that unorganized and 
uncompensated self-selecting volunteers can sustain complex enterprises requiring constant 
updating and maintenance to keep generating value over time (Tapscott and Williams 2008). OC 
systems emerged in the past two decades, and our limited time perspective prevents us from 
knowing who is right: those who hype OC systems as a superior way of organizing production, or 
those who doubt the capacity of OC systems to continuously provide value over the long run. The 
conflicting findings from empirical research on the quality of OC system outputs—some finding 
it to be on par with professionally created products (Brown 2011; Chesney 2006; Giles 2005), 
while others finding it to be subpar (Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; Lavsa et 
al. 2011)—continue to remind us that the questions of how OC systems resolve quality issues is 
important for their long-term viability.  
At present, research on the quality of OC systems is exploratory and almost entirely atheoretical, 
providing insights on certain factors associated with quality, but for the most part unable to explain 
how OC systems successfully manage to balance their high-level inclusiveness and openness to 
participation with inevitably arising quality problems. Using PIC theory (Essay 1) as our lens, 
Essay 3 examines how OC systems address quality issues through the prism of polycentric 
governance and information pollution resolution. PIC theory asserts that all information commons 
are more susceptible than professionally organized production to incidental and even deliberate 
pollution. When unlimited numbers of mostly anonymous people are free to upload content with 
little supervision, PIC theory asserts that some of it is bound to conflict with the overarching goal 
of the information commons. Examples of information pollution include fake news, 
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unsubstantiated rumors and conspiracy theories, manipulated and biased content, and all sorts of 
incomplete and erroneous information.  
In Essay 3, we zero-in on how polycentric practices of shared accountability, boundary regulation, 
incremental adaptation, and provider recognition are associated with pollution event resolution in 
Wikipedia—one of the most successful and arguably the most polycentric OC system to date. 
Conceptualizing that the posting of tags calling for the cleanup of articles is the start of “pollution 
events,” we examine the relationship between the four polycentric practices mentioned above and 
the time until the tag is removed, which signifies the temporary pollution resolution. We find that 
shared accountability and incremental adaption is directly associated with the reduction in the time 
it takes to resolve pollution. Boundary regulation, on the other hand, at first increases pollution 
resolution time to a point; thereafter, it is associated with a decrease in pollution resolution time. 
This suggests that boundary regulation initially creates confusion about the article’s boundary, but 
after the confusion is resolved, it helps it to improve information quality. Finally, although 
Wikipedia does not have a provider recognition mechanism at the article editing level, we find 
evidence that persistent provider rejection—that is, reverts of revisions—is associated with a 
decrease in the pollution resolution time. Essay 3 contributes to both the literature on OC system 
quality management and to PIC theory by confirming the relationship between polycentric 
practices and pollution alleviation.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE SUSTAINABILITY OF POLYCENTRIC INFORMATION 
COMMONS  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research on various distributed online information systems—including blogging, crowdsourcing, 
media sharing, online communities, online reviews, open source software development, social 
media, wikis, peer-to-peer file sharing, and two-sided electronic markets—shows that the level of 
user engagement and overall activity in most systems eventually decline substantially. Here, we 
draw on Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons and Ostrom’s theory of polycentric 
governance to introduce a unifying theory of polycentric information commons (PIC) that explains 
these phenomena. Further, our theory illuminates how polycentric governance principles, as 
manifested in system rules and infrastructure features, counterbalance various sustainability 
threats arising from unrestricted participation. By integrating previous research findings and 
offering new insights into information and governance practices, the theory, practically applied, 
can enhance the likelihood of sustained participation across diverse, decentralized online 
information systems. We conclude by discussing how researchers can use the theory in empirical 
investigations and how they can engage in theoretical elaborations.  
 
Key Words: Theory development, tragedy of the commons, polycentricity, governance, 
decentralized online information systems, collective-action threats 
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2.1 Sustainability of Decentralized Systems Online 
We increasingly depend on information systems (IS) with a high degree of volunteer user 
participation and consequential sustainability threats, including blogging, crowdsourcing, media 
sharing, online communities, online reviews, open source software (OSS) development, social 
media, wikis, peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing, and two-sided electronic markets. Although many 
researchers have studied these decentralized online information systems and produced important 
insights over the past several years, the literature remains fragmented and light on theory 
(Majchrzak 2009; Singh et al. 2011). With the exception of the theory of social dynamics in online 
settings (Levina et al. 2014), which explains power relations across various user-generated content 
platforms, the few theories recently published are primarily phenomenon-specific (Bateman et al. 
2011; Butler et al. 2014; Howison et al. 2014; Kane et al. 2012) and have limited applicability 
beyond their explicit context of origin. It is not surprising, then, that researchers are increasingly 
calling for “more highly socialized and multitheoretic explanations of community development” 
(Johnson et al. 2014) that “cover the interplay with institutions, goods, and the social practice” 
(Von Krogh et al. 2012). In response, our work integrates contemporary empirical evidence in IS 
research and theoretical insights from the literature on the sustainability of online communities 
(Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014; Butler et al. 2012) with the literature on the governance of 
common pool resource (CPR) institutions (Ostrom 1990) to develop a theoretical framework 
aimed at explaining and predicting outcomes in decentralized online information systems.   
While undoubtedly different in many regards, the online phenomena cited above share three 
important characteristics. First, relative to traditional information systems, decentralized online 
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information systems are (1) highly accessible4 to content consumers (typically at no cost) and (2) 
highly accessible to content producers who, in most cases, engage without payment. These features 
give rise to a third: (3) high-accessibility characteristics, which let individuals join for free and 
leave anytime, can lead to high volatility in consumer and producer participation. Although 
commercial (and sometimes nonprofit) organizations create and maintain the technical 
infrastructure of these systems, most of their content is not provided by system owners; rather, it 
is generated in an unordered, decentralized fashion by volunteer participants. This freedom of 
participation creates the conditions for sudden growth, but it also makes the systems vulnerable to 
sudden massive exits of content producers. This open access and high dependency on self-selecting 
individuals is the foundation on which we build our theory, guided by the following overarching 
research question: How can decentralized online information systems mitigate the threats to 
sustainability that follow from their high degree of openness to participation?  
For centuries, ecologists, demographers, economists, sociologists, and political scientists have 
studied and debated questions related to the sustainability of various types of openly accessible 
resource systems. The discourse on the topic can be coarsely categorized into two prominent—yet 
rival—schools of thought. One school is best represented by ecologist Garret Hardin, and the other 
by political scientist Elinor Ostrom.  
In 1968, Hardin published his influential thought experiment in which he describes the dissipation 
of medieval-type grazing commons resulting from unchecked individual-level overgrazing and 
pollution. “The tragedy of the commons,” as it came to be known, grew to be the leading paradigm 
in political science and economics, taught in college classes and public administration circles as a 
                                                          
4 Throughout the paper, we use the term “accessibility” in the sense of “hard to exclude people” as opposed to 
technical accessibility (i.e., internet access, ease of access, and so forth). 
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cautionary tale of what might happen to collective resources if strong, top-down institutions do not 
sufficiently curtail individual freedoms (Hardin 1968). According to the logic of the tragedy of the 
commons, decentralized online information systems will eventually decline and become 
unsustainable because of their high level of openness. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that 
many online communities, after initial growth, have experienced a substantial decline in 
participation (as in Napster and MySpace) or ceased activity all together (Butler 2001; Butler et 
al. 2014; Butler et al. 2012; Hann et al. 2013; Ma et al. 2007; Moon et al. 2008; Ransbotham et al. 
2011; Stewart et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2013). Even high-profile systems such as Wikipedia, 
according to observers studying them, show signs of declining participation (Halfaker et al. 2011). 
The rise of cyber-archeology, which “digs” into failed digital communities and their digital 
artifacts, further illustrates the tendency of decentralized online information systems to decline or 
collapse (Harrison 2009; Jones 1997). Can the decline of these systems be viewed, at least partially, 
as a form of tragedy of the commons—that is, an inevitable outcome resulting from “too much” 
freedom in how people engage and interact with these technologies? If so, how can we then 
reconcile the supposed inevitability of decline with the fact that so many successful decentralized 
online information systems such as YouTube and Facebook manage to remain robust? 
According to Ostrom, the tragedy of the commons oversimplifies reality, and its conclusion—that 
a central authority must significantly curtain individual freedoms—is highly problematic5 (Ostrom 
1990). Ostrom and her colleagues analyzed thousands of cases of local resource governance 
arrangements (such as grazing grounds, fisheries, forests, and watersheds) and, while they did find 
instances of tragedies, they also found numerous examples of sustainable and well-functioning 
                                                          
5 Ostrom challenged Hardin’s notion of open access commons and instead maintained that Hardin in effect was 
describing a common property regime which, although permeable, is not ungovernable.  
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resource systems that operate without strong centralized authorities (Nagendra et al. 2012; Ostrom 
1990; Schlager et al. 1999). More often than not, local communities, for hundreds of years in some 
cases, were found to be successful in governing CPRs with minimal oversight from central 
authorities (Ostrom 1990). That is, contrary to the tragedy of the commons, in most cases people 
communicate and work together to find sensible ways to share resources without endangering their 
long-term sustainability. Ostrom observed that the most resilient governance arrangements were 
those that dynamically managed boundary setting and mutual accountability through a high degree 
of inclusivity in decision-making. Increasing the number of independent decision-making centers 
generates system stability by reinforcing individual commitment to the CPR rather than delegating 
this responsibility to a narrow, elite group of decision makers. These boundary-setting and mutual-
accountability mechanisms constitute local arrangements that keep wrongdoers at bay without 
compromising the freedoms of others. The mechanisms emerge from mutual adjustments among 
the involved autonomous actors, rather than relying primarily on central governance structures or 
private market forces; they thus represent a third mode of governance: polycentricity. Following 
this school of thought, could one major differentiating factor between successful and unsuccessful 
decentralized online information systems be rooted in the extent to which they embed polycentric 
governance principles in their design?  
Drawing on these important distinctions and insights, we conceptualize decentralized online 
information systems as “information commons.” Although these various online systems differ in 
structure and objectives, they are similar in at least two important ways: (i) they are information 
systems, and (ii) they resemble Hardin’s commons in their openness. Adopting this as a frame, we 
suggest that the extent to which polycentric governance principles are embedded into those 
information commons explains why some systems decline and others flourish, even in the face of 
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many collective-action threats resulting from their inherent openness. Although polycentricity 
cannot explain everything we need to know about the sustainability of decentralized online 
information systems, we use it as a starting point for developing a foundational theory. While we 
build on Ostrom’s insights, we acknowledge that decentralized online information systems are 
sociotechnical phenomena that do not entirely fit the definition of CPR systems. The difference in 
contexts necessitates a careful borrowing and adaptation of specific concepts to enhance the theory 
development beyond a simple overt reproduction that would fail to increase our understanding of 
the phenomena at hand (Whetten et al. 2009). Hence, in our theorizing, we rely on both our 
reasoning and our creative imagination (Bacharach 1989; Rivard 2014) supported by two literature 
streams: (i) the general literature on polycentric governance of shared resources, and (ii) the 
literature on decentralized online information systems (see the Appendix for details of our IS 
literature review).  
We structure the paper in accordance with Zmud’s (1998) recommendations to develop “pure” IS 
theory papers by defining the principle phenomena, explicating core concepts, and relating them 
to each other while articulating their raisons d’être. Accordingly, we next specify the proposed 
theory’s content and boundaries by defining information commons and specifying the many 
different IS phenomena that fit the definition. We subsequently conceptualize and define the core 
concepts underlying our theoretical development: derived stakeholder value, sustainability, 
collective-action threats, and polycentric governance practices. We then develop a conceptual 
model and associated propositions that relate the core concepts to each other and to their 
constituent constructs. We conclude by discussing the contributions of our theorizing and how the 
proposed theoretical framing can serve as a generative mechanism for further theoretical 
elaboration and empirical evaluation of information commons. 
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2.2 Information Commons 
To facilitate analysis of their sustainability, we conceptualize decentralized online information 
systems as information commons—that is, a highly accessible, self-rising information system in 
which stakeholders share an overarching goal. To conceptually unify several streams of research, 
we address information commons in their generic form, acknowledging that future research should 
explore differences across their specific forms, such as whether an information commons is stand-
alone, nested within traditional systems, or entangled with other information commons. To set the 
boundary conditions for our theorizing, we draw on Ostrom’s work to conceptualize information 
commons (Table 2.1) and describe contemporary phenomena that represent information commons 
(Table 2.2).  
Both Hardin and Ostrom identify accessibility as a major defining characteristic of the commons 
and CPR systems, respectively (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). Accordingly, relative to other 
information systems and platforms, information commons are highly accessible. Although the 
access is not necessarily unlimited, information commons are generally nonexclusive, allowing 
anyone who wishes—regardless of experience or credentials—a high degree of freedom of 
entrance and autonomy to supply and acquire digitalized information in the form of words, videos, 
images, sound, and code (Hann et al. 2013; Shah 2006; Stewart et al. 2006). The flip side of 
freedom of access is freedom of exit. Individual participants can easily leave the information 
commons at any time.  
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Table 2.1 Conceptualization of Information Commons 
CPR Concept Adapted Concept Examples 
Common Pool 
Resource System 
“…natural or man-
made resource 
system that is 
sufficiently as to 
make it costly to 
exclude potential 
beneficiaries from 
obtaining benefits 
from its use” (E. 
Ostrom 1990, pp. 30) 
Information 
Commons 
Highly 
accessible, 
self-rising 
information 
system in 
which 
stakeholders 
share an 
overarching 
goal 
Blogging, 
crowdsourcing, 
media sharing, 
online 
communities, 
online reviews, 
OSS development, 
P2P file sharing, 
two-sided 
electronic markets, 
social media, wikis 
Physical Resources  
Natural and man-
made 
Information 
Intangible; 
digitalized 
and man-
made  
Words, icons, 
videos, images, 
sound, code 
A
c
to
rs
 
Producers  
“Anyone who actually 
constructs, repairs, or 
takes actions that 
ensure the long-term 
sustenance of a 
resource systems 
itself” (E. Ostrom 
1990, pp. 31) 
Producers 
Architects 
and 
sponsors of 
the 
infrastructure 
that enable 
the system 
The Mozilla 
foundation, 
Wikimedia 
foundation, Turner 
Broadcasting 
Providers 
“…those who arrange 
for the provisioning of 
a CPR” (E. Ostrom 
1990, pp. 31) 
Providers 
People who 
supply 
information 
to the system 
Developers, 
uploaders, posters, 
content producers 
Appropriators 
“…those who 
withdraw [resource 
units]” (E. Ostrom 
1990, pp. 30) 
Appropriators  
People who 
acquire 
information 
from the 
system 
Readers, 
downloaders, 
content consumers 
Hardin warned about the dire consequences of accessibility; however, Ostrom, basing her assertion 
on a substantial body of empirical observations, argued that, in the majority of cases, a high degree 
of accessibility prompts the emergence of a self-rising order. Taking Ostrom’s position, we 
identify self-rising order from within—as opposed to top-down design—as the second 
characteristic of information commons. Prior IS research addresses this self-rising property in 
different forms of information commons. For instance, OSS development research has referred to 
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the property as “self-emerging” (Hann et al. 2013), while online community research calls it 
“inherently evolving” (Butler et al. 2014). Moreover, blogs have different centers of influence that 
emerge spontaneously (Chau et al. 2012; Howison et al. 2014), and online communities involve 
autonomous centers that emerge and disappear without any predefined pattern (Johnson et al. 
2014). Although the self-rising property of information commons is widely recognized in extant 
literature, it is rather unconventional. Throughout history, traditional information systems—from 
the hieroglyphs in the Great Pyramid to printed newspapers—were produced by specialists 
working within hierarchical structures of authority. Hence, based on the self-rising property alone, 
information commons are distinctly unique types of information systems.  
In these systems, people play various roles; IS research describes these roles using many different 
terms, including users, consumers, participants, contributors, developers, uploaders, bloggers, and 
posters. To further clarify our definition of information commons, we adapt Ostrom’s (1990) 
concepts to classify these principal stakeholders into three distinct categories: (i) producers—the 
architects and sponsors of the infrastructure that enable the system; (ii) providers—the people who 
supply information to the system; and (iii) appropriators—the people who extract information 
from the system. Of course, an individual may play more than one role; most people are both 
providers and appropriators of content on social media platforms, for example. Distinguishing 
among the principal actors involved in information commons also facilitates cross-case analyses 
(Darke et al. 1998). We expand further on these stakeholders in the next section. 
Every CPR system has an overarching purpose, whether it is distributing water, managing grazing 
rights, determining tree-cutting schedules, restricting fishing activities, or allocating specific 
common resources. Similarly, every information commons has an overarching goal, which might 
be broad or specific, continuous or ephemeral, legal or illegal. While stakeholders may be 
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motivated by different considerations and goals, they inevitably share some overarching goal that 
ties them to the information commons. For instance, sellers and buyers in two-sided electronic 
markets such as eBay, Craigslist, Airbnb, and Uber are typically interested in maximizing their 
individual utility but share the overarching goal of transacting. Similarly, providers of code, 
articles, and posts may have different motivations and goals than appropriators, yet they both share 
the overarching goal of exchanging the information; otherwise, they would not be participating in 
the information commons.  
Despite common characteristics, an important difference exists between information commons on 
the one hand, and Hardin’s commons and Ostrom’s CPRs on the other. Hardin and Ostrom both 
addressed physical resource systems with tangible natural or man-made resource units. This 
materiality makes the resource units subtractable—implying that their consumption depletes the 
CPR (Ostrom 1990). In contrast, information commons pertain to resources in digitalized form, 
implying that the resources in information commons cannot be depleted through overconsumption. 
If anything, information commons become more sustainable through increased consumption 
because of network effects that bring about the comedy of the commons (Rose 1986) rather than 
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). This difference in resources is a given and, in any case, 
Hardin’s notion of the commons focuses on the collective decline resulting from unchecked 
individual actions, rather than on overconsumption per se. As a result, we assert that our use of the 
term “commons” is appropriate because the types of information systems that we theorize emerge 
from the actions of free individuals and make the systems susceptible to various collective-action 
threats afflicting CPRs. We expand more on these threats to information commons in subsequent 
sections.  
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Information commons are information systems. Hence, to bound the phenomena of information 
commons, we emphasize the representation and token views of information (McKinney Jr et al. 
2010). Information can be viewed as representative of something that exists independently in the 
world as an object, is reflected through symbols and signs,6 and becomes meaningful only after a 
brain (whether organic or computerized) processes it. An image or a video is simply mediums 
transferring static and dynamic visuals with or without auditory sounds—all of which are 
meaningless without a brain to process them. Similarly, words on the screen, numbers, and 
symbols (be they emojis or lines of code) are also just meaningless shapes outside a human context 
(language) that can attach significance to them. Subscribing to the representation view, we can see 
that, even though information commons differ vastly in the ways in which information is 
transferred within them, they are nonetheless information systems. We can also see that the process 
of encoding information into symbols and signs and the subsequent interpretation of them is 
inherently vulnerable. The “pure” form of information typically gets compromised to a certain 
degree because of the limitations of symbol systems and of the processing capabilities of humans 
and computers.  
The token view is also worth considering here. This view asserts that information, while abstract 
in general, acquires a certain tangible property when encoded into symbols and signs via an 
information system in which it can be further molded, moved, stored, repackaged, retrieved, and 
distributed (McKinney jr et al. 2010). The token view suggests that information, despite not being 
a physical resource, nonetheless is “governable.” When providers upload, delete, edit, transfer, and 
publish content, they engage in acts of information governance (as opposed to system governance, 
                                                          
6 Examples include language symbols, such as words, numbers, icons, and codes, as well as sensory signs, such as 
visual images, audible sounds, odorous smells, feelable textures, and tasteable flavors (as of now, the latter three are 
irrelevant for information commons).  
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which is the producers’ domain). Thus, when we posit that information commons are “self-rising,” 
we do not mean that they pop into existence out of nowhere, but rather that the content and 
information in them emerge in an unorganized fashion from the actions of individual providers.  
In Table 2.2, we list exemplary contemporary phenomena that we conceptualize as information 
commons. Because these phenomena and the related literature are still emerging, each 
phenomenon has multiple definitions and names that at times overlap. For instance, we list 
Wikipedia as a wiki, but it may also be viewed as an online community or crowdsourcing platform. 
In this case, we categorize Wikipedia as a wiki because of its unique characteristic of live-time 
editing, which does not exist in most online communities or crowdsourcing platforms. The 
phenomena in Table 2.2 differ in many respects, but they all share the defining characteristics of 
information commons—that is, they are highly accessible, self-rising information systems in 
which stakeholders share an overarching goal, even if some of their individual goals differ and 
possibly conflict within the overarching goal’s framework. 
Table 2.2 Contemporary Forms of Information Commons 
Phenomenon Definition  Examples Shared Goal 
Blogging 
A website that lets anyone write and 
publish a blog 
Blogger, Tumblr, 
Twitter  
Self-expression and 
information sharing  
Crowdsourcing 
A platform in which the contributions of 
numerous self-selected volunteers or 
part-time workers combine with those of 
others to achieve a greater result 
Innocentive, 
Quirky, 
Threadless 
A specific, context-
dependent goal  
Media sharing  
A website that lets people upload and 
share their video clips and/or images with 
the public at large or invited guests 
YouTube, 
Vimeo, 
DailyMotion, 
Instagram, 
Flickr, Imgur 
Creation of a 
repository of videos 
and images 
Online 
community 
A website where people congregate 
online to discuss a subject or to introduce 
themselves for possible in-person 
meetings 
TES, Mumsnet, 
HackerNews 
Creation of a 
dedicated 
information 
resource 
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Online reviews  
A platform on which reviews can be 
posted about people, businesses, 
products, or services 
Yelp, 
TripAdvisor, 
Amazon, IMDB 
Self-expression and 
peer signaling on 
quality of products 
and services  
Open source 
software 
development  
A website that software developers can 
use to control and manage free and open-
source software development 
SourceForge, 
GitHub, BerliOS 
Making software 
publically available 
to study, change, 
and distribute 
Peer-to-peer 
file sharing 
A platform that lets users access media 
files such as books, music, movies, and 
games  
Pirate Bay, 
Torrentz, 
isoHunt 
Sharing of digital 
content 
Two-sided 
electronic 
markets  
A platform that lets individuals post and 
access information for making online or 
offline transactions 
eBay, Craigslist, 
Airbnb, Uber 
Transacting  
Social media  
Online forms of communication that 
individuals and companies use to share 
information with interested parties 
(friends, colleagues, customers, etc.) 
Facebook, 
MySpace, 
Friendster  
Maintaining social 
ties 
Wikis 
A website that lets users collaboratively 
edit its content and structure 
LyricWiki, 
WikiAnswers, 
wikiHow, 
Wikipedia 
Amassing a large 
body of information  
 
2.3 Derived Stakeholder Value 
Realizing the shared goal of an information commons requires that the involved stakeholders 
receive value 7  from it. Accordingly, we define derived stakeholder value as the benefits 
stakeholders gain from being involved with an information commons. Although a significant body 
of IS research has examined IT’s value by focusing on tangible aspects of organizational 
performance, the value of information commons cannot be adequately gauged through such 
traditional measures. In information commons, derived value is context dependent, can be tangible 
or intangible, is realized at both the individual and collective levels, and is likely to be multifaceted. 
Prior research reveals that IT users can derive different types of value including satisfaction, self-
expression, enjoyment, and economic value in different contexts (Agarwal et al. 2000; Kohli et al. 
                                                          
7 The word value can mean either “a person’s principles” or “worth.” Here, we refer to value as worth, which is how 
it is commonly used in research on IT gains (typically referred to as the “value of IT”).  
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2008; Melone 1990); all of these facets of value can be relevant when examining derived 
stakeholder value in information commons. Drawing on these insights, we distinguish between 
three types of actors involved in information commons and propose the following constructs 
related to derived stakeholder value: (i) producer value, (ii) provider value, and (iii) appropriator 
value. 
2.3.1 Derived Producer Value 
We define producer value as the benefits a producer gains from architecting and maintaining the 
infrastructure of an information commons. Information commons support may require an ongoing 
investment, such as to pay the salaries of graphic designers, programmers, and other personnel. 
Information commons’ producers may also carry other costs, such as for domain names, servers, 
cloud storage, search engine optimization, and securing private information. While some 
producers (such as Wikipedia producers) are motivated by intangible factors such as prestige, 
satisfaction, and genuine interest in the overarching goal of the information commons, others are 
profit-seekers and thus measure much of the value they derive in terms of financial gain. Producers 
of two-sided electronic markets may derive economic value by charging providers and 
appropriators brokerage fees, but most information commons are free to use and supported through 
advertising revenue. For that reason, producers’ value is directly dependent on appropriators (the 
segment advertisers are trying to reach) and indirectly on providers, who attract appropriators by 
supplying them with content. Of course, other economic systems also depend on the efficient 
alignment of supply and demand. The difference, though, is that in information commons, 
producers have little control over provision.  
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Table 2.3 Conceptualizing Stakeholder Value 
Concept Detention Examples 
Derived 
Stakeholder 
Value 
The benefits stakeholders gain from 
being involved with the information 
commons 
Benefits vary based on stakeholder type (see 
below) 
Constructs 
Producer 
Value 
The benefits a producer gains from 
architecting and maintaining the 
infrastructure of the information 
commons 
Personal satisfaction, pride, profit 
Provider 
Value 
The benefits a provider gains from 
contributing content to the 
information commons 
Recognition, personal satisfaction and 
enjoyment, rewards 
Appropriator 
Value 
The benefits an appropriator gains 
from accessing the content of the 
information commons 
Satisfaction of a defined need for information 
(such as content, entertainment, software, or 
knowledge) or an undefined need for 
information (discovery and exploration) 
 
2.3.2 Derived Provider Value 
We define provider value as the benefits a provider gains from contributing content to an 
information commons. In some information commons, providers can expect to receive tangible 
value (as in crowdsourcing competitions and two-sided electronic markets), while in others, the 
value that providers derive is intangible. Past work finds that the value here is often a combination 
of personal and social fulfillment (Faraj et al. 2011; Hann et al. 2013; Levina et al. 2014; Ma et al. 
2007; Moon et al. 2008; Tsai et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2013). Past work also finds that providers 
are sensitive to barriers that increase the opportunity cost of participation (Butler et al. 2014), as 
well as that the intensity of provision varies across time and from individual to individual (Gu et 
al. 2007).  
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2.3.3 Derived Appropriator Value 
We define appropriator value as the benefits an appropriator gains from accessing the content of 
an information commons. Appropriators turn to information commons to satisfy a specific need 
for information or an indeterminate need to explore (Aggarwal et al. 2013; Browne et al. 2007; 
Heer et al. 2005). The need for information is personal for each appropriator and varies greatly 
across different information commons—ranging from a need to learn about transaction 
opportunities or the availability of free software to a need to know what members of one’s social 
circle are doing. Often, appropriators seek to satisfy the need to explore or simply to be entertained. 
Regardless of the context, the derived value from satisfying the need for information and discovery 
determines the likelihood of the appropriator returning to the information commons. Like 
providers, appropriators are also sensitive to barriers that raise their opportunity cost of 
information retrieval and exploration (Gu et al. 2007; Jones et al. 2004). Examples of opportunity 
cost-raising barriers include cumbersome registration mechanisms, interfaces that are difficult to 
navigate, cybersecurity issues, and other factors that reduce the seamlessness of appropriation. 
2.4 Sustainability  
For stakeholders to continuously derive value from an information commons, that commons must 
be sustainable. Sustainability, or “the capacity to endure” (Davidson 2014), has long been 
examined in environmental, social, and economic contexts (Malhotra et al. 2013) and has been 
increasingly examined in the context of online communities, virtual teams, online forums, and 
smartphone applications (Adar et al. 2000; Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014; Cheung et al. 2002; 
Ridings et al. 2010; Teo et al. 2003). Drawing on themes from CPR literature and research on the 
sustainability of emerging phenomena related to decentralized online information systems, we 
consider sustainability as the universal purpose of all information commons. Thus, understanding 
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sustainability can help explain why an information commons fails or succeeds in realizing its 
overarching goal, as well as help predict a commons’ trajectory. Accordingly, we define 
sustainability as the capacity of an information commons to continuously provide value to its 
stakeholders. Ultimately, any information commons seeks to realize this overarching goal, whether 
it is achieved through continuous activity, such as the ongoing cataloging of all human knowledge 
or ongoing maintenance of social relationships, or in a more temporary fashion that completes the 
overarching goal and countermands the need for sustainability, such as solving a technical problem 
in an online forum. Drawing on insights from CPR and IS research, we put forward four constructs 
of sustainability: (i) provision, (ii) appropriation, (iii) revitalization, and (iv) equitability.  
Table 2.4 Conceptualizing Derived Stakeholder Value 
Concept Definition Examples 
Sustainability  
The capacity of the information 
commons to continuously provide 
value to its stakeholders 
The micro-blogging platform Pownce is an 
information commons that is no longer 
sustainable due to low provision, appropriation, 
and revitalization 
Constructs 
Provision 
The extent to which providers 
continuously input information into 
the information commons 
Posting and uploading of digital content on 
YouTube, Facebook, eBay, Craigslist, and Digg 
Appropriation 
The extent to which appropriators 
continuously consume information 
from the information commons 
Viewing, reading, listening to, and downloading 
digital content on YouTube, Facebook, eBay, 
Craigslist, and Digg 
Revitalization 
The rate of information provision 
between new and disengaged 
providers  
The rate of digital content contributions between 
new and inactive providers on YouTube, 
Facebook, eBay, Craigslist, and Digg  
Equitability 
The extent to which provision 
activities are distributed across a 
base of providers 
The extent to which a broad rather than narrow 
base of individuals provide information on 
YouTube, Facebook, eBay, Craigslist, and Digg 
2.4.1 Provision 
Without continuous provision of resource units, CPR systems (Ostrom 1990) and information 
commons such as online communities (Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014) eventually dwindle. 
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Provision activities in information commons rely on self-selecting individuals who come from 
vastly different backgrounds (Hann et al. 2013; Shah 2006; Stewart et al. 2006) and who inevitably 
incur the opportunity cost of forfeiting their time and energy for no tangible return (Butler et al. 
2014). As a result, provision of information is diverse and volatile (Daniel et al. 2013; Gu et al. 
2007; Ransbotham et al. 2011). Understanding provision activities is thus important for predicting 
whether an information commons is growing, stabilizing, or declining.  
2.4.2 Appropriation 
Appropriation is a fundamental activity in information commons. In contrast to subtractable 
physical resource systems, which are strained as appropriation grows (for instance, ever-increasing 
hunting can cause extinction), information commons depend on continuous appropriation to 
reinforce network effects (Susarla et al. 2012). In addition, studies find that providers in 
information commons are often motivated by continuous appropriation (Goes et al. 2014; 
Huberman et al. 2009; Jabr et al. 2013; McKinney Jr et al. 2010; Moon et al. 2008; Singh et al. 
2014; Zhang et al. 2013) and that information commons production is often supported by 
appropriation—through subscriptions, advertising, or brokerage fees. As such, understanding 
appropriation predicts the likelihood of an information commons to continue offering value.  
2.4.3 Revitalization 
Sustainability of natural resource systems is often gauged by the rate of resource unit replacement 
(Ostrom 1990). Although information does not decay8 and is not subject to physical depletion, the 
representation view implies that information is interdependent with the agency transferring it 
(McKinney Jr et al. 2010). Thus, attraction-selection-attrition theory (Butler et al. 2014) suggests 
                                                          
8 Information can become outdated, which can be considered a form of decay. 
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that the balance between newly engaged and withdrawing information providers (that is, the 
balance between those who enter and those who are no longer active) is an important predictor of 
an information commons’ capacity to continue generating value for its stakeholders. Accordingly, 
we focus on information revitalization—that is, the difference between contributions of content 
from new providers and those who have become disengaged. A positive balance between provider 
entrance and exit (that is, a net gain in the number of providers) accompanied by an overall 
decrease in provision indicates that the new providers are not as productive as the providers that 
left the system. In contrast, a negative balance between the entrance and exit of providers (a net 
loss in the number of providers) accompanied by an overall increase in provision indicates that the 
burden of supplying the information commons with content is shared among fewer providers. 
2.4.4 Equitability 
Equitability among providers is another important information practice. Although complete 
equitability is unrealistic and impractical, as some providers are naturally better suited for certain 
information provision tasks than others (Kuk 2006), it is important to remember that provision in 
information commons is inherently unpredictable as providers can exit at any time without notice. 
Thus, the greater the dependency on a few information providers, the more vulnerable the 
information commons is to attrition. Political scientists and economists use concentration 
indices—such as the GINI coefficient—as a proxy measure of inequality that endangers the 
sustainability of economies and municipalities (Pulselli et al. 2006; Rodrik 1999). Such 
concentration indices also can be used to understand the distribution of information-provision 
activities; understanding equitability can serve to predict the information commons’ future 
capacity to provide value to its stakeholders.  
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Sustainability is as important for information commons as it is for organisms, ecosystems, and 
other artificial resource systems. On that account, the information commons are not unique. On 
the other hand, as highly accessible, self-rising information systems, information commons operate 
under conditions of uncertainty that make them more vulnerable to collective-action threats than 
traditional information systems.  
2.5 Collective-Action Threats 
Many factors can adversely or positively impact the sustainability of information commons. 
Ostrom identifies six institutional factors that include no less than 43 subfactors for analyzing 
socio-ecological system sustainability (Ostrom 2009). Factors known to reduce information 
commons’ capacity to provide value to their stakeholders include government censorship, 
insufficient internet infrastructure, competition from other information commons, poor design, 
information overload, and lack of capital (Christine Roy et al. 2001; Rochet et al. 2003; Rosen and 
Purinton 2004; Sullivan 2012). Factors that increase information commons’ capacity to provide 
value include uniqueness, virtuous network effects, and provision volume (Butler et al. 2014; 
Ellison et al. 2007; Prahalad et al. 2013). To advance research into these factors and maintain the 
thematic consistency of our theory development effort, we focus on collective-action threats to 
sustainability. Building on the notion of the tragedy of the commons, we conceptualize a 
collective-action threat as an adverse aggregate effect that is caused by individual-level actions.  
Every resource system is subject to collective-action threats caused by the inherent tension 
between community interests and the pursuit of individual gain (Ostrom 1990). Similarly, 
information commons’ inherent properties make them highly vulnerable. In these commons, the 
unchecked freedom of entry, exit, and action, and the lack of centralized authority to ensure that 
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rules are followed and processes carefully executed amplifies the potential for opportunistic 
behavior that can lead to negative consequences, including loss of trust, widespread desertion, and 
even crackdown by external authorities. Synthesizing observations from the literature on CPR 
management (Ostrom 1990) and the commons (Hardin 1968), with insights from the diverse body 
of research on decentralized online information systems, we identify five collective-action threats: 
(i) free-riding, (ii) congestion, (iii) pollution, (iv) violation, and (v) rebellion (see Table 2.5). Our 
theorizing of the five phenomena as collective-action threats is inspired by Hess and Ostrom’s 
(2003) conceptualization of information as a CPR; works on “open commons,” such as roads 
(Benkler et al. 2013); Hardin’s tragedy of the commons logic, which focuses on individual-level 
actions’ adverse effects on collective outcomes in an environment with few restrictions on such 
actions; and examples from the literature on decentralized online information system.  
Table 2.5 Conceptualizing Collective-action Threats 
Concept Definition Examples 
Collective-
action 
Threats 
Adverse aggregate effects that are 
caused by individual-level actions 
Individual-level consumption as a cause of 
global warming; individual-level tax evasion as a 
cause of budget shortages  
Constructs 
Free-riding 
The extent to which appropriators 
evade information provision 
Consuming but not contributing to online 
reviews platforms, discussion boards, online 
support communities, P2P file sharing 
Congestion  
The extent to which appropriation or 
provision clogs the information 
commons 
Slowdowns in video streaming, online gaming 
networks, edit wars on Wikipedia 
Pollution 
The extent to which information fails 
to be aligned with the information 
commons’ overarching goal 
Electronic word-of-mouth manipulation, article 
vandalism, false rumors spread on social media  
Violation  
The extent to which providers break 
internal and external morals, rules, 
and laws 
Copyright violation, cyber bullying, spread of 
hate speech, Illegal pornography 
Rebellion 
The extent to which providers exit 
because of dissatisfaction with 
producer actions 
User revolts in Wikipedia, Reddit, eBay, Uber, 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube 
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2.5.1 Free-riding 
We define free-riding as the extent to which appropriators evade information provision. Extracting 
resource units from a resource system without contributing to it on a large, continuous scale might 
endanger that system’s sustainability (Ostrom 1990). The vast majority of appropriators never 
become active providers, and while information commons differ in their tolerance for free-riding, 
the extent to which appropriators avoid acting as providers will inevitably impact the information 
commons’ sustainability prospects. For instance, if two information commons occupy the same 
niche, yet free-riding is substantially higher in one than the other, then—all else being constant—
we can reasonably predict that the latter is more likely to be sustainable in the long run. Information 
provision carries an opportunity cost that differs vastly across individuals (Butler et al. 2014). If 
people do not think that the benefit of information provision outweighs the cost of forfeiting their 
time and energy, they are more likely to free-ride. Smaller information commons, in which each 
additional provider has a relatively high marginal effect, are especially vulnerable to free-riding. 
Free-riding behavior is cited as a problem in OSS development (Baldwin et al. 2006), P2P file-
sharing networks (Adar et al. 2000; Hosanagar et al. 2010; Johar et al. 2011; Karakaya et al. 2009; 
Rodrigues et al. 2010), discussion forums (Gu et al. 2007; Wasko et al. 2005), and reputation 
mechanisms (Liu et al. 2004). 
Although free-riding may adversely impact an information commons, some important caveats 
must be considered. Prior research finds that free-riding might be desirable in situations where 
certain providers are better suited to performing a specific task (Kuk 2006). In addition, an 
information commons with no free-riding would likely cause information overload and reduce the 
information value. Finally, evasion of information provision does not necessarily imply free-
riding, as appropriators can help the information commons in other ways. For instance, some 
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appropriators might not contribute information, but may act as “ambassadors” and attract others 
to join (Susarla et al. 2012) or may engage in mundane but necessary tasks, such as editing and 
organizing content in wikis (Beck et al. 2015). When appropriators make contributions other than 
direct provisioning of information, they are playing a constructive role toward sustaining the 
commons and therefore should not be viewed as free-riders. 
2.5.2 Congestion 
We define congestion as the extent to which appropriation or provision clogs an information 
commons. CPRs are vulnerable to spikes in appropriation that, in extreme cases, can render the 
entire system highly ineffective. Unlike CPRs, information commons can experience congestion 
both in appropriation and in provision. Although information is a non-subtractable resource, the 
digital infrastructure that supports its provision and appropriation is a subtractable resource (Johar 
et al. 2011; Listanti et al. 2000). For instance, when Facebook was initially expanding its market 
penetration, it did so in a deliberately gradual manner to make sure it had enough server capacity 
to support growing demand to avoid congestion in appropriation (“How Facebook Became,” 
2016). Other examples of information commons that are most susceptible to congestion include 
video-streaming platforms (Plissonneau et al. 2012; Setton et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2001) and P2P 
file-sharing networks (Johar et al. 2011). Appropriators might get frustrated with and even lose 
trust in information commons that suffer from frequent congestion. Loss of trust inevitably leads 
to a certain level of desertion that, if large scale, can undermine a commons. Another type of 
congestion problem that may frustrate appropriators is information overload caused by rapid 
provision (Rosen and Purinton 2004). A rapidly changing Facebook feed that makes it difficult for 
appropriators to keep up is an example of information overload caused by congestion in provision. 
Congestion in provision is a rather unique problem; it occurs because of the distinctive freedom of 
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access and action that information commons afford (similar to the problem academics experience 
as they try to get published). Congestion in provision is especially problematic in the most 
accessible information commons, which are open to immediate simultaneous provision from 
multiple providers (Aaltonen et al. 2015; Kittur et al. 2008). 
At present, most information commons do not suffer from serious appropriation congestion. 
However, it is not yet clear what will happen if appropriation increases as projected and broadband 
infrastructure fails to keep pace (Bolcskel et al. 2001). Similarly, internet service providers’ (ISPs) 
objective to undermine Net Neutrality can potentially increase congestion in appropriation for 
some information commons (Hahn et al. 2006).  
2.5.3 Pollution 
We define pollution as the extent to which information fails to be aligned with an information 
commons’ overarching goal. Not unlike natural resources, information is subjected to 
contamination (data contamination in research is one example of pollution). According to the 
representation view of information, in its “pure” form, high-quality information should be true in 
relation to its source object, comprehensible, subjectively sincere, and socially legitimate 
(Habermas 1985). However, this high standard is rarely achieved, and all information is potentially 
subject to misrepresentation. Unintentional, occasional pollution from low-quality provision raises 
the search cost for appropriators (Gu et al. 2007) and decreases the information’s overall value to 
appropriators (Rice 2012). Deliberate pollution, in the form of information manipulation and 
vandalism, can also undermine the trust in a commons and reduce appropriation. Information 
manipulation is cited as a problem in online review platforms (Anderson et al. 2014; Dellarocas 
2005; Hu et al. 2012; Mayzlin et al. 2012), wikis (Kittur et al. 2008; Shachaf et al. 2010; Stvilia et 
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al. 2007), blogs (Schmierbach et al. 2012; Thorson et al. 2010), and two-sided electronic markets 
and online communities (Gibbs et al. 2010; Gu et al. 2007; Toma et al. 2008). 
2.5.4 Violation 
We define violation as the extent to which providers break internal and external morals, rules, 
and laws. Crime and the violation of social rules and norms demonstrate how the actions of 
relatively few individuals can cause substantial societal damage. This violation strains public 
resources, reduces productivity, and, in extreme situations, disintegrates entire communities 
(Covington et al. 1991). In information commons, high accessibility inevitably increases the 
potential for violation, as opportunistic actors can blend in and exploit the freedom of movement 
with relative ease. The literature is full of examples of violation activities in information commons: 
stalking, bullying, fraud, proliferation of hate speech, distribution of illegal pornography, 
coordination of hacking activities, coordination of terrorism, identity theft, intellectual property 
theft, and more (Beale et al. 2007; Gerstenfeld et al. 2003; Gross et al. 2005; Hinduja et al. 2010; 
Juvonen et al. 2008; Mishna et al. 2009; Svensson et al. 2012). In addition to violating social rules 
and norms, when widespread, such violations threaten information commons’ sustainability in two 
distinct ways: (i) they cause information providers and appropriators to leave, thus reducing 
appropriation, provision, and, subsequently, revitalization and equitability; (ii) they prompt a 
challenge from powerful actors, such as ISPs or criminal or civil litigation systems. Depending on 
the nature of the offense, the impact of outside challenges on information commons might be small 
or large, ranging from a virtual slap on the hand to a fine, or, in some instances, a complete 
shutdown.  
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2.5.5 Rebellion  
We define rebellion as the extent to which providers exit because of dissatisfaction with producer 
actions. Although most people do not actively participate in them, revolutions drive history. As 
such, they are in effect a collective-action phenomenon, where the actions of a relatively small 
number of individuals have an impact that extends beyond the local level (Muller et al. 1986). To 
date, the academic literature does not pay much attention to online rebellions, but that does not 
mean they do not occur. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many prominent information commons 
experienced some sort of user revolt at one time or another. Over the years, the mainstream media 
and the blogosphere have reported instances of rebellion in different information commons, 
including eBay, Digg, Wikipedia, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Uber, and Reddit 
(Auerbach 2015; Clifford 2010; Feuer 2016; Graham-Felsen 2006; Gross 2012; Johnson 2009; 
Nizza 2007; Shih 2013; Tkacz 2011). While in-depth research on user rebellion is lacking, we can 
identify three recurring triggers: (i) unwelcomed changes to infrastructure features, (ii) 
unwelcomed changes to policies, and (iii) producers’ heavy-handedness in dealings with core 
providers.  
As with free-riding, congestion, pollution, and violation, rebellion is a potential issue in any 
situation involving people. In the information commons, however, these five basic threats are 
amplified by high accessibility. Given this, we now examine how information commons can 
remain sustainable in the face of such threats and thus continue to benefit their stakeholders. 
2.6 Polycentric Governance Practices 
  
To reduce the provenance and impact of collective-action threats and promote sustainability, 
traditional information systems rely on hierarchical structures. Such structures are characterized 
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by relative stability, compartmentalization, specialization, formal authority and procedures, and 
the use of behavioral and outcome controls. In contrast, systems characterized by open access are 
more likely to achieve long-term stability through polycentric governance practices that balance 
local-level autonomy and inclusivity with local-level boundary-setting and accountability 
mechanisms (Ostrom 1990). Drawing on these distinctions, we propose that the extent to which an 
information commons integrates polycentric governance into its design determines how likely it is 
to fend off collective-action threats and thereby promote sustainability.  
The concept of polycentricity was originally developed by Polanyi (1951) to describe the 
continuous state of flux in science. Unconstrained by an intervening central authority, scientists, 
according to Polanyi, are free to exercise independent, original thought and engage in 
experimentation (Aligica et al. 2012). A decade later, the concept of polycentricity was adapted as 
an alternative to the movement toward greater centralization and consolidation of public services 
administrations in US metropolitan areas (Ostrom et al. 1961). The notion that multiple 
crosscutting and autonomous jurisdictions are better positioned to administer public services than 
a single centralized authority stood in stark contrast to the prevailing wisdom of political scientists 
and policymakers at the time. Defined as an arrangement in which independent elements mutually 
adjust to create orderly relationships within a larger system of rules (Ostrom 1972), polycentricity 
is characterized by self-emerging spontaneity, self-governing independence, and flexibility arising 
from resilience to experimentation with rules. Researchers have found polycentricity to be an 
effective alternative to top-down centralization in municipal governance (Ostrom 1972) and, 
subsequently, to characterize sustainable CPR systems (Ostrom 1990). People in resilient CPR 
systems are generally more engaged in the system’s governance, actively participating in decision-
making about adjusting rules and working together to monitor those who fail to abide by rules 
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agreed to by the majority of people. Ostrom (1990) identified eight principles underlying most 
flourishing CPRs that were absent in failing systems (see Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6 Ostrom’s Polycentric Governance Principles  
Principle Explanation  
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw units from the 
CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR 
itself. 
2. Congruence between 
appropriation and provision 
rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or 
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to 
provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money. 
3. Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in 
modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator 
behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the 
appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of 
the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or by both. 
6. Conflict-resolution 
mechanism 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local 
arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between 
appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of 
rights to organize 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not 
challenged by external governmental authorities. 
8. For CPRs that are parts of 
larger systems: Nested 
enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, 
and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises. 
 
We draw on Ostrom’s eight governance principles of successful CPR systems and on insights from 
empirical research on decentralized online information systems to synthesize polycentric 
governance practices applicable to the information commons context. To balance faithfulness to 
the reference literature and our theorizing, we examined points of overlap between Ostrom’s 
principles with the different IS context, while avoiding artificial retrofitting as Whetten et al. 
(2009) recommend. To make the theoretical framework useful—and not overbearing—we 
consolidated some principles to arrive at four general polycentric governance practice constructs: 
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(i) boundary regulation, (ii) incremental adaptation, (iii) shared accountability, and (iv) provider 
recognition.  
Table 2.7 Conceptualizing Polycentric Governance Practices 
Concept Definition Examples 
Polycentric 
Governance 
Practices 
Practices that promote order, where 
independent elements make mutual 
adjustments to order relationships 
with one another within a general 
system of rules 
In the physical world: local overlapping 
municipalities, the European Union, 
communes; Online: Wikipedia, eBay, Pirate 
Bay, YouTube 
Constructs 
Boundary 
Regulation 
The extent to which rules and 
technical infrastructure features afford 
information provision and 
appropriation consistent with the 
information commons’ overarching 
goal  
Restricting posting of content that does not 
meet the information commons’ overarching 
goal; requiring providers to register 
Incremental 
Adaptation 
The extent to which changes in 
infrastructure and rules are gradually 
introduced and providers and 
appropriators are actively involved in 
shaping them 
Gradually updating technical features; small-
scale experimentation with new features and 
rules; seeking feedback from users on new 
rules and features  
Shared 
Accountability  
The extent to which rules and 
features afford peer monitoring and 
gradual sanctioning to support 
appropriate behavior and dispute 
resolution in an information commons  
Peer monitoring mechanisms, such as 
mutual ratings and rankings, helpfulness 
cores, and flagging rule violators; gradual 
punishment of rule violators, from a warning 
to banning 
Provider 
Recognition 
The extent to which providers are 
acknowledged by peers, 
appropriators, and producers 
 
Subscriptions; followers; digital status 
symbols, such as icons and avatars; “likes”; 
direct feedback 
 
Polycentric governance is an abstract notion that manifests in an information commons’ rules and 
technical infrastructure features. Rules underlie the governance of social activities by playing an 
integral part in ordering relationships, responsibilities, and expectations (Ostrom 1972). CPR 
research identifies three levels of rules—constitutional, collective choice, and operational (Ostrom 
1990)—that are also present in information commons. Terms of use by an information commons’ 
providers and appropriators exemplify constitutional rules. Policies that change in response to 
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petitioning or protest of providers and appropriators exemplify collective choice rules (for 
example, Facebook relaxed its “real name” policy in response to user protests). Operational rules 
are exemplified by an information commons’ day-to-day implicit and explicit norms of conduct, 
such as reciprocity (Mathwick 2002), sharing (Sharratt et al. 2003), trust (Ridings et al. 2002), and 
the language used in communications (Wilson et al. 2002). Without a mechanism to help enforce 
them, rules are no more than general directives or recommendations. Therefore, constitutional, 
collective choice, and operational rules are often reflected in an information commons’ 
infrastructure features, including the graphical interface and mechanisms for access (such as 
login), provision, appropriation, self-identity representation, communication, and peer monitoring 
(Bartelt et al. 2014; Jabr et al. 2013; Kane et al. 2012; Levina et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2007). Next, 
we detail the four practices of polycentric governance.  
2.6.1 Boundary Regulation 
Although CPR systems need boundaries primarily to control appropriation and avoid overuse 
(Ostrom 1990) (Principle 1, Table 2.6), information commons need boundaries to control 
provision, including the type of information allowed, provider conduct, and the degree to which 
providers can mask their identities. Typically, producers set these boundaries when they design 
the information commons, expressing the boundaries both in the commons’ constitutional rules 
and in its infrastructure features. However, drawing on Ostrom’s observations, we assert that 
provider engagement here is important: the more involved providers are in establishing boundaries, 
the more effective those boundaries are in regulating the information commons. The literature 
finds that setting effective boundaries based on overarching goals and other contextual 
characteristics of online communities and OSS projects is positively associated with outcomes 
(Bonaccorsi et al. 2003; Butler et al. 2012; Di Tullio et al. 2013; Hertel et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa et 
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al. 2011; Ren et al. 2007). Twitter’s 140-character tweet restriction is an example of the alignment 
of Twitter’s constitutional rules and technical features with its overarching goal of being a 
microblogging platform. In addition to regulating types of content, information commons must 
regulate anonymity, which is increasingly found to be associated with various types of illicit 
behavior (Christopherson 2007; Coffey et al. 2004; Suler et al. 1998). Extant research suggests 
that the tolerable degree of anonymity depends on the commons’ overarching goal (Ren et al. 
2007). Drawing on polycentricity theory and empirical findings, we assert that involving providers 
in decisions on boundary setting such as these increases the likelihood of sustainability.  
2.6.2 Incremental Adaptation 
A central notion in polycentricity theory is the idea that incremental, bottom-up experimentation 
with rules will likely lead to the discovery of better rules for governance (Ostrom et al. 1962) 
(Principles 2 and 3, Table 2.6). Because each information commons is different in its overarching 
goal, governance rules and infrastructure features must be specific to its evolving circumstances. 
It is particularly important that providers and appropriators—who experience these dynamics close 
up—influence decisions about rules and features. As the literature finds, autonomy of provision 
spurs creativity (Bishop 2007; Hertel et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2012; Roberts et al. 2006), and such 
creativity should not be restricted to content provision alone; it should also be leveraged to 
incrementally adapt an information commons’ rules and infrastructure features to support its 
overarching goal. Although we still lack substantial empirical evidence on the impact of provider 
involvement in adjusting the rules and infrastructure features of an information commons, past IS 
literature on the benefits of user involvement in systems design (Ives et al. 1984; Kujala 2003) and 
recent literature on the sustainability of startups (Blank 2013; Ries 2011) suggest that open 
communication and feedback between producers and participants can increase the speed and 
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quality of adaptations to rules and infrastructure features. 
2.6.3 Shared Accountability  
Effective, low-cost, local-level conflict-resolution mechanisms that gradually enforce sanctions on 
rule violators, together with peer monitoring, are associated with CPR sustainability (Ostrom 
1990) (Principles 4, 5 and 6, Table 2.6). In many cases, community members can effectively 
identify perpetrators long before outside police authorities get involved (Bennett et al. 2009). Thus, 
a system of accountability arising bottom-up from within the community can be a robust 
alternative to top-down policing. Similarly, research finds peer monitoring in information 
commons to be an effective governance mechanism (Chua et al. 2007; Feller et al. 2008; Gu et al. 
2007; Wall et al. 2007). As long as the offense is not severe, sanctioning of rule violators should 
be carried out in a gradual manner (Ostrom 1990). In information commons, this gradual 
sanctioning typically starts with a warning, then escalates step-by-step to temporary—and in rare 
cases, permanent—blocking of access. Drawing on polycentricity theory and empirical findings, 
we assert that, in an information commons, rules and infrastructure features that enable shared 
accountability among community members increase the likelihood of sustainability.  
2.6.4 Provider Recognition 
In information commons, provision activities typically carry no monetary payoff and are instead 
motivated by an array of personal and social factors. Although producers cannot easily impact the 
providers’ personal motivation, they can enhance the social experience by incorporating various 
peer-recognition features. For some time now, IS researchers have recognized that providers are 
“strongly driven by status and status seeking, and that status sentiments are more likely to sustain 
virtual communities” (Lampel et al. 2007). As such, research finds that recognition—whether from 
peers, appropriators, or producers—is a major driver of continuous provider participation. Hence, 
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direct feedback, rating schemes, helpfulness scores, “likes,” number of followers or subscribers, 
and digital status symbols such as icons and badges have a lasting positive impact on provision 
(Goes et al. 2014; Jabr et al. 2013; Levina et al. 2014; Moon et al. 2008; Ren et al. 2007; Von 
Krogh et al. 2012). Despite differences in overarching goals and contexts across information 
commons, it is safe to assume that rules and infrastructure features that facilitate recognition 
increase provider satisfaction, which in turn increases the likelihood that providers will remain 
involved in the information commons.  
2.7 Theorizing Relationships 
Our discussions thus far have focused on the terms—that is, the concepts and their elaboration into 
constituent constructs—of the theory of PIC (see Tables 2.1, 2.3–2.5, and 2.7). We now build on 
these terms to theorize the relationships between concepts and their constituent constructs9 as 
summarized in the conceptual model in Figure 2.1.  
We draw on the logic of profile constructs and ideal profiles (Doty and Glick 1994; Venkatraman 
1989) and on the literature on decentralized online information systems to conceptualize the 
relationship between sustainability and its underlying constructs—that is, continuity of provision, 
continuity of appropriation, revitalization, and equitability. We suggest that these four constituent 
constructs contribute in non-substitutive and mutually reinforcing ways to achieving the 
sustainability necessary for providing continuous value to stakeholders (whether providers, 
appropriators, or producers). Accordingly, we suggest that an ideal sustainability profile for an 
                                                          
9 We follow the notion of “ladder of abstraction” (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 115) in differentiating between concepts and 
constructs. Concepts are semantically defined but cannot be operationalized, while constructs are mid-level 
abstractions and may be operationalized. 
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information commons is one with high values for each of its constituent constructs, as explained 
in the following.  
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model 
Continuous appropriation and provision are fundamental forces that feed each other (Huberman et 
al. 2009; Jabr et al. 2013; Moon et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2013) in the same way that supply and 
demand are fundamental to all economic activities involving resource exchange. The need to 
revitalize provision to sustain the information commons might not be as immediately evident, as 
it depends on the provider attrition rate (Butler et al. 2014). However, this revitalization is as 
essential to determining the sustainability prospects of an information commons as the resource 
replacement rate is to determining the sustainability of natural and economic systems (Ostrom 
1990). Providers in information commons typically enter and exit the commons at a rapid rate, 
which, when positive, generally injects new energy and content (Ransbotham et al. 2011). As long 
as revitalization in provision remains flat or is positive, the information commons is likely to 
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remain sustainable. However, if the rate between exit of old providers and entry of new providers 
is negative for a prolonged period of time, the likelihood of the commons remaining sustainable 
will decrease. Because provision carries an opportunity cost, the smaller the provider pool, the 
greater the relative burden on the remaining providers; this can cause some of them to leave, further 
aggravating the problem. Revitalization goes hand in hand with equitability. The need for equitable 
distribution of provision might not be immediately evident; after all, a few providers can often 
sustain a software development project or a discussion forum for some time. Further, equitability 
is rarely perfect—some providers are, by nature, more likely to be more involved than others. Still, 
we assert that the efforts of a few providers cannot sustain most information commons for an 
extended period of time because it increases the systemic vulnerability to provider dropout. Thus, 
low revitalization or low equitability is likely to lead to reduced provision which, in turn, is likely 
to reduce appropriation. Hence, we make the following core premise in our theorizing:  
Premise: Sustainability of an information commons requires that continuous 
provision and appropriation as well as revitalization and equitability in provision 
operate as a system of complements. 
 
We draw on the nature of collective action in relation to individual action (Morgeson and Hofmann 
1999), the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), and the literature on decentralized online 
information systems to theorize how collective-action threats that impact information commons’ 
sustainability emerge from individual actions. We suggest that information commons’ inherent 
openness creates conditions for individuals to engage in free-riding, congestion, pollution, 
violation, and rebellion. These actions are motivated by individual reasons that may be at odds 
with the common good. While less-inclusive information systems can rely on hierarchical 
mechanisms to control such actions by individuals, providers in information commons are largely 
unaccountable to the system producers. An information commons’ producer cannot threaten to fire 
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underperforming providers or incentivize them with pay increases and promotions. For good and 
for bad, an information commons is a virtual space in which people—who often feel anonymous 
(regardless of how anonymous they really are)—upload, post, publish, broadcast, and code content 
and information freely. Just as multiple small individual actions can create remarkable aggregate 
outcomes (Benkler et al. 2006; Tapscott et al. 2008), self-interested actions by individuals can 
propagate to create adverse aggregate effects, including large-scale free-riding, congestion, 
pollution, violation, and rebellion that threaten the long term sustainability of an information 
commons. Even if a small proportion of providers and appropriators mistakenly or deliberately 
violate the rules—whether those rules pertain specifically to the commons or violate the law—the 
aggregate effect becomes larger than the sum of individual parts in commons that involve 
hundreds, thousands, or even millions of actors. Because the amount of content provisioned and 
appropriated and the number of providers and appropriators differs considerably across 
information commons, the threshold at which self-interested, contrary-to-common-good 
individual actions emerge as collective-action threats is not clear-cut. However, given that open 
access is characteristic of information commons, the potential exists for collective-action threats 
to emerge from such individual actions.  
Research shows that collective-action threats may adversely impact provision, appropriation, 
revitalization, and equitability in information commons. For instance, pollution from low-quality 
provision raises the search cost for appropriators (Gu et al. 2007) and decreases their capacity to 
derive value (Rice 2012); this can lead to reduced appropriation. As another example, when free-
riding increases, revitalization and equitability are likely to decline (Adar et al. 2000; Butler et al. 
2014; Johar et al. 2011; Karakaya et al. 2009). Past research also offers evidence of the adverse 
impact of congestion and violation on provision and appropriation activities (Beale et al. 2007; 
Polycentric Information Commons   V. Mindel  2018 
 
62 
 
Finn 2004; Johar et al. 2011; Setton et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2001). At this stage, we could not identify 
research on the negative impact of rebellion, but substantial anecdotal evidence exists on the toll 
user revolts take on provision and appropriation (Auerbach 2015; Clifford 2010; Feuer 2016; 
Graham-Felsen 2006; Gross 2012; Johnson 2009; Nizza 2007; Shih 2013; Tkacz 2011). Hence, 
we propose: 
Proposition 1: Collective-action threats, which emerge from the aggregation of 
the free-riding, congestion, pollution, violation, and rebellion actions of 
individual providers and appropriators, create vulnerabilities for an information 
commons’ sustainability. 
Next, we draw on Ostrom’s observations on the association between the eight governance 
principles (Table 2.6) and CPR resilience (Ostrom 1990) and the literature on decentralized online 
information systems to theorize that boundary regulation, incremental adaption, shared 
accountability, and provider recognition constitute a set of polycentric governance practices that 
reduce collective-action threats in information commons while increasing their sustainability. For 
instance, achieving a compromise between providers and producers on content boundaries is likely 
to reduce rebellion, which can improve the sustainability of the information commons (Jarvenpaa 
et al. 2011). Establishing and enforcing boundaries can reduce pollution and help focus provision 
activities for an information commons that has close-ended overarching goals, such as in OSS 
(Bonaccorsi et al. 2003; Hertel et al. 2003). Indeed, failure to set boundaries on the type of 
information allowed into an online community can lead to rebellion and the subsequent exit of 
some providers (Butler et al. 2012; Ren et al. 2007). Further, incremental adaptation of rules and 
infrastructure features can reduce instances of pollution, violation, and congestion in provision 
(Aaltonen et al. 2015; Dellarocas 2005). For instance, Wikipedia’s adoption of the three-revision 
rule helped mitigate pollution and congestion threats in provision (Aaltonen et al. 2015). As part 
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of the infrastructure, algorithms that incorporate feedback from other providers (peer monitoring 
and shared accountability) can substantially reduce pollution and violation in P2P file-sharing 
networks (Kamvar et al. 2003). When producers unilaterally initiate major changes to the 
infrastructure’s graphic design and technical features or change the content or anonymity 
boundaries, a significant proportion of providers are likely to feel dissatisfied and leave (e.g., Gross 
2012; Johnson 2009; Nizza 2007). Incremental adaptation that takes stakeholder feedback into 
account is likely to reduce dissatisfaction and rebellion (Halfaker et al. 2011). Shared 
accountability—as manifested through ratings, flagging, and “report abuse” and “report problem” 
features—can also reduce violation and pollution (Diakopoulos et al. 2011; Jøsang et al. 2007; 
Resnick et al. 2000). Identity features that act as recognition features and reduce anonymity have 
a positive effect on provision and appropriation (Forman et al. 2008; Ma et al. 2007). Recognition 
from peers, appropriators, or producers has a lasting effect on sustainability outcomes as it 
motivates continuous provision (Goes et al. 2014; Levina et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2007) and helps 
entice appropriators to join the ranks of providers, subsequently reducing free-riding and 
increasing revitalization. Hence, we propose that:  
Proposition 2: Polycentric governance practices of boundary regulation, shared 
accountability, incremental adaptation, and provider recognition (a) reduce 
collective-action threats and (b) increase the sustainability of an information 
commons. 
Finally, we draw on literature from CPR governance (Ostrom 1990) and decentralized online 
information systems to suggest that the sustainability of an information commons creates the 
conditions for deriving stakeholder value, which in turn impacts the evolution of the commons’ 
polycentric governance practices. Provision of content and information allows appropriators to 
derive value by fulfilling their need for information (Aggarwal et al. 2013; Browne et al. 2007; 
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Heer et al. 2005). It also allows producers to derive economic value from having a volunteer 
“workforce” provide the bulk of the content (Ramaswamy et al. 2010). Appropriation allows 
producers to derive value from selling ads, while also motivating providers who, in part, derive 
value from feeling needed (Burke et al. 2009). Revitalization and equitability help an information 
commons maintain the flow of provision over time and allow appropriators and producers to 
continue to derive value. In contrast, when sustainability decreases, the stakeholders’ capacity to 
derive value also decreases, creating a spiral effect that endangers the long-term sustainability of 
the information commons. 
The need to change the information commons’ polycentric governance practices relates inversely 
to the level of derived stakeholder value. On the one hand, when all stakeholders derive value, 
producers do not need to make urgent changes to the information commons’ rules and 
infrastructure features supporting boundary regulation, incremental adaptation, shared 
accountability, and provider recognition. In such cases, producers have the opportunity to 
experiment with incremental modifications to enhance the overall experience for providers and 
appropriators. On the other hand, the urgency to change polycentric information practices 
increases when the value derived diminishes for one or more stakeholder groups. The importance 
of receiving and adapting to stakeholder feedback is recognized as crucial for the sustainability of 
organizations (Anderson 1999; Ries 2011); we suggest it is similarly important for information 
commons. As the creators of the information commons, producers ultimately control changes to 
the system rules and infrastructure features. Thus, they should create the conditions for monitoring 
the extent to which appropriators and providers derive value from participation to preserve their 
capacity to derive value. For instance, Angie’s List, a pioneer of online consumer peer reviews, 
made major changes to its boundary regulation on access in an attempt to reverse a long-running 
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trend of decline in its provision and appropriation (Tuttle 2016). It took Angie’s List a long time 
to realize that when providers and appropriators do not derive value, they go somewhere else (to 
yelp.com, for instance) and might never return. Had Angie’s List included an effective feedback 
process on the value derived by its providers and appropriators, its producers might have been able 
to act more urgently to stop its decline by adjusting its access boundaries. Hence, we propose: 
Proposition 3: A sustainable information commons allows stakeholders to 
continuously derive value. 
 
Proposition 4: Feedback on value derived by stakeholders impacts the evolution 
of an information commons’ polycentric governance practices. 
 
2.8 Discussion  
 
While the openness and decentralization of PIC can spur incredible outcomes (Benkler et al. 2006; 
Tapscott et al. 2008), they also inevitability create systemic vulnerabilities that cannot be fully 
curtailed by traditional means of hierarchical command and control. Information governance that 
relies on voluntarily participation is a major paradigm shift—one that challenges previous 
assumptions of organized production and its underlying mechanisms (Baldwin et al. 2011; Benkler 
et al. 2006; Füller et al. 2006). As the dust of the first wave of mostly empirical research is settling 
and researchers provide evidence of the effectiveness of crowdsourcing, open source, and other 
forms of peer production (Benkler et al. 2006; Tapscott et al. 2008), the need for new theories 
capable of explaining the observed outcomes becomes more pronounced (Arazy et al. 2011; 
Johnson et al. 2014; Majchrzak 2009; Von Krogh et al. 2012). Most online forums, communities, 
and OSS projects are, in fact, inactive (Butler et al. 2012; Ren et al. 2007; Stewart et al. 2006; 
Wiertz et al. 2007), suggesting that the majority of initiatives become unsustainable following a 
phase of initial growth. In our theorization, we therefore focused on the common denominator—
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the existential question of sustainability—to develop the theory of PIC by iterating between 
insights from literature on CPR governance and from decentralized online information systems.  
Building on the notions of the tragedy of the commons and polycentricity, we focused on 
identifying the sustainability threats that impact information commons with few restrictions on 
participation. The aim of our theoretical framework is to explain outcomes related to sustainability 
and governance in information commons as well as to predict (Gregor 2006) the likelihood of 
achieving sustainability and the subsequently derived stakeholder value. As such, our merging of 
insights from CPR governance literature and empirical evidence from a diverse body of 
decentralized online information systems research under a single theoretical platform contributes 
to existing literature by (i) unifying multiple related empirical insights under one overarching 
framework; (ii) conceptualizing decentralized online information systems as information 
commons, which, in turn, helps us better understand questions related to their sustainability in the 
face of collective-action threats; and (iii) explicating the polycentric governance practices that 
reduce the threats’ prevalence and mitigate their impact.  
We are not the only ones to use the CPR governance literature to study intangible resources. 
Previous research has convincingly employed this framing to examine governance of radio 
spectrums, budgets, and even academic databases (Brubaker 1997; Evans 2005; Hess et al. 2003; 
Kranich et al. 2008; Soroos 1982). From these efforts, we have learned that it is implausible and 
inappropriate to directly translate all CPR and commons research to advance IS theory. Instead, 
we have endeavored to achieve a balance between remaining faithful to the reference literature 
(Whetten et al. 2009), our own “creative imagination” (Bacharach 1989. pp, 498), and the body of 
literature on decentralized online information system to which we aim to contribute. Hence, 
although digital information is vastly different from physical resources—especially when it comes 
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to subtractability and cost of distribution—information commons are nonetheless susceptible to 
sustainability threats that are traditionally more associated with physical systems, including free-
riding, pollution, congestion, violation, and rebellion.  
Besides being used to study intangible resources, the CPR governance and collective-action 
literature has also been sporadically employed to frame IS studies, including knowledge exchange 
in electronic communities of practice (Wasko et al. 2004), governance of Wikipedia (Forte et al. 
2009), congestion in P2P networks (Johar et al. 2011), governance of OSS development (Markus 
2007; O’Mahony 2003), and adoption and growth of regional health information infrastructures 
(Constantinides et al. 2014). What sets our work apart from these previous studies is our ambition 
to create a new theoretical platform for studying a diverse body of decentralized online information 
systems.  
Thus, we position the theory of PIC beside other emerging theories aimed at explaining and 
predicting outcomes in decentralized online information systems, such as the theory of social 
dynamics in online fields (Levina et al. 2014). While the latter builds on Bourdieu’s notion of 
social fields and provides a theoretical framing for studying power relations across various user-
generated content platforms, our theory builds on Ostrom’s work and focuses on governance and 
sustainability. Both theories draw inspiration from well-established reference literature to tailor 
new, context-specific frameworks for advancing our understanding of emerging online 
technologies from different, yet complementary, vantage points. We also see the theory of PIC as 
a theoretical expansion of previous empirical and theoretical work of IS scholars who examined 
the sustainability of online communities; their work provides important insights on the role of 
community size, communication patterns, member attrition, and the opportunity cost of 
participation (Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014; Butler et al. 2012). 
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The theoretical framework we present here opens new avenues of research and further theoretical 
expansion. Future research can look more deeply at the role of rules and infrastructure features in 
information commons governance. The web design literature provides a good starting point for 
identifying and classifying the different features (Andrews 2002; Zhang et al. 2000). We need to 
better understand how infrastructure features reflect governance rules and how they facilitate a 
balance between autonomy and restrictiveness. Theoretical and empirical work that takes the next 
step, opening the black box of infrastructure components to see how they reflect governance 
practices that reduce sustainability threats’ prevalence and impact, can help us better understand 
the technical aspects of information commons. 
Future research might also more deeply examine the nuanced differences between types of actors 
in an information commons. Although stakeholders share a certain overarching interest in the 
context of an information commons, producers, providers, and appropriators are by no means 
homogenous. Some researchers already distinguish between actors according to their engagement 
levels, splitting providers and appropriators into “core” and “peripheral” actors (Gu et al. 2007; 
Scacchi 2004; Setia et al. 2012). Those distinctions are important for understanding dynamics in 
PIC; for instance, engaging all providers in decision-making about changes is much harder than 
engaging only the core providers, who are also more likely to provide valuable feedback. 
Differentiating types of appropriators can also enhance our understanding of sustainability. For 
example, a distinction can be made between casual and intensive appropriation, as well as between 
patterns of passive content appropriation and active ambassadorship that promotes social 
contagion effects (Susarla et al. 2012) that increase an information commons’ sustainability 
through enhanced revitalization. Similarly, differentiating between types of producers can help us 
better understand their role in governance. Many information commons are produced by profit-
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seeking owners who, besides ensuring the system’s sustainability in the face of collective-action 
threats, work to establish a profitable business model to achieve financial sustainability. The 
tension between these two goals should be further examined. For instance, appropriators and 
providers in an information commons might perceive advertisements as pollution and personal 
data mining as a violation. In addition to expanding our understanding of the nuances in 
stakeholder groups, we also suggest that future research examines the important differences within 
each stakeholder category based on their network characteristics. Examining the co-evolution of 
the network structure of stakeholders with the governance of an information commons can provide 
insights into how network characteristics constrain or enable the emergence of polycentric 
governance and the continuous derivation of value by producers, providers, and appropriators. 
Finally, our conceptualization of information commons may also be applied to study different 
types of organizational systems, including open-access enterprise-sponsored systems, 
crowdsourcing initiatives created for soliciting ideas or specific tasks from information providers 
(such as MyStarbucksIdea), support forums created by organizations to allow users to help each 
other, and enterprise-based social networks that are generally highly open for participation and 
likely to encounter collective-action threats (which might reduce their sustainability and potential 
for providing value) and thus can benefit from integrating polycentric governance practices. 
The main objective of the PIC theory is to help frame future inquiry in a broad research field with 
too few theoretical alternatives. The contextual differences between various information 
commons, and the inevitable differences between study objectives, necessitate the 
operationalization of measures specific to each research; pollution in P2P file-sharing, for 
example, manifests differently than pollution in user-generated online review systems. Given this, 
the different concepts and constructs we developed and linked should be adapted in future 
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qualitative and quantitative studies aimed at explaining and predicting (Gregor 2006) sustainability 
and subsequently derived stakeholder value in information commons. Our generative lexicon of 
concepts can be used for framing both process and variance studies (Van de Ven 2007). Process 
studies might examine how policies and infrastructure features that reflect polycentric governance 
practices are adjusted over time. Process studies can also enhance our understanding of different 
information commons’ life cycles—from their inception to maturity—through either a positivist 
prism, focusing on measuring variables, or through an interpretive prism, aiming at explaining the 
phenomena of interest (Van de Ven 2007). Case studies and netnography (Kozinets 2002) can be 
used to enhance our understanding of how stakeholders derive value, how sustainable information 
practices unfold, and how polycentric governance practices emerge in response to or anticipation 
of unfolding collective-action threats.  
The proposed theoretical framing can also be used to investigate changes in sustainable 
information practices, collective-action threats, and stakeholder value following a change in an 
information commons’ policies and infrastructure features. Such discoveries can be made through 
lab and field experiments, as well as through selective examination of naturally occurring quasi 
experiments—such as examining outcomes before and after a major change that reflects 
polycentric governance practices. In addition, many of the proposed constructs can be 
operationalized to be observed directly and used in inferential analysis of relationships between 
variables. For instance, it is possible to examine the relationship between free-riding and 
revitalization by measuring traffic and provision activities. Latent constructs can also be further 
developed to measure stakeholder perceptions psychometrically. At this early stage, we wish to 
avoid boxing the nascent theoretical framework into any particular research methodology; we urge 
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future researchers to freely adapt and dissect the proposed concepts and constructs to fit their 
specific lines of inquiry. 
The role of science is to zoom in and break down phenomena into small components. Periodically, 
however, it must zoom out to examine how the puzzle pieces fit together on a grander scale. Our 
main goal was to take many pieces from a growing body of mostly empirical literature and try to 
order them in a way that facilitates a certain degree of cross-fertilization between different streams 
of research related to the overarching phenomenon of information commons. As such, we hope 
that the resulting theoretical framework will prove general enough to invite further theoretical 
expansion and specific enough to be immediately useful for framing empirical studies examining 
research questions related to the governance and sustainability of diverse types of decentralized 
online information systems. 
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APPENDIX: Reviewed IS Research  
 
In the 1980s, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University’s Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis set out to inform CPR theorization by collecting, sorting, and 
analyzing more than 5,000 empirical field studies of local resource management arrangements 
around the world. The scrutinized field studies did not use CPR or polycentricity language, and 
they came from many different research domains. To unify this diverse body of empirical work 
from various research domains, the workshop scholars chiefly focused on identifying the structural 
characteristics of the observed resource system, the attributes and behaviors of its members, the 
rules it used, and the reported outcomes (Ostrom 1990). This grounded theory approach was 
complemented by the use of existing taxonomy and terminology from polycentricity research on 
public-goods governance (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom 1972). The resulting framework became the 
theoretical foundation that was used over the next 30 years in CPR governance research (also 
known as collective-action research). The framework was constantly refined by new insights from 
the field, but its core remained intact. 
On a much smaller scale, we emulated this process. Using core taxonomy and terminology from 
CPR governance research to guide our effort, we systematically reviewed 73 studies of 
crowdsourcing, social media, online communities, electronic word of mouth, peer-to-peer 
networks, and open source software (OSS) development published in Information Systems 
Research and MISQ between 2005 and 2014. We specifically focused on extracting and translating 
insights on rules and their use, stakeholders and their derived value, evidence on collective-action 
threats, evidence of Ostrom’s eight governance principles, infrastructure and design features 
(environmental conditions in CPR research), and outcomes (direct effects and indirect 
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externalities). We knew that we would not be able to reach the scope of Ostrom and her colleagues; 
we therefore explicitly focused our effort on the leading IS research journals to provide a solid 
foundation. To frame our discussion, we also branched to other sources for additional evidence 
and perspectives. Although our primary goal is theory development and not a literature review, we 
did use literature review methodologies to find relevant research on decentralized online 
information systems. We followed Jane Webster and Richard Watson’s (2002) guidelines for 
performing effective literature reviews and examined reference sections to identify many other 
important papers published in ISR or MISQ prior to 2005, as well as in other IS (and related fields’) 
journals. To avoid saturation, we cast our net wide (but not too wide), using standard search 
engines such as Ebscohost and Google Scholar to find additional relevant material. This inclusive 
strategy gave us additional evidence and insights to substantiate the many theoretical claims and 
propositions presented in this manuscript. 
Table A: Overview of the Reviewed IS Research 
Paper Focus Findings Adaptation Coding 
Aggarwal 
& Singh 
2013 
Examines the 
impact of 
technology blog 
content on 
venture capitalist 
investor 
decision-making 
Blogs impact decision-
making in the initial 
screening stage, but less 
so in subsequent stages. 
Blog exposure gave 
better negotiation 
leverage to the entities 
featured. 
Information commons 
reduce appropriators’ 
search costs and impact 
their decision-making. In 
some contexts, 
information commons 
increase competition 
between appropriators for 
information, leading to 
increased transaction 
costs. 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value; 
exploration 
August et 
al. 2013 
Examines 
different 
strategies 
available to firms 
that sponsor 
OSS 
development  
When contributors are 
efficient, sponsors should 
pursue an open software 
license and focus on 
capitalizing through 
support services sales. 
When contributors are 
inefficient, sponsors 
should pursue a 
proprietary license and 
sell each software unit 
Producers of information 
commons are often profit 
motivated and must 
determine the best 
strategy when seeking a 
balance between 
attracting effective 
providers and preventing 
free-ridership from 
competitors who benefit 
production; 
producer 
value; 
provision; 
free-riding 
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separately to prevent 
contributors from 
spreading the software 
code to competitors. 
from sitting on the 
sidelines. 
Bapna et 
al. 2008  
Examines how 
much surplus 
consumers 
receive from 
eBay auctions 
Consumers extract a 
median surplus of at 
least $4 per eBay 
auction. In 2003, eBay’s 
auctions generated at 
least $7.05 billion in total 
consumer surplus. 
Transaction information 
commons directly benefit 
appropriators. 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
Bartelt & 
Dennis 
2014 
Examines how 
instant 
messaging and 
discussion 
boards are 
utilized and 
subsequently 
impact quality of 
outcomes 
Genre rules can have 
powerful effects that 
significantly impact team 
behavior and 
performance. 
Operational rules are as 
important as 
infrastructure for the 
sustainability of 
information commons. 
Language used and built 
into a commons’ features 
influence its operational 
rules, and those rules 
become increasingly 
entrenched in the fabric 
of the commons over 
time. 
operational 
rules; 
infrastructure; 
incremental 
adaptation 
 
Bateman 
et al. 
2011 
Presents a 
model to unify 
conflicting 
explanations as 
to why people 
engage in 
discussion 
forums  
Members may have 
psychological bonds to a 
particular online 
community based on 
need, affect, and 
obligation. Each form of 
community commitment 
has a unique impact on 
each behavior, with 
need-based commitment 
predicting thread 
reading; affect-based 
commitment predicting 
reply posting and 
moderating behaviors; 
and obligation-based 
commitment predicting 
only moderating 
behavior. 
The need for information 
drives appropriation. The 
need to make an impact 
drives provision. A sense 
of obligation to the 
commons drives certain 
providers to monitor their 
peers. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value; 
operational 
rules; shared 
accountability 
Browne et 
al. 2007 
 
Examines why 
people stop 
searching for 
information 
online 
Mental list and single 
criterion rules are used 
more often when people 
search for relatively 
straightforward 
information (such as 
product information); 
people use magnitude 
threshold and 
representational stability 
Appropriation of 
information depends on 
the appropriator’s task. 
More complex and 
abstract tasks, such as 
diagnosis, adhere to the 
representational stability 
rule. Other rules for 
stopping information 
searches are: mental list, 
difference threshold, 
appropriation; 
appropriation 
value 
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rules when searching for 
complex information. 
single criterion, and 
magnitude threshold. 
Butler & 
Wang 
2012 
Examines the 
extent to which 
boundary 
reshaping in an 
online 
discussion 
community 
impacts member 
dynamics and 
responsiveness 
An inherent tension 
exists between content 
boundary management 
and reshaping the 
community. Reshaping 
behaviors within a 
discussion forum affect 
member dynamics and 
community 
responsiveness in both 
positive and negative 
ways. 
Information commons 
content boundaries 
impact information 
governance. Flexible 
boundaries afford more 
engaged provisioning, 
while greater 
engagement leads to 
changes in the commons 
that potentially drive 
other providers away.  
boundary 
regulation; 
provision; 
operational 
rules; 
constitutional 
rules; 
provision; 
pollution; 
rebellion  
 
Butler et 
al. 2014 
Presents a 
model of key 
latent constructs 
influenced by 
technology 
choices and the 
possible causal 
paths by which 
they dynamically 
effect 
communities  
Community size and 
resilience directly affect 
the community’s 
sustainability over time. 
The lower the 
participation costs and 
the more focused the 
issue, the better chances 
for sustainability.  
Critical mass of provision 
and appropriation directly 
impact the sustainability 
of the information 
commons. The lower the 
opportunity cost of 
provision and 
appropriation and the 
more focused the 
subject, the more likely 
the commons is to be 
sustainable. 
provision; 
appropriation; 
boundary 
regulation 
 
Chan & 
Ghose 
2014 
Examines the 
connection 
between 
Craigslist and 
spread of HIV  
Entry of Craigslist is 
related to a 15.9% 
increase in HIV cases. 
The analysis suggests 
that the site entry 
produces an average of 
6,130–6,455 cases of 
HIV infection in the 
United States each year. 
Analyses reveal that 
nonmarket-related casual 
sex is the primary driver 
of the increase in HIV 
cases. 
Example of a direct effect 
of a polycentric 
information commons 
that is also a social 
externality. 
appropriation; 
appropriation 
value 
Chau & 
Xu 2012 
Proposes a 
framework for 
gathering 
business 
intelligence from 
blogs by 
automatically 
collecting and 
analyzing blog 
contents and 
bloggers’ 
interaction 
networks 
Networks of bloggers 
have different centers of 
influence. The networks 
are decentralized and do 
not exhibit pattern 
structures, such as star 
and hierarchical 
structures. These implicit 
communities have been 
formed spontaneously. 
Polycentric information 
commons are 
decentralized and 
spontaneously arising. 
provision; 
polycentricity  
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Chua et 
al. 2007 
Examines how 
community 
members 
monitor fraud on 
auction sites 
Communities monitor for 
fraudulent behavior. 
Engaged community 
members can often 
detect suspicious activity 
better then outside 
official authorities. 
Tactics are: direct 
intervention against 
those who commit fraud, 
notification of other 
community members, 
and involvement of 
outside authorities. 
Opportunistic providers 
can pollute information to 
gain at the expense of 
other members in the 
information commons. 
Members of the 
information commons 
often combat pollution 
directly and by involving 
outside authorities.  
pollution; 
violation; 
provision; 
shared 
accountability 
 
Claussen 
et al. 
2013 
Examines how 
rule modification 
by Facebook 
that rewarded 
quality app 
developers with 
access to 
Facebook’s 
users impacted 
application 
development  
The rule change led to 
the development of new 
applications with 
significantly higher user 
satisfaction.  
Producers have control 
over rules and 
infrastructure design that 
impact information 
provision and subsequent 
appropriation. Loosening 
control and increasing 
polycentricity, for 
example, can lead to 
improved provision and 
more satisfied 
appropriators. 
production; 
provision; 
infrastructure; 
constitutional 
rules; 
incremental 
adaptation; 
boundary 
setting 
Daniel et 
al. 2013 
Examines the 
impact of 
diversity among 
developers on 
engagement and 
market success 
Variation in participants’ 
contribution-based 
reputation is positively 
associated with success. 
Diversity in the spoken 
language and country of 
participants has a 
negative impact on 
community engagement, 
but a positive effect on 
market success. 
Dispersion in project 
participant roles 
positively influences 
community engagement 
and market success. 
Diversity’s impact on 
market success is 
conditional on the project 
stage; it is most 
important at the very 
beginning and toward the 
end. 
Polycentric governance 
of information facilitates 
greater diversity that, in 
turn, enhances 
outcomes. Diversity is 
especially important in 
the birth stage and when 
reaching maturity. During 
the growing stage, 
diversity is less desirable. 
provision; 
polycentricity  
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Dellaroca
s 2005 
Presents a 
theoretical 
analysis of 
reputation 
mechanism 
design in trading 
environments 
with pure moral 
hazard 
Reputation mechanisms 
on eBay mitigate moral 
hazard and adverse 
selection, thus increasing 
efficiency in markets. No 
one-size-fits-all set of 
guidelines exists for 
reputation mechanism 
design. Depending on 
the context, reputation 
mechanisms can act as a 
sanctioning tool or as a 
signaling mechanism. 
An externality of 
reputation information 
commons is increased 
efficiency in markets. No 
one-size-fits-all set of 
guidelines exists for 
reputation mechanism 
design. Depending on the 
context, reputation 
mechanisms can act as a 
sanctioning tool or as a 
signaling mechanism. 
pollution; 
producers; 
shared 
accountability 
Dewan & 
Ramapra
s 2012 
Examines the 
relationship 
between music 
blogs and music 
sales 
Music sharing reduces 
the sales of songs. 
P2P sharing causes an 
economic externality.  
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
Dewan & 
Ramapra
s 2014 
Examines the 
impact of music 
blogs on music 
consumption 
Niche music receives 
substantially more 
attention in blogs. This 
increased exposure 
leads to more 
consumption of niche 
music. 
Polycentric information 
commons produce more 
diverse information; that, 
in turn, leads to a 
decrease in the influence 
of monocentric 
information sources.  
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value; 
exploration 
 
Duan et 
al. 2009 
Examines 
whether 
individuals 
exhibit a herd 
behavior pattern 
when choosing 
software online 
Individuals do exhibit 
herd behavior when 
choosing software; online 
reviews have particular 
impact on the demand for 
lesser known products. 
The opportunity cost of 
information search 
impacts the intensity of 
appropriation. Online 
reviews improve the odds 
of marginal products and 
services at the expense 
of more established 
products and services; 
this displacement can be 
viewed as an externality. 
appropriation 
Feller et 
al. 2008 
Examines how a 
network of firms 
manages OSS 
development 
Infrastructure impacts 
social interactions. 
Shared goals and norms 
drive collaboration, along 
with the ability to impose 
collective sanctions on 
those who violate the 
shared norms. 
Polycentric governance 
of information commons 
is a socio-technical 
process in which social 
interactions that drive 
governance of 
information depend on 
the physical architecture 
of the commons. Shared 
norms and goals drive 
collaboration between 
providers.  
production; 
provision; 
boundary 
setting; 
shared 
accountability  
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Fitzgerald 
2006 
Challenges the 
notion that open 
source is driven 
by volunteers 
and the notion of 
collective 
intelligence  
The open source model 
moved toward greater 
“professionalism” with 
more planning and less 
spontaneous and paid 
contributors. 
Open source moves from 
open access regime to 
common property regime. 
regimes 
Forman et 
al. 2008 
Examines the 
relationship 
between identity 
disclosure and 
perceived 
usefulness of 
reviews 
Community norms impact 
disclosure of personal 
identity. Disclosure of 
identity of review 
contributors increases 
the perceived 
helpfulness of the review. 
In addition, prevalence of 
identified reviewers 
increases sales.  
Information commons’ 
operational rules and 
norms impact providers’ 
choice to disclose their 
identity. Appropriators 
tend to value information 
from non-anonymous 
providers. A culture of 
transparency adds value 
to the information 
commons. 
operational 
rules; 
provision; 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
Ghose 
2009 
Examines how 
online reviews 
impact seller 
and product 
uncertainty, 
consequently 
impacting 
information 
asymmetry  
Reputation signals do not 
mitigate seller or product 
uncertainty. 
This contradicts other 
findings. Online reviews 
do not mitigate 
information asymmetry; 
information does not 
relate a positive 
externality.  
externalities  
Goes et 
al. 2014 
Examines the 
change review 
writers undergo 
as users 
subscribe to 
them 
As review writers 
become more popular, 
they produce more 
reviews and more 
objective reviews; 
however, their numeric 
ratings also 
systematically change 
and become more 
negative and more 
varied. 
Information providers are 
motivated by demand 
from appropriators. As 
time passes, they learn to 
provide more objective 
information. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
appropriation 
Goh et al. 
2013 
Compares the 
impact of both 
user-generated 
content and 
marketed 
content on 
purchasing 
behavior 
User-generated content 
is significantly more 
influential in driving 
purchasing behavior. 
Polycentric information 
can have a direct 
economic impact on its 
subject source. 
direct effect; 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value  
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Gu et al. 
2007 
Examines how 
users value 
virtual 
communities 
and how virtual 
communities 
differ in their 
value 
propositions 
Quality of information is 
more important than 
quantity for the growth of 
virtual investment 
communities. 
Information quality is 
more important than 
quantity because of the 
cognitive cost associated 
with processing 
information. High-quality 
information is more likely 
to lead to externalities. 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
Gu et al. 
2012 
Examines the 
difference in 
impact of 
reviews on sales 
of a “high-
involvement” 
product 
(cameras) 
between reviews 
found on the 
retailer site and 
external review 
sources 
External sources play a 
greater role in impacting 
sales of high-involvement 
products compared to 
reviews posted on the 
retailer site. 
Appropriators triangulate 
information from different 
information commons 
prior to making major 
purchasing decisions.  
appropriation 
Hahn et 
al. 2008 
Examines how 
OSS 
development 
teams are 
formed and how 
individuals make 
decisions about 
which teams to 
join  
Past ties between 
initiator and collaborator 
impact present 
participation. 
Past relationships 
between core providers 
and peripheral providers 
play a role in the 
formation of provision 
network on a polycentric 
information commons. 
provision 
Han et al. 
2012 
Examines the 
business and 
strategic value 
of an open, 
collaborative 
organizational 
form in which 
participating 
firms co-create 
economic value 
by jointly 
developing and 
co-marketing of 
IT innovations 
Participating firm’s 
market valuation 
increased; not 
participating benefited 
rivals due to knowledge 
spillover. Heterogeneity 
is not associated with 
value creation. 
Development of radical 
innovation adds more 
value to the firm. Limited 
access and decision 
authority is better than 
unlimited access and 
decision authority.  
Polycentric governance 
of information creates 
synergy, especially when 
rules and boundaries are 
well defined. 
Stakeholders’ level of 
heterogeneity is 
irrelevant to quality. 
Information created spills 
over— and other firms 
benefit as well.  
production; 
boundary 
setting  
 
Hann et 
al. 2013 
Examines 
whether open 
source 
programmers 
get higher 
wages due to 
their experience 
in open source  
Credentials obtained 
from programming OSS 
are associated with up to 
an 18% increase in 
wages. 
Volunteer information 
providers can potentially 
benefit financially. 
provision; 
provider 
value  
Polycentric Information Commons   V. Mindel  2018 
 
90 
 
Hardaway 
& Scamell 
2012 
Proposes 
changes in the 
academic 
research 
publication 
process to 
incorporate 
greater 
transparency, 
inclusivity, and 
openness in 
reviews as well 
as publication 
decisions. 
An inclusive review 
process that is open to 
participants (but not too 
open) will improve the 
quality of published 
research and the fairness 
of the publication 
process. 
Polycentric information 
commons of academic 
information will increase 
the suitability and quality 
of academic research 
over time. 
production; 
producer 
value; 
provision; 
provider 
value 
Hildebran
d et al. 
2013 
Examines how 
feedback from 
other users 
impacts the 
satisfaction and 
creativity of 
individuals 
designing their 
own products  
Early feedback from 
community members 
reduces the boldness of 
the design and reduces 
creativity.  
Providers check and 
balance each other to a 
point of reducing 
creativity and individual 
expression. 
provision 
Howison 
& 
Crowston 
2014 
Presents a 
theory about 
building artifacts 
out of 
information and 
the 
organizational 
affordances of 
those artifacts 
OSS development is 
more about work 
redesign than about how 
to run an effective virtual 
team, and more about 
task work in context than 
generic team work 
processes. Layerability, 
open distribution, 
irrevocable contribution, 
and time are conditions 
that contribute to open 
source success. 
Polycentric information 
commons is individual 
rather than team driven. 
Polycentric information 
commons are 
characterized by 
compartmentalization 
and incremental 
improvements that can 
take time. Information 
providers respect the 
autonomy of other 
providers. 
provision; 
production; 
incremental 
adaptation 
Hsien-
Tung & 
Bagozzi 
2014 
Examines the 
factors driving 
contribution in 
virtual 
communities  
Social identity and group 
norms drive decisions to 
contribute. 
Information providers in 
the commons assume a 
certain collective identity 
relating to the 
information’s subject 
matter. 
provision; 
provider 
value; shared 
goal; provider 
recognition 
Jabr et al. 
2014 
Examines the 
factors driving 
contribution in 
online technical 
support forums  
Peer feedback 
mechanisms are 
associated with better 
quality and technical 
support compared to 
quantity feedback (just a 
count of contribution). 
The results indicate that 
problem solvers are 
partially motivated by the 
need to be recognized by 
their peers. 
Information providers 
value the feedback from 
other providers and are 
partially motivated by it. 
Existence of peer 
feedback mechanisms 
thus increase the 
likelihood of long-term 
sustainability of the 
information commons.  
provision; 
provider 
value; 
provider 
recognition; 
infrastructure 
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Jarvenpa
a & 
Majchrzak 
2010 
Commentary on 
how trust 
asymmetry, 
deception, and 
novelty impact 
collaboration 
online 
Participants manage 
vigilant interactions in 
different ways. 
Conflict between 
providers impacts 
relationships in 
information commons. 
provision; 
violation; 
shared 
accountability  
Johar et 
al. 2011 
Examines how 
P2P congestion 
impacts 
propensity to 
share 
Sharing increases as the 
network grows, reducing 
congestion. The 
community can reduce 
the impact of free-riding 
by increasing individual 
sharing. 
Information is a resource 
that can be subjected to 
congestion and free-
riding. 
free-riding; 
congestion; 
provision 
Johnson 
et al. 
2014  
Examines the 
emergence of 
power law 
distributions via 
the mechanisms 
of preferential 
attachment, 
least efforts, 
direct 
reciprocity, and 
indirect 
reciprocity 
No single unitary 
motivation drives 
participation in online 
communities but many 
different—sometimes 
competing, sometimes 
complimentary—
motivations exist. New 
participants can become 
popular at any time, 
replacing previously 
popular participants as 
social centers. 
Polycentric governance 
of information is dynamic, 
and new autonomous 
centers of authority 
emerge and disappear 
constantly without a 
pattern. Multiple 
individual motivations 
drive information 
provision. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
polycentricity  
Kane et 
al. 2014 
Outlines a set of 
theoretically 
distinct 
questions raised 
by the 
introduction of 
social media in 
and by 
organizations to 
formulate a 
research agenda 
Social media introduces 
questions of platform 
design into social 
network analysis. Social 
media gives users 
capabilities that they do 
not possess in traditional 
offline social networks; 
these capabilities include 
visualizing network 
structure and searching 
for content in a network 
without using relational 
ties. 
The architectural features 
of the polycentric 
information commons 
directly impact 
stakeholders and 
indirectly impact the 
prospects of long-term 
sustainability. Polycentric 
information commons 
characterized by 
transparency and open 
access to information. 
production; 
appropriation;  
Levina & 
Arriaga 
2014 
Presents an 
analytical lens 
for studying 
social status 
production 
processes 
across different 
user-generated 
content 
platforms  
Content production is a 
social process that 
occurs in different 
specific contexts in which 
different status signals 
play a role. 
Provision of information 
is a context-dependent 
social process. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
provider 
recognition 
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Li & Hitt 
2010 
Tests whether 
online reviews 
more closely 
reflect a 
product’s quality 
or its price value 
Online review are biased 
towards the product 
value—that is, ratings 
reflect price more than 
they reflect value. 
An example of 
unintentional information 
pollution.  
provision; 
appropriation; 
pollution 
Ludwig et 
al. 2014 
Examines to 
what extent 
communication-
style alignment 
impacts 
participation 
quantity and 
quality 
Stronger trend of 
alignment leads to 
greater participation 
quantity and quality. At a 
community level, greater 
synchronicity in the 
linguistic style across all 
community members 
fosters individual 
members’ participation 
behavior. 
Operational rules (norms) 
of communication impact 
provision. 
operational 
rules;  
provision 
Lukyanen
ko et al. 
2014 
Examines the 
impact of 
modeling 
decisions on 
information 
quality in 
amateur 
content-creation 
settings 
Participants provide more 
accurate information 
when classifying 
phenomena at a more 
general level. In addition, 
we found greater overall 
accuracy when 
participants could provide 
free-form data compared 
to a condition in which 
they selected from 
constrained choices. 
Polycentric information 
provision benefits from 
freedom of action. 
provision; 
autonomy 
Ma & 
Agarwal 
2007 
Examines a 
feature that 
supports 
reputation and 
identity 
management, as 
well as archives 
of past 
interactions, to 
assess the 
impact on online 
community 
members’ 
satisfaction and 
willingness to 
contribute  
IT artifacts that allow 
reputation management 
improve perceived 
identity verification, 
cause greater 
satisfaction, and increase 
contributions by 
members.  
Appropriators and peer 
providers prefer to 
interact with those who 
have an online persona 
(not complete 
transparency or complete 
anonymity) and also 
need to have an online 
persona to feel validated 
by others. Interaction with 
those who have an online 
persona leads to greater 
satisfaction with the 
commons and increases 
the likelihood of 
provision. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
appropriation; 
operational 
rules; peer 
recognition  
Ma et al. 
2014 
Examines the 
impact of pre-
release movie 
piracy on movie 
sales 
Sales decrease 
approximately 20% due 
to piracy. 
Example of an economic 
externality that impacts 
the film industry.  
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value; 
externalities 
McLure 
Wasko & 
Faraj 
2005 
Examines why 
people 
contribute to 
People contribute their 
knowledge when they 
perceive that it enhances 
their professional 
Provision of information 
is driven by mostly 
personal reasons and not 
by social motivations. 
provision; 
provider 
value 
free-riding 
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discussion 
forums 
reputations, when they 
have the experience to 
share, and when they are 
structurally embedded in 
the network. Surprisingly, 
contributions occur 
without 
regard to expectations of 
reciprocity from others or 
high levels of 
commitment to the 
network. 
Polycentric information 
commons tolerate free-
riding.  
Meservy 
et al. 
2014 
Examines how 
individuals filter 
knowledge 
encountered in 
online forums 
Peripheral cues (source 
expertise and validation) 
have a greater influence 
on knowledge filtering 
decisions than does the 
content quality of the 
solution.  
Appropriators rely on 
heuristics when 
evaluating information. 
Provider’s status and 
perceived expertise are 
used as a proxy for 
quality of information. 
appropriation 
Moon & 
Spraull 
2008 
Examines the 
role of feedback 
on participation 
in online 
communities  
In forums that 
incorporate a systematic 
quality feedback system, 
answer providers 
contribute more often 
and technical problem 
resolution is more 
effective. Volunteers who 
produce higher-quality 
contributions have longer 
participation duration, 
and participation duration 
is positively associated 
with community 
maintenance 
contributions. 
Feedback from 
appropriators and peer 
providers motivates 
provision and increases 
its overall quality. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
provider 
recognition  
Nan & Lu 
2014 
Examines 
patterns of crisis 
management 
arising 
unintentionally 
from 
decentralized 
and 
spontaneous 
actions in an 
online 
community 
during an 
earthquake 
Fluctuation of message 
content themes in this 
online community served 
to energize continuous 
input from ordinary 
organization members. 
Self-organization is a 
viable source of 
organizational order that 
complements the 
traditional centralized 
plan-and-control 
approach. 
Polycentric information 
governance is 
characterized by diverse 
provision patterns that 
attract further diverse 
provision, resulting in 
synergy.  
polycentricity; 
provision 
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Kumar & 
Benbasat 
2006 
Examines how 
an infrastructure 
that facilitates 
consumer 
reviews and 
recommendation
s impacts the 
perceived 
usefulness and 
social presence 
of the website 
incorporating 
them 
Infrastructure that 
facilitates consumer 
reviews and 
recommendations 
impacts positively the 
perceived usefulness 
and social presence of 
the website incorporating 
them. 
Producers of platforms 
that facilitate provision of 
eWOM benefit because 
appropriators of eWOM 
information see the 
websites as more useful 
and pleasing. 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
Oh et al. 
2013 
Examines the 
factors causing 
rumors on twitter 
Source ambiguity is the 
most important factor in 
creating rumors, followed 
by personal involvement; 
anxiety is the least yet 
marginally important 
rumor-causing factor. 
Information source 
ambiguity impacts 
information provision. 
provision; 
pollution 
Park et al. 
2013 
Examines the 
impact of 
information on 
expectation and 
trading behavior 
in the context of 
a stock 
investment 
discussion forum 
Investors tend to cluster 
with similar investors and 
generally do not benefit 
from the diversity offered 
by the community.  
Appropriators do not 
always benefit from the 
diversity of information 
found in the information 
commons, as different 
biases lead them to 
primarily seek information 
that suits their 
preconceived knowledge. 
appropriation 
Pavlou & 
Dimoka 
(2006) 
Examines the 
impact of written 
reviews on trust 
in sellers and 
the price 
premiums they 
receive from 
their online 
reputation 
Written reviews explain 
50% of the variance in 
price premiums, 
suggesting that reviews 
act a information 
asymmetry-mitigating 
mechanism. 
Polycentric governance 
of reputation information 
mitigates information 
asymmetry in markets, 
subsequently increasing 
market efficiency.  
appropriation; 
shared 
accountability 
Ransboth
am & 
Kane 
2011 
Examines 
longitudinally 
how retention 
and turnover of 
contributors 
impacts the 
status of 
Wikipedia 
articles 
Membership retention 
relates in a curvilinear 
fashion to effective 
collaboration: it’s 
important in initial stages, 
but becomes less 
important and turnovers 
become more important; 
moderate levels of 
membership turnover are 
desirable. 
Polycentric information 
provision is dynamic as 
providers replace 
previous core providers 
in a continuous manner. 
provision; 
polycentricity  
Ray et al. 
2014 
Develops the 
concept of 
engagement in 
online 
communities as 
Engagement is a key 
factor driving knowledge 
contribution, but not 
necessarily satisfaction. 
Engagement and 
Providers and 
appropriators must feel a 
sense of engagement to 
gain a sense of collective 
purpose that leads to 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
appropriation 
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key variable for 
driving 
knowledge 
contribution and 
diffusion across 
the community 
through word of 
mouth. 
Engagement 
and satisfaction 
are parallel 
mediating forces 
at work in online 
communities 
satisfaction together 
drive positive word of 
mouth and subsequent 
growth. 
information provision and 
appropriation. 
Engagement motivates 
providers of information 
and, together with 
satisfaction, is associated 
with being a member of 
the information commons 
and drives positive word 
of mouth, contributing to 
its growth. 
Ren et al. 
2012 
Examines how 
identity and 
communication 
features impact 
the attachment 
of online 
community 
members over 
time 
Group identity features 
that allow members to 
see profiles and facilitate 
repeated exposure to the 
group activities impact 
traffic twice as much as 
interpersonal bond 
features. 
Providers and 
appropriators are more 
motivated by group 
identity than personal 
ties.  
provision; 
provider 
value; 
appropriation; 
provider 
recognition 
Rice 2012 
Examines how 
reputation is 
evolving and 
how it affects 
transactions 
Reputation mechanisms 
are significant for 
purchase decisions 
regarding specific sellers, 
while specific reputation 
information is associated 
with the overall decision 
of whether to transact in 
the marketplace. When 
reputations are 
increasingly noisy, 
buyers are less likely to 
react negatively to poor 
ratings and are more 
likely to give sellers the 
benefit of the doubt.  
Polycentric governance 
of reputation information 
mitigates information 
asymmetry in markets, 
subsequently increasing 
markets efficiency. 
Pollution of reputation 
information confuses 
appropriators and 
decreases efficiency.  
appropriation; 
pollution; 
shared 
accountability 
 
Setia et 
al. 2012 
Examines the 
role of peripheral 
developers in 
the creation of 
OSS 
Peripheral developers 
are instrumental, 
especially when the 
project reaches maturity. 
While core information 
providers are important at 
the beginning, as time 
passes, peripheral 
providers become 
increasingly important. 
provision 
Shi et al. 
2014 
Examines 
patterns of 
information 
diffusion on 
Twitter 
Unidirectional (weak) 
rather than bidirectional 
social ties exhibit the 
fastest pattern of 
information diffusion as 
users pass content to 
other users. 
Information diffusion is 
the fastest through 
encounter dynamics of 
provision and 
appropriation in 
information commons. 
provision; 
appropriation; 
relationship 
dynamics 
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Singh et 
al. 2011  
Examines to 
which extent 
individuals 
involved in OSS 
development 
learn from their 
own experience 
and from 
interacting with 
peers  
Learning from peers is 
most important for 
developers. Developers 
benefit from discussions 
they initiate in the middle 
of the project; at the 
beginning and end of the 
project, developers 
benefit more from 
participating in 
discussions initiated by 
others. 
Providers learn both from 
other providers 
(especially in the middle 
of the project) as well as 
from their own 
experiences. 
provision; 
operational 
rules 
Singh et 
al. 2013 
Examines how 
text 
characteristics 
attract readers 
of blogs 
Sentimental textual 
characteristics (negative, 
positive, or controversial 
tone) attract and retain 
readers, while quality 
textual characteristics 
(grammar, readability, 
and comprehensiveness) 
have no impact on 
attracting readers, but do 
impact retention. 
Appropriators care more 
about the content of the 
information than about 
how well it presented; 
however, presentation 
plays a role in retaining 
appropriators. 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
Smith & 
Telang 
2009 
Looks at the 
effect of piracy 
on sales of 
movies 
Giving away content in 
one channel can 
stimulate sales in a paid 
channel if the free 
content is sufficiently 
differentiated from its 
paid counterpart. 
Piracy (information 
commons) can have a 
positive effect of sales if 
the content is sufficiently 
differentiated.  
externalities; 
direct effect 
Stewart & 
Gosain 
2006 
Examines the 
role of ideology 
in OSS 
Generally, team 
members’ adherence to 
the tenets of the OSS 
community ideology 
impact trust and 
communication in teams, 
which positively relates to 
effectiveness.  
Provision outcomes in 
relationship dynamics are 
impacted by ideological 
alignment between 
providers. 
provision; 
provider 
value; shared 
goal 
Stewart et 
al. 2006  
Develops and 
tests a model of 
the impacts of 
license 
restrictiveness 
and 
organizational 
sponsorship on 
two indicators of 
success: user 
interest in, and 
development 
activity on, OSS 
development 
projects 
Users are mainly 
attracted to OSS projects 
initiated by 
noncommercial interests 
that do not employ 
restrictive licenses. 
Identity of the sponsor of 
the projects impacts 
developer participation. 
Ideological 
synchronization between 
producers and providers 
is a condition for an 
information commons’ 
ability to attract providers 
and achieve 
sustainability. Providers 
prefer constitutional rules 
that are flexible.  
provision; 
provider 
value; 
production; 
producer 
value; 
constitutional 
rules; 
rebellion  
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Turel et 
al. 2011 
Examines how 
user cognition 
and ultimately 
usage intentions 
toward an 
information 
technology are 
distorted by 
addiction to the 
technology 
The level of online 
auction addiction distorts 
the way the IT artifact is 
perceived. 
Over appropriation can 
lead to addiction. 
appropriation 
 
von Krogh 
et al. 
2012 
Reviews the 
literature on the 
motivations of 
OSS developers 
Current research on the 
motivation of software 
developers does not go 
deep enough.  
Provision of information 
is motivated by multiples 
variables. 
provision; 
provider 
value 
Wen et al. 
2013 
Examines the 
effect of 
copyright 
infringement 
lawsuits both on 
the open source 
development 
projects being 
sued and on 
related projects 
that employ the 
disputed 
technology  
Projects that exhibit high 
technology overlap with 
the disputed OSS 
experienced a 15% 
greater decline in user 
interest and 45% less 
developer activity than 
projects in the control 
group; OSS projects that 
are intended for business 
and specific to the 
disputed OSS platform 
had a 34% greater 
decline in user interest 
and 86% less developer 
activity than the control 
group. 
Challenge from the 
outside by powerful 
interests threatens the 
sustainability of a 
polycentric information 
commons. The impact is 
stronger on providers 
than on appropriators. 
provision; 
appropriation 
Xu & 
Zhang 
2013 
Examines the 
impact of firm 
information on 
Wikipedia on 
insider trading 
Information on Wikipedia 
causes firm bosses to 
disclose negative news 
about the firm’s financial 
performance faster, 
reducing the potential 
gain from insider trading. 
An example of market 
externality of an 
information commons. 
appropriation; 
externalities 
Yan & 
Tan 2014 
Examines 
whether social 
support 
exchanged in an 
online 
healthcare 
community 
benefits patients’ 
mental health 
Patients benefit from 
learning from others, and 
their participation in the 
online community helps 
them improve their health 
and better engage in 
their disease self-
management process. 
Evidence exists that 
informational support is 
the most prevalent type 
in the online healthcare 
community, but 
An example of a direct 
effect of a polycentric 
information commons; 
appropriation can be 
psychologically 
beneficial. 
appropriation; 
appropriator 
value 
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emotional support plays 
the most significant role 
in helping patients move 
to a healthier state. 
Ye et al. 
2014 
Examines how 
sellers respond 
to changes in 
the design of 
eBay’s 
reputation 
systems 
Coercing buyers to 
revoke their negative 
feedback through 
retaliation enables low-
quality sellers to 
manipulate their 
reputations and 
masquerade as high-
quality sellers. Low-
quality sellers exerted 
additional efforts to 
improve their reputation 
scores after the system 
changed. 
Opportunistic information 
providers pollute the 
information in the 
commons to advance 
their interests. Change in 
constitutional rules by 
producers changed the 
balance of power 
between providers and 
appropriators, and 
subsequently reduced 
pollution. 
provision; 
appropriation; 
pollution; 
violation 
boundary 
regulation; 
incremental 
adaptation, 
shared 
accountability 
Zhang et 
al. 2013 
Examines the 
factors that 
influence online 
innovation and 
community 
members’ 
continued 
participation  
Both users and software 
modifiers are influenced 
by community response, 
but users seem to be 
influenced by it more. 
Participation is primarily 
motivated by software 
needs, the enjoyment of 
programming, the desire 
to improve the software, 
the opportunity to learn 
about others’ 
improvements to the 
software, and the 
gratification of helping 
others and giving back to 
the community. 
Engagement of 
appropriators leads to 
continuous appropriation. 
Providers are partially 
motivated by feedback 
from appropriators, but 
mostly by personal 
reasons. 
provision; 
provider 
value; 
provider 
recognition; 
appropriation 
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CHAPTER 3: HARNESSING DIGITAL ACTIVISM FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COLLECTIVE-ACTION PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Interest in how information technology is impacting societal issues is growing. Although 
considerable evidence shows that online communities and social media spur social activism online 
and offline, we know little about whether—and under what conditions—this digital activism 
translates into institutional change. To address this void, we draw on Polycentric Information 
Commons theory to advance knowledge on how partisan actors can harness digital activism to 
create institutional change. We assert that the success of such efforts depends on the actors’ 
capacity to use a dedicated information commons to generate legitimate collective action. To 
inform this theorizing, we examine the case of Cabotagestudien, in which partisan actors used 
social media and smartphone-based crowdsourcing to mobilize and drive collective action that 
successfully fended off attacks from other institutional actors and changed haulage regulations and 
supply chain practices in Northern Europe. 
 
Key Words: Digital activism, institutional change, collective action, polycentric information 
commons, legitimacy 
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3.1 Decentralized Systems Online and Societal Change  
 
Information systems (IS) scholars increasingly identify a need for research on the impact of 
information technology (IT) on societal issues (Saunders 2007; Walsham et al. 2007, Majchrzak 
et al. 2016). In recent years, researchers have published many important studies on topics such as 
the digital divide and poverty (Agarwal et al. 2009; Hsieh et al. 2008), IT in developing countries 
(Braa et al. 2004; Leonardi et al. 2016; Venkatesh, and Sykes 2013), the impact of E-governance 
on corruption (Srivastava et al. 2016), and IT’s impact on environmental sustainability (Elliot 
2001; Melville 2010). Increasingly, researchers are examining how online-based technologies such 
as crowdsourcing and online communities are used in promoting societal issues (Ketter et al. 2016; 
Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016). It is increasingly evident that the internet can be useful for driving 
activism online and for mobilizing activists in the physical world, however, we still lack theoretical 
understanding on how it can be purposefully harnessed to change institutional dynamics in 
substantial and lasting ways. Following calls for greater theoretical grounding in research on the 
impact of technology on societal issues (Majchrzak et al. 2016), we closely examine how online 
technologies can be harnessed to promote institutional change.  
In the late 1990s, the internet began transitioning from a novel broadcast media that business and 
government organizations used to pass content to passively browsing users, to a decidedly more 
open medium in which participating users actively create content, write posts and blogs, upload 
images and videos, and even develop code (Tapscott and Williams 2008). This transition 
challenged long-standing economic theories of production by demonstrating that loosely organized 
private individuals can produce outcomes previously thought possible only by hierarchical systems 
with clear incentive structures (Tapscott and Williams 2008). For two decades now, various 
academics and other interested observers have studied these new open access systems that rely on 
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self-selecting individuals for content and information. This research area is rather broad and 
touches on many questions, including how we might better understand user motivations (Von 
Krogh et al. 2012), underlying dynamics (Levina and Arriaga 2014), network effects (Ganley and 
Lampe 2009), performance of specific tasks (Majchrzak and Malhotra 2013), and direct impacts 
on user well-being (Yan and Tan 2014). A small but growing subset of this research stream focuses 
on how open access systems might affect broader societal outcomes, including business (Andriole 
2010), financial markets (Xu and Zhang 2013), political campaigns (Wattal et al. 2010), and public 
health (Goh et al. 2016).  
Evidence demonstrates that online communities and social media can be a fertile ground for 
spurring social activism on- and offline (Enjolras et al. 2013; White 2016). Still, we lack a 
theoretical understanding of whether, and under what conditions, this digital activism translates 
into institutional change—that is, a high-impact transformation of existing social, political, and 
economic arrangements. Researchers have noted that digital activism campaigns online, while 
effective in achieving short-term impacts, typically lose steam rather quickly and generally fail to 
generate more permanent change in the institutions of society (Obar et al. 2012; Selander and 
Jarvenpaa 2016). Although institutional change is not necessarily the main objective of digital 
activism online, evidence from other campaigns that openly challenge institutional order and rely 
heavily on online technologies for mobilization show that they are rarely successful. As a case in 
point, we might consider the well-known Occupy Wall-Street and Arab Spring movements which, 
according to their founders, failed to achieve institutional change (White 2016, 2017). Given the 
growing visibility—and shortcomings—of digital activism, it becomes increasingly important to 
understand, theoretically, what might be holding it back and how it can be more effectively 
leveraged to drive high-impact change.  
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Polycentric Information Commons (PIC) theory focuses on the fundamental question of how to 
sustain open access systems in the face of degenerative collective-action threats that are amplified 
because of the systems’ relatively high degree of openness (Mindel et al. 2018). The theory asserts 
that the integration of polycentric governance practices in the design of the rules and features of 
these systems may help reduce their vulnerability. Based on the logic of collective action, the 
theory provides an analytical framework for examining governance issues related to the 
sustainability and governance of open access systems. Still, PIC lacks some important nuances. 
While Mindel et al. (2018) assert that information commons must be sustainable to realize their 
overarching goal for the benefit of their stakeholders, they acknowledge that information commons 
differ in their goals and that further theorizing is needed to gain more nuance on the different 
“types” of information commons (Mindel et al. 2018).  
Building on previous literature on digital activism and the blueprints of PIC theory, we theorize 
on information commons that seek to drive institutional change in society. As a complementary 
lens, we draw on institutional theory on legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002) 
and on change through collective action (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002) to 
propose that digital activism’s success depends on its capacity to achieve appropriate sustainability 
in order to drive legitimate collective action. As basis for this theorizing, we examine a case in 
which actors harnessed social media and smartphone-based crowdsourcing to mobilize and drive 
collective action that caused institutional change.  
 3.2 Digital Activism  
In the early 1990s, social activists were already creating websites and using email chains to pass 
information, solicit support, and coordinate activities (Butler 2011). Although the new medium 
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made some aspects of outreach and coordination easier, it did not radically change the long-
existing traditional and centralized model of activism. Things began to change, however, as the 
internet gradually evolved from a broadcast to a participatory medium that enables private 
individuals to add content, organize as online communities, and connect with each other on social 
network platforms (Von Krogh et al. 2012). This shift let activist organizations more easily tap 
into large existing networks (Obar et al. 2012), as well as more easily recruit new activists, raise 
funds, and communicate the message to the general public.  
Defined as an “organized public effort, making collective claim(s) of target authority(s), in which 
civic initiators or supporters use digital media” (Edwards et al. 2013. pp. 10), digital activism can 
be split into two types10: (i) digital online activism, and (ii) digital offline activism. Although these 
types of activism may overlap in terms of tactics and objectives, the key distinction is spatial. 
Online activism mostly occurs on the internet among dispersed individuals, while offline activism 
uses open access systems to mobilize people in the physical world. Both types have successful at 
mobilizing people for various causes, but each has its limitations.  
 3.2.1 Digital Online Activism  
In the not-so-distant past, to raise funds and promote the change of rules, laws, or policies, activists 
spent long hours standing on street corners to gather signatures, going door to door to solicit 
support, and waiting in well-stretched lines in bureaucratic offices to obtain documents and 
permits. However, in recent years, open access systems significantly lowered the barriers of entry 
to the activism arena (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). Nowadays, anyone—regardless of gender, 
                                                          
10 At present, we do not address hacker activism, or hacktivism, which is a form of illicit digitally enabled online 
activism occurring mostly on the dark web. 
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race, sexual orientation, or age—can rather easily engage in promoting various causes through 
their devices, as long they can access the internet. Thus, instead of braving the elements outdoors 
for hours to gather a few dozen signatures, open access systems afford activists the opportunity to 
effectively reach numerous individuals anywhere.  
The literature on digital online activism is split between cautious optimism regarding its potential 
and a dose of sober realism on its actual impact. There is consensus, however, that digital online 
activism makes it much easier and faster to raise awareness about various causes, collect 
signatures, and raise funds. Perhaps one of the most memorable recent examples of digital online 
activism is the 2014 “Ice Bucket Challenge”—a social-media-propelled campaign in which 
citizens and celebrities from around the world dumped icy water on themselves to raise awareness 
of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a rare and not very well-known neurological disease 
affecting human muscles. Within only a few months, the viral Ice Bucket campaign increased ALS 
society donations five-fold in comparison to the entire previous year (Diamond 2014). While the 
Ice Bucket Challenge no doubt helped the ALS cause (Gebelhoff 2015), the campaign was not 
universally popular; some argued that it diverted attention from other equally deserving causes 
(Hiltzik 2014), while others claimed that it was mostly an attention-seeking gimmick and not real 
activism. Approximately 17 million people posted online videos and pictures of themselves being 
doused in icy water, but only a tiny fraction—an estimated 4–5%—bothered to donate to ALS 
organizations. As one observer noted, people collectively spent more on ice and bucket purchases 
than on actual ALS donations (Kosinski 2014).  
Still, despite the skepticism about the motivations of online activists, research suggests that 
involvement in such campaign leads to increased civic mindfulness and can generate other positive 
externalities (Kristofferson et al. 2013). For instance, researchers found that taking part in online 
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campaigns increases the likelihood that participants join charitable organizations (Lee and Hsieh 
2013). Researchers also find that online activism gives those who usually do not take part in 
activism an opportunity to participate (Bonilla and Rosa 2015). Some research asserts that online 
activism is a useful tactical tool for promoting good causes (Karpf 2010), and that even small 
gestures can be powerful when combined (Christensen 2011; Vie 2014).  
The growing body of research examining online activism primarily focuses on its short-term 
impact on campaigns and specific events (Agarwal et al. 2014; Ghobadi and Clegg 2015; Wattal 
et al. 2010). Although recent research has begun to examine factors that impact participation in 
long-term online activism (Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016), the question of whether online activism 
can go beyond increasing awareness, petitioning, and fundraising to bring about actual institutional 
change is presently unresolved (Lim 2013; Obar et al. 2012).  
 3.2.2 Digital Offline Activism  
Open access systems have become a powerful medium for mobilizing people in the physical world 
(Gerbaudo 2018). Notable examples include the Anti-Globalization, Occupy Wall Street, and 
Black Lives Matter movements, as well as the Arab Spring protests (Carney 2016; Ghonim 2012; 
Gleason 2013; Juris 2005; Kelly Garrett 2006). Over the past few years, scholars of those and other 
digitally enabled social movements have uncovered their power and limitations.  
Today, the rapid spread of messages and the sheer number of people receiving them through social 
networks make mobilizing masses of people unequivocally cheaper and faster than in the past 
(Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Obar et al. 2012; Theocharis et al. 2015). Further, as with digitally 
enabled online activism, the reduced cost of coordination gives traditionally disenfranchised 
groups—including minorities and the economically disadvantaged—an opportunity to organize 
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and express themselves (Anduiza et al. 2014; Ghonim 2012). In a matter of hours, a call on social 
media can translate into a flash crowd of protestors occupying a physical space, be it a street, a 
shopping center, a highway, or an airport terminal (Doubek 2017).   
Although digital offline activism may give a voice to the marginalized, such movements too often 
succumb to the echo-chamber effect—that is, rapidly growing discontent spreading like wildfire 
among people echoing to each other similar beliefs (Garrett 2009), making the movement an outlet 
for expression of frustration (Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Gillan 2009). Outside the eco-
chamber, some people who may be privately sympathetic to the cause can grow dismayed at the 
aggressive tone or plainly agitated because of the disruptions caused by protests (Tankersley 2011; 
White 2016). To the activists in the eye of the storm who are intensely involved with the protest, 
the mobilization may appear revolutionary, while the rest of us may simply see an angry crowd 
blocking roads and making our daily commute worse than usual.  
Even when movements gain widespread public support, they often fail to achieve concrete gains 
due to lack of consensus on the next steps following the initial mobilization (Gladwell 2010; Taub 
2016; White 2016). This often results from an absence of leaders who are capable of unifying the 
many decentralized parts enough to articulate a plan of action that the movement can get behind 
(Gladwell 2010; Taub 2016). Thus, paradoxically, the major advantage of digitally enabled offline 
activism—that is, its decentralized emergence—becomes its Achilles heel. Too many independent 
centers are devoid of a common direction, and thus ineffective in achieving significant concrete 
gains beyond the action of mobilization itself. Leadership is essential for social movements 
(Morris and Staggenborg 2004), and when it is fragmented, it is very difficult having productive 
dialogue with established institutions (White 2016). As he events of Occupy Wall-Street illustrate, 
weathering the storm—that is, holding steady until protesters get tired and go home—is in effect 
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the default tactic that established institutions use when challenged on the streets (White 2016). 
Even when protests are successful at overthrowing entrenched institutions, the lack of leadership 
becomes a problem in the aftermath. The events of the Arab-Spring revolution in Egypt illustrate 
how successful digital activism mobilization failed to achieve institutional change11. The lack of 
unified leadership on the side of the activists following the collapse of the Mubarak regime allowed 
entrenched political and military institutions to reclaim power (Howard and Hussain 2011; 
Gunitsky 2015).  
So, when examining digital on- and offline activism, we see their advantages as well as their 
limitations in promoting institutional change. Digital online activism is too “soft”—that is, it is 
somewhat ineffective beyond low-risk actions (Lim 2013) such as raising awareness and funds. 
Moreover, some perceive it as a form of lazy clicktivism (Gladwell 2010). On the other hand, 
digital offline activism is too “hard”—that is, it is effective at punching a hole in public opinion, 
but too aggressive and disjointed to facilitate lasting change (White 2016).  
 3.3 Theoretical Framing  
To better understand how digital activism may be harnessed to promote change in the institutional 
foundations of society, we merge two theoretical perspectives—PIC (Mindel et al. 2018) and 
institutional change and legitimacy (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002; 
Suchman 1995)—to offer a detailed case study analysis of Cabotagestudien (CS). Using collective 
action as a shared perspective that merges these two theoretical lenses, we were able to examine 
                                                          
11 Calhoun (2013) notes that it is too early to judge the true long-term impact of offline activism movements, but 
even some of the prominent figures leading Occupy Wall-Street and the Arab Spring concede failure due to the lack 
of coordinated leadership in the aftermath of mobilization (White 2016, 2017).  
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this case with a focus on the mutually constitutive duality (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones 
et al. 2004) between the digital activism and the institutional context it aims to change.  
3.3.1 Digital Activism as Polycentric Information Commons 
 
PIC theory (Mindel et al. 2018) examines open access systems online that integrate user-generated 
content and information as “common grounds.” According to this lens, social media and other 
open access systems online that enable digital activism may be conceptualized as “information 
commons,” that is, as manifestations of collective action taking place in cyberspace. This is a 
departure from prior research on digital activism, which primarily examines the enabling online 
systems as communication tools (Harlow and Harp 2012; Obar et al. 2012; Segerberg and Bennett 
2011).  
When examining the use of new technologies to promote change, digital activism literature broadly 
distinguishes between two types of actors: institutional and non-institutional (Bimber et al. 2012; 
Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016). This distinction works well when examining the dynamics between 
a single, identifiable organization (an institutional actor) and everyone else outside of this 
organization (non-institutional actors). The challenge, however, is that activism often involves 
multiple organizations and actors entangled as part of an “institutional field,” which obscures the 
institutional/non-institutional dichotomy. In the dichotomous view, for example, a social 
movement organization dedicated to a cause is an institutional actor, while the individuals 
accessing the organization’s social media page to make comments or acquire information are non-
institutional actors. However, people accessing the organization’s information may be politicians, 
reporters, business owners, and other actors who belong to various organizations and whose 
individual actions impact institutional change. To avoid the confusion, we appropriate PIC 
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theory’s distinction between three types of actors relevant to digital activism as follows: (1) 
producers: the architects and organizers of the digital activism platform; (2) providers: the people 
who supply information by posting content; and (3) appropriators: the people who acquire 
information for various reasons (Mindel et al. 2018).  
While collective action is typically viewed as a generative mechanism (Hargrave and Van de Ven 
2006), PIC theory sees it as potentially degenerative to the point that it might undermine the 
system’s sustainability (Mindel et al. 2018). In the same way that commons in the physical world 
face sustainability pressures as the aggregate result of smaller-scale actions (Ostrom 1990), 
information commons in digital activism are vulnerable because of their high degree of open 
access, widespread anonymity, and lack of hierarchical control (Mindel et al. 2018). Thus, as with 
common pool physical resources such as forests or grazing grounds, these information commons 
are likely to experience pressure due to pollution, congestion, violations, and rebellion.  
Low barriers for participation in digital activism increase the odds that a certain portion of the 
uploaded content may be polluted by inaccurate or even deliberately manipulated information. 
Information pollution—defined as “the extent to which information is contaminated and fails to 
align with the information commons overarching goal” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617)—is a problem 
for platforms that invite users to contribute content and information (Gu et al. 2007; Hu et al. 2012; 
Kittur et al. 2008). Further, prior research finds that the spread of misinformation online reinforces 
echo chamber effects, which can lead to increased polarization and other negative spillover effects 
(Del Vicario et al. 2016; Kata 2012; Silverman and Singer-Vine 2016).  
Digital activism can also suffer from activity spikes that jam the system. Such congestion—that 
is, “the extent to which appropriation and provision clog the information commons” (Mindel et al. 
2018, p. 616)—may cause the system to crash and create information overload. Digital activism 
Polycentric Information Commons   V. Mindel  2018 
 
110 
 
research finds that simultaneous uploads of posts can create messy feeds and cause confusion and 
information overload, which in turn may lead to fatigue among activists (Branagan 2013; Kelly 
Garrett 2006). Frequent crashes caused by congestion may frustrate existing and potential activists 
alike; moreover, it may prevent important messages from spreading, subsequently muffling the 
potential impact of digital activism. 
Because digital activism that touches on political issues is likely to be controversial and heated 
(Lee 2005), it can be a fertile ground for harassment, cyberbullying, hate speech, and trolling (Li 
2005; Warzel 2016). Defined as “the extent to which providers in an information commons violate 
rules and laws” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617), violations such as harassment may cause some 
activists to quit and may even attract pressure from outside actors. Although digital activism 
literature does not address harassment specifically, plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that it is 
indeed a problem (Larkin 2016).  
In digital activism, rifts between producers and providers may cause the latter to desert or rebel. 
Rebellion—that is, “the extent to which providers in an information commons are dissatisfied and 
exit it” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617)—jeopardizes the supply of content (Clifford 2010; Graham-
Felsen 2006; Gross 2012). So, while digital activism can grow exponentially because of low 
participation barriers, it can also experience rapid participation decline. Donor reactions to reports 
that Red Cross stashed money donated to help the 2010 Haiti earthquake victims (Sullivan 2015) 
exemplifies how rebellion can adversely affect digital activism.  
To reduce the prevalence and impact of collective-action threats in digital activism, PIC theory 
proposes four mutually reinforcing governance practices that may help actors balance openness 
and order to achieve stability. These practices (Table 3.1) may be embedded in the system’s 
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technical features and design, as well as in its official and unofficial rules and norms of conduct 
(Mindel et al. 2018).  
Table 3.1 PIC Theory Appropriated to Digital Activism 
Concept Definition Construct Definition References 
Collective-
action 
threats 
Adverse aggregate effects 
that are caused by 
individual-level actions 
during digital activism 
Pollution 
The extent to which information is 
contaminated and fails to align with 
the overarching goal of digital 
activism 
Kata 2012; 
Kelly Garrett 
2006; 
Lampel and 
Bhalla 2007; 
Mindel et al. 
2018; Stien 
2016 
Congestion 
The extent to which appropriation and 
provision of information clog the 
system that enables digital activism 
Violations 
The extent to which providers of 
information violate rules and laws 
related to digital activism 
Rebellion 
The extent to which providers of 
information are dissatisfied and exit a 
digital activism effort  
Polycentric 
governance 
practices  
Digital activism practices 
that promote order 
through independent 
adjustments as part of an 
emergent system of rules  
Boundary 
regulation 
The extent to which rules and 
technical infrastructure features 
regulate anonymity and content 
during digital activism 
Mindel et al. 
2018; 
Ostrom 1990 
Incremental 
adaptation  
The extent to which actors gradually 
introduce changes in infrastructure 
features and rules during digital 
activism 
Shared 
accountability 
The extent to which rules and 
features afford peer monitoring and 
gradual sanctioning of violators of 
rules and norms during digital 
activism 
Provider 
recognition  
The extent to which providers of 
information are acknowledged by 
peers, appropriators, and producers 
during digital activism  
Boundaries that align with digital activism’s overarching goal reduce the prevalence and impact 
of collective-action threats. Boundary regulation—defined as “the extent to which rules and 
technical infrastructure features of the information commons regulate anonymity and content” 
(Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—may therefore help reduce collective-action threats in information 
commons (Butler and Wang 2012; Di Tullio and Staples 2013; Hertel et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa and 
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Lang 2011; Ren et al. 2007) and thereby improve digital activism outcomes. For example, rules 
and design features, such as login requirements, can reduce the adverse effect of anonymity, while 
boundaries on content can prevent the discourse from getting overly heated. 
Information providers and appropriators are sensitive to changes they perceive as too sudden or 
radical. Given this, incremental adaptation—that is, “the extent to which changes in infrastructure 
features and rules are gradually introduced” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—may reduce the 
likelihood of alienating digital activism participants and, as a consequence, reduce instances of 
rebellion and violations. PIC theory would suggest that a digital activism effort is more likely to 
be sustained when it involves information providers in governance and incorporates community 
feedback into an incremental adaptation of the system’s rules and features. 
It is important that participants have a sense of collective responsibility toward digital activism 
efforts. This self-emerging shared accountability—defined as “the extent to which rules and 
features afford peer monitoring and gradual sanctioning of violators of rules and norms of the 
information commons” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—can improve outcomes in various open 
access systems (Chua et al. 2007; Wise et al. 2006). Consistent with this insight, we suggest that 
actors adopt shared accountability and peer monitoring to reduce collective-action threats to their 
digital activism efforts. 
The more content providers feel recognized for their efforts by other stakeholders, the more likely 
they are to continue participating and contributing (Lampel and Bhalla 2007). Given this, provider 
recognition—defined as “the extent to which providers are acknowledged by peers, appropriators 
and producers” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—is an important source of motivation (Von Krogh et 
al. 2012). Recognition may come as direct congratulatory messages and posts, or as badges, icons, 
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“likes,” and other features that tell providers that their efforts are noticed. Provider recognition is 
an important driver of continued engagement during digital activism, which often succumbs to 
drops in engagement level (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). 
We build on these PIC theory concepts (Table 3.1) to empirically examine and theorize about how 
digital activism may be harnessed for institutional change. At the same time, we observe that PIC 
theory is generally concerned about the sustainability of information commons, whereas digital 
activism’s primary objective is to drive action and achieve some form of change Given this, we 
suggest that digital activists not only sustain the information commons but also collectively 
achieve a legitimacy threshold (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002) as a basis for maneuvering other 
partisan actors and the complex institutional landscape in which they operate. 
3.3.2 Digital Activism for Institutional Change 
Institutions—that is, the significant practices, relationships, or organizations in a society12—
implicitly and explicitly impact most aspects of life. Hence, how institutions are altered is of great 
interest to social scientists from multiple disciplines, including management research (Hargrave 
and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002), political science (Streeck and Thelen 2009), and 
information systems research (Mignerat and Rivard 2009; Orlikowski and Barley 2001). 
Institutional change—defined as “a difference in form, quality, or state over time in an institution” 
(Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006, p. 866)—can be manifested on the regulatory level, the practice 
level, or both. As Table 3.2 shows, the regulatory level appertains to the formal laws, rules, and 
policies that govern interactions among institutional actors, groups, and individuals, while the 
practice level appertains to the informal behavioral norms of conduct. 
                                                          
12 Merriam-Webster  
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As partisan actors harness digital activism to change regulations and practices in a specific 
institution, they must maneuver the broader institutional field in which entrenched institutions are 
likely to oppose the changes to preserve the status quo. For that reason, it is very difficult for actors 
to spur institutional change on their own. On the other hand, a collective action in which multiple 
actors maneuver simultaneously, even if not in unison, is less risky for the involved individuals 
and has a better chance to succeed (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). As outlined above, examining 
the role of digital activism in collective action, institutional researchers have found that it is an 
effective mechanism to reach and mobilize great numbers of individuals, but also that the intended 
societal impact is rarely achieved or sustained.  
Institutional theories posit that legitimacy is the key means by which intuitional actors obtain and 
maintain resources and ultimately exert influence (Oliver 1991; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). 
Accordingly, we suggest that the muffled impact of digital online and offline activism is largely 
the result of weak legitimacy. Although legitimacy has many definitions (Deephouse and Suchman 
2008), it generally concerns an institutional actor’s congruence with social laws, norms, and 
values; an institutional actor is legitimate within its field if its actions are recognized as legal, 
aligned with existing practices, and socially acceptable to its stakeholders and related institutional 
actors. In his seminal work, Suchman (1995) identifies three broad types of legitimacy: pragmatic, 
moral, and cognitive. 
Without the continuous support of its most immediate stakeholders, an institutional actor is 
unlikely to survive. For that reason, institutional actors must secure pragmatic legitimacy by 
providing value to their immediate stakeholders (Suchman 1995). Pragmatic legitimacy is based 
on a symbiotic dependency between an actor’s actions and the interests of an institution’s 
immediate stakeholders; it is the most basic form of legitimacy that must be achieved. In the 
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context of digital activism, the campaign—whether it aims to raise funds, collect signatures, 
increase awareness, or get people on the streets—must first and foremost gain initial support from 
first adopters. Once it gains traction, network effects (Ackland and O’neil 2011) propel further 
growth in participation, thereby stabilizing pragmatic legitimacy.  
To gain and maintain legitimacy, the actions of institutional actors must be generally perceived as 
ethical by stakeholders and other institutional actors (Suchman 1995). As such, moral legitimacy 
gives institutional actors the credence required to shore up support and fend off potential 
challengers. Digital activism that is perceived to be “slacktivism” or “too aggressive” is less likely 
to secure broad moral legitimacy.  
Table 3.2 Institutional Theory Applied to Digital Activism 
Concept Definition Construct Definition References 
Institutional 
change 
A difference in form, 
quality, or state over 
time in the institution 
targeted by digital 
activism 
Institutional 
regulations 
Formal laws, rules, and policies that 
govern the behaviors and actions within 
the institution targeted by digital activism 
Hargrave & 
Van de Ven 
2006 Institutional 
practices 
Informal behavioral norms of conduct 
within the institution targeted by digital 
activism 
Legitimate 
action 
An action that is 
desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within an 
institution of regulations 
and practices related to 
digital activism 
Pragmatic 
legitimacy 
The extent to which the actions of an actor 
are perceived to enhance the interests of 
an institution’s immediate stakeholders 
Suchman 
1995 Moral 
legitimacy 
The extent to which the actions of an actor 
are perceived to be the “right thing to do” 
within an institution 
Cognitive 
legitimacy  
The extent to which the actions of an actor 
are perceived to be comprehensible, 
factually valid, and “inevitable” within an 
institution  
Institutional actors’ activities also must be perceived as comprehensible and rational by 
stakeholders and other institutional actors in order to be “taken-for-granted” (Suchman 1995). This 
high standard of cognitive legitimacy is not based on instinctive self-interest (pragmatic 
legitimacy) or subjective evaluation (moral legitimacy), but rather on a rational consideration that 
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an institutional action is inevitable because it is superior to other alternatives. As such, cognitive 
legitimacy is the highest form of legitimacy and the most difficult to establish.  
3.4 Research Method  
Using the explanatory case study approach (Benbasat et al. 1987; Yin 2008), we examine CS, a 
research collaboration between a logistics researcher from Lund University in Southern Sweden 
and the Swedish Transportations Workers Union, that turned into a digital activism campaign with 
widespread ramifications. CS is a unique contemporary case in which institutional actors 
effectively leveraged on- and offline digital activism—through social media and smartphone-
based crowdsourcing—to change road haulage regulations and practices in Northern Europe. 
Through data crowdsourcing via smartphones, CS generated evidence on existing EU legislations’ 
adverse effects to prompt political, legislative, and industry changes far beyond what traditional 
activism had achieved in the preceding 15 years. As such, CS offers important practical and 
theoretical lessons on digital activism’s potential to promote institutional change.  
We gathered case study data from three primary sources: interviews with key actors, electronic 
records of communication among actors, and third-party reports. Interviews are essential 
information sources for case study research as they provide the individual perspectives of key 
actors in their own words (Yin 2008). Following the guidelines of Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) 
for case-study-based theory development, we sought a plurality of perspectives and interviewed 
the actors who had the most knowledge of CS and its impact. Plurality of perspectives reduced the 
narrative bias that might potentially impact subsequent theorization. As Table 3.3 shows, we 
conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders: the principal producer of CS who 
initiated the crowdsourcing study; the mathematician who analyzed the crowdsourced data; the 
union leaders who financially supported the study and used the findings to push for institutional 
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change; several truck drivers who were highly involved in data collection; a high-ranking politician 
who used the crowdsourced data for campaigning and later for promoting new legislation; a 
manager of a large retail transportation fleet who instituted changes to practice based on the 
crowdsourced findings; CS supporters and the legal counsel for an opposition interest group who 
lobbied against CS.  
Table 3.3 Interviews  
18 Semi-structured Interviews (in-person, unless indicated by “T” for telephone interviews)  
# Key Informants Position # Interviews 
1 University Researcher Principal producer of CS 3 
2 Mathematician  Developer of CS data triangulation algorithm  1(T) 
3 Union Leader 1 The former head of the Swedish Transport Union 1 
4 Union Leader 2 Assistant to the union leader in charge of operations 1 
5 Union Leader 3 Assistant to the union leader in charge of lobbying 1 
6 Driver 1  Leader of the protest movement “Sweden Comes to Halt“ 1 
7 Driver 2 Moderator of the CS Facebook page 1 
8 Driver 3 High-volume data collector for CS 1 
9 Driver 4 High-volume data collector for CS 1 
10 Driver 5 Opinion leader in the online trucking community 1 
11 Driver 6 Opinion leader in the online trucking community 1(T) 
12 High-Ranking Politician  Former minister who used CS to promote new legislation  1 
13 Industry Leader  Transport boss of a large Swedish retailor  1(T) 
14 Legal Council  Lawyer of a large logistics association (chief opponent of CS) 1 
15 Company Owner Retired haulage company owner (supporter of CS)  1 
16 Whistle-blower Former owner of a haulage firm (provided hacked data) 1(T) 
Social media posts and communiqués are increasingly used as data sources in case study research 
(Wattal et al. 2010; Yates and Paquette 2011) as they provide a wealth of mostly unfiltered insights 
into the views, opinions, and conversational dynamics of actors in real-time. The electronic time 
stamping also helps create a chronology that lets researchers trace changes over time. We reviewed 
a total of 95 email messages, 47 communication streams on Facebook instant messaging, and 439 
Facebook posts to help develop a more comprehensive account of our case. Case study researchers 
also often use third-party reports to obtain an outsider perspective on the events in question (Myers 
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1997). We therefore collected a total of 621 media reports on the crowdsourcing project, as well 
as 7 official reports related to the case.  
In accordance with Eisenhardt (1989), we aimed to develop a theory-informed narrative for the 
case study. We followed prior case study research to distill insights from the multiple qualitative 
data sources into a cohesive interpretation by analyzing key episodes and events (Newman and 
Robey 1992; Lyytinen and Newman 2008). We used temporal bracketing to organize the key 
events into five thematically cohesive episodes: episode one (September 2012–March 2013) 
focuses on the events related to the instigation of institutional change; episode two (April 2013–
July 2013) focuses on the events related to the emerging collective action; episode three (May–
September 2013) centers on the enactment of polycentric governance practices; episode four (May 
2013–March 2014) examines how the collective action further cascaded; and episode five 
(November 2014–February 2015) focuses on how information-provider rebellion was avoided. To 
provide context for the five episodes, we first described the intuitional field and summarized the 
resulting institutional changes on both the regulation and practice levels. 
To develop our inductive theory, we followed the recommendations by Eisenhardt (1989) and 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). First, we used the theoretical framing (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) to 
identify collective-action threats, polycentric governance practices, legitimate digital activism, and 
institutional changes across the various episodes. The first author analyzed all of the material based 
on the theoretical framework’s concepts and constructs, while the second and third authors 
reviewed the analyses results. Based on their feedback, the first author revisited the data and, when 
needed, conducted follow-up interviews with the CS’s principle producer. Following three 
iterations of this analysis, critical review, data review, and follow-up interview, we achieved the 
analysis provided below. Next, relying on analytical generalization (Lee and Baskerville 2003; 
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Yin 2008), we used the analysis in conjunction with existing literature to develop a series of 
propositions; we then tied these propositions together in a conceptual model that theorizes on the 
relationship between legitimate digital activism, institutional change, collective-action threats, 
institutional resistance, and polycentric governance.  
3.5 Case Study Analysis  
Here, using PIC and institutional theories to frame the analysis, we provide a detailed account of 
the case study (summarized in Table 3.4). We begin by describing the institutional field in which 
the digital activism operated and conclude with the resulting regulatory and practice changes in 
the targeted road haulage institutions in Northern Europe. 
3.5.1 Institutional Field  
In the 1990s, The European Union (EU) integration accelerated and debates over the impact of 
opening borders to newly admitted Eastern European member countries began to dominate 
European politics (Richardson and Mazey 2015; Schimmelfennig 2001). One such debate focuses 
on the impact of EU Regulation directive 1072/2009 (2009), which concerns domestic road 
haulage regulations. To reduce CO2 emissions, Regulation 1072/2009 grants the right to long-
distance international road haulage operators to stay in a country for up to a week and carry up to 
three domestic loads. This practice is known as cabotage. 
Regulation 1072/2009’s intention was to increase the fill-rate of large trucks so that they could be 
used economically and not travel empty. The regulation was hailed as a good example of how 
environmental mindfulness can be applied in a practical manner. Indeed, data submitted by 
member state statistics bureaus to Eurostat13 showed that, following the regulation’s enactment, 
                                                          
13 Eurostat is the Luxemburg-based EU administration branch dedicated to compiling statistical data. 
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fewer empty trucks were operating at any given moment across the EU. The policy’s success 
prompted EU legislators to schedule further cross-border haulage deregulations.  
However, as Regulation 1072/2009 took effect, haulers from newly admitted Eastern EU member 
states began inundating the domestic markets of Western European countries (Hilal 2008; Kummer 
et al. 2014). Reports emerged of widespread exploitation of cheaper Eastern European drivers by 
haulage companies (Hilal 2008). Anecdotal reports also suggested that cabotage regulations—that 
is, the provisions limiting local carries to a maximum of three per week—were largely ignored, 
and that underpaid Eastern European drivers were driving around with empty containers in the 
hope of getting assignments. A retired haulage company owner explained to us the chief reason 
that haulage companies were ignoring the cabotage rules: “I [and other haulage companies] could 
get four or five Romanian drivers for the price of one Swedish driver.” On top of that, he said that 
“nobody was enforcing the rules” limiting cabotage to three assignments per week. The availability 
of cheap labor launched a race to the bottom, driving haulage companies to let go of West European 
drivers while recruiting more East Europeans to compete for transportation assignment bids. The 
big-box retailers and other haulage customers, who benefitted from lower transportation costs, 
simply turned their heads, according to the retired haulage company owner. So, in effect, EU cross-
border transport deregulation gave rise to institutional exploitation of East European drivers, 
harmed rather than improved environmental sustainability, and disrupted the livelihood of West 
European drivers. 
3.5.2 Instigating Institutional Change (September 2012–March 2013) 
Witnessing its members hurting, the Swedish Transportation Union pushed the first domino to 
challenge the status quo. Established in 1897, the Union is tasked with protecting the rights and 
Polycentric Information Commons   V. Mindel  2018 
 
121 
 
interest of its 60,000 transport industry members. To maintain pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of 
its stakeholders, the Union engages in different activities, including negotiating collective 
bargaining agreements on working conditions with various commercial and governmental 
organizations, and lobbying for or against policies impacting its members. Naturally, the Union 
opposed Regulation 1072/2009 prior to its enactment and continued arguing against it, but without 
success. In political circles, Regulation 1072/2009 was seen as environmentally friendly, 
economically efficient, and undisruptive. Although the Union had considerable anecdotal evidence 
on widespread disregard for cabotage laws and exploitation of Eastern European drivers, the 
evidence was largely dismissed by the political establishment as merely isolated incidents and 
rumors. As one Union leader explained it to us: “We needed real data and statistics to get the 
attention of policy makers.” 
To challenge the status quo, the Union decided to sponsor scientific research that could contradict 
or at least seriously question Eurostat’s data to show that Regulation 1072/2009 was not nearly as 
good for the environment. The Union leadership contacted a logistics researcher and asked him to 
examine Regulation 1072/2009’s environmental impact. The researcher first contacted various 
haulage companies and retailors with their own transportation fleets to request access to their 
internal data logs on transportation assignments. Not a single company agreed to release its data, 
however. The researcher and his team then began manually recording the movements of trucks in 
and out of Gothenburg port, the major entry point of foreign trucks into Sweden. However, while 
this data collection approach showed a disproportionate traffic volume of Eastern European trucks, 
it said nothing about their environmental impact. 
To gather the requisite empirical observations, the researcher considered crowdsourcing 
techniques. Although relying on crowds of volunteers to collect data had been attempted in other 
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research contexts—including emergency response, noise pollution mapping, medical research, and 
map making (Goodchild and Glennon 2010; Heipke 2010; Stevens and D’Hondt 2010)—it had 
not been used to map moving targets on such a vast geographical scale. To facilitate this mapping, 
the research team designed a simple smartphone application that let users record truck license 
plates and automatically extract the time-stamp and coordinates from the phone’s GPS.  
At this point, the team’s main challenge was to legitimize the data crowdsourcing to motivate users 
to participate. The Union issued an announcement through its webpage, newsletter, and official 
Facebook page with the goal of getting its members to download the app and participate in data 
collection. Initially, the call was largely ignored, and hardly anyone downloaded the app. 
Moreover, several truckers prominent on the Facebook community page “Trucker’s Paradise”—
with more than 12,000 members, most of whom are Swedish truck drivers—openly ridiculed the 
idea, questioning both its practicality and usefulness. As one truck driver put it: “The entire thing 
seems like a waste of time.” 
The researcher, henceforth referred to as the “producer” of the information commons14, personally 
contacted every driver who expressed skepticism about the data crowdsourcing initiative. Using 
Facebook messenger as his main tool of communication, he urged the skeptics to participate by 
empathetically addressing the basic collective need of Swedish truck drivers: to secure their 
livelihood. As the producer noted to a skeptic truck driver: “You have nothing to lose and a lot to 
gain.” Although still hesitant, the drivers that he contacted gave their word that they would 
participate in data collection and that they would urge other truckers to join in as well. 
                                                          
14 The entity leading the information commons—setting its overarching goal and organizing it rules and 
infrastructure, called a “producer” in PIC theory.  
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To coordinate the data collection efforts, the producer created a new Facebook group page titled 
“Cabotagestudien.” Although the study’s stated goal was to examine the environmental and social 
impact of Regulation 1072/2009, the chosen name of the project and the associated Facebook page 
purposefully zoomed in on the issue of cabotage—specifically, the practice of local carries by East 
European trucks in the Nordic countries. The producer and his team reasoned that it was easier to 
rouse the crowd to participate in data collection if it spoke to their basic concerns about the 
deteriorating conditions in the industry, job security and accurate statistics rather than to an abstract 
notion of environmentalism. 
In summary, the implicit rebellion, on social media, of truck drivers who initially refused to partake 
in data crowdsourcing was threatening the pragmatic legitimacy of the digital offline activism 
(Table 3.4). However, through direct recognition of key opinion leaders in the trucking 
community, the producer secured initial pragmatic legitimacy to support CS. The resulting 
partnership between the university researcher (producer), the Transport Union leadership, and the 
trucking community’s online opinion leader signaled an initial shift in the institutional field.  
3.5.3 Emerging Collective Action (April 2013–July 2013) 
 
The Union’s engagement of the producer to obtain data that could be used to challenge Regulation 
1072/2009 suddenly expanded into a collective action. Hundreds of truck drivers from rival 
factions—union members, anti-union private trucking group members, and independent operators 
alike—downloaded the app and used it to tag the license plates of trucks. As one non-union 
member truck driver put it when committing to the data crowdsourcing: “I hate the Union, but I 
will tag.” 
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The volume of participation and the stream of truck observations steadily grew over the six weeks 
of the first crowdsourcing run, providing thousands of data points used to triangulate truck 
movement (Figure 3.1). For the first time ever, an observation-based account of truck movement 
was available. As Figure 3.2 shows, the producer and his team created a website to show 
information appropriators the movement patterns of trucks on an interactive map. 
 
Figure 3.1 First Crowdsourcing Run, April–June 2013 
The observed movement patterns largely confirmed the suspicion that East European trucks did 
not exit the country as required, but instead drove around scrambling for local assignments. 
Moreover, the observations suggested that East European trucks were often traveling without 
cargo. In addition to tagging trucks, some drivers began recording and posting videos showing the 
horrid unsanitary living conditions of East European drivers in their makeshift camps. In just six 
weeks of data crowdsourcing and on t=other on the ground activism, CS could provide evidence 
of the adverse consequences of Regulation 1072/2009: rampant breaking of cabotage practices and 
widespread marginalization of East European drivers. 
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The openness of the information commons—that is, the study’s Facebook page and the 
crowdsourcing app—almost immediately gave rise to collective-action threats. After maps of truck 
movement patterns were made accessible to the public online, increased internet traffic caused 
congestion in appropriation and frequent crashes of the website. More concerning, the production 
team began noticing an increase in nonsensical observations submitted to the data pool. While 
some of that information pollution was attributed to simple human error in punching numbers, the 
appearance of observations of trucks on open water and other suspicious data suggested that the 
app also was being deliberately abused. It was unclear what proportion of this deliberate data 
pollution was the result of juvenile vandalism and what was sabotage by those who opposed the 
CS objectives, but we do know that the latter occurred. For example, we interviewed the legal 
counsel for an organization supporting Regulation 1072/2009, and he openly bragged about 
tagging the license plates of trucks he knew for a fact were on assignments in other parts of Europe. 
The concern at the time was that data pollution might compromise the accuracy of the 
mathematical triangulation used to map truck movements, subsequently hurting CS’s cognitive 
legitimacy. 
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Figure 3.2 Example Movement Patterns of a Truck Violating Cabotage Regulations 
In addition to pollution, violations began emerging, threatening the digital activism’s moral 
legitimacy. After the findings became public and exposed the scope of the problems that 
Regulation 1072/2009 caused, an increasing number of frustrated Swedish truck drivers began 
openly expressing vicious—and at times racist and xenophobic—sentiments toward the East 
European drivers on the study’s Facebook page. One truck driver, for example, posted the angry 
message: “The [expletive] Polish drivers are stealing our jobs!” Although the East European 
drivers were themselves often victims of institutional exploitation (Hilal 2008), some Swedish 
drivers perceived them to be the problem. In our interviews, the principle producer, Union leaders, 
and high-ranking politicians all expressed concern that such antagonistic rhetoric could alienate 
public opinion and other political allies. 
Polycentric Information Commons   V. Mindel  2018 
 
127 
 
In summary, collective action emerged as an increasing number of truckers and others downloaded 
the data-crowdsourcing app (Table 3.4). In response to growing interest in the digital activism, the 
producers launched a website that showed visitors the preliminary results of the data analysis on 
an interactive map; however, the website frequently crashed because of congestion in 
appropriation. Further, as PIC theory predicts, other collective-action threats—including violations 
(in the form of xenophobic comments) and pollution (in the form of invalid tags)—began 
emerging. 
 3.5.4 Enacting Polycentric Governance (May 2013–September 2013) 
The first version of the app and the associated website were rather rudimentary, and the production 
team realized that several incremental adaptations were needed to respond to the collective-action 
threats following the first data crowdsourcing run. To deal with the study website’s frequent 
crashes, the principle producer acquired additional server capacity to increase data availability to 
the appropriators. At first, most of the people accessing the website were the Swedish drivers 
involved in data collection, but other institutional actors—including the media, politicians, and 
various transport industry actors—quickly began accessing the findings as well.  
To combat data pollution, the production team took several steps. First, it devised detailed 
protocols for cleaning data prior to analysis. Second, the team required app users to register. The 
team was initially concerned that eliminating anonymity might reduce participation. However, 
after deliberations that included feedback from core information providers, the team decided that 
data accuracy (cognitive legitimacy) was more important than user anonymity. Rather than block 
polluters, the CS mathematician used the polluted data to further calibrate the triangulation 
algorithm. As the mathematician noted, paradoxically, “knowing which tags were deliberately 
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manipulated made it easier to detect other unintentionally polluted observations and thus focus 
the analysis on the untainted data.”  
To combat violations on the Facebook page, the production team and other participants tried to 
post conciliatory messages to urge people to focus on the data collection and avoid xenophobic 
posts. For example, one truck driver commented on another trucker’s xenophobic post on the study 
Facebook page as follows: “Please stop with the hate posts. They [the East European drivers] are 
not the problem.” However well intended, those calls for civility were largely ignored. The 
principle producer then contacted core providers to discuss the harmful impact of xenophobic 
rhetoric on public perception of the study. Some providers volunteered to act as peer reviewers, 
and norms of shared accountability began emerging as these fellow drivers systematically urged 
peers to avoid using derogatory language. Subsequently, though not eliminated, the volume and 
viciousness level of xenophobic posts dropped substantially. 
To encourage the crowd, the production team also started to post updates on the data collection 
effort’s progress, along with links to media stories, on the Facebook page. More than hundred such 
posts—ranging from two to five paragraphs long—were made over a two-year period. Additional 
recognition came from the Scandinavian trucker magazines as well as other supporters, who began 
offering modest prizes to top information providers. In addition, the producer team created a 
ranking system that included medals and other achievement icons to recognize top data providers. 
The principle producer also personally contacted top data providers to commend their effort. 
Although, initially, concerns about the future of their livelihood was the main motivation for truck 
drivers to participate, the various forms of recognition helped to prevent the flame from sizzling 
and strengthened the needed pragmatic legitimacy.  
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In summary, following the emergence of collective action and the collective-action threats, CS 
producers enacted a series of polycentric responses: they incrementally adapted server capacity, 
set a boundary on anonymity, recruited responsible activists to act as Facebook page moderators, 
and added a rating system to recognize top data taggers. These improvements helped to increase 
the moral and cognitive legitimacy of the digital activism.  
3.5.5 Cascading Collective Action (May 2013–March 2014) 
Following the release of the crowdsourced data, multiple dormant actors in the institutional field 
began taking steps to protect and enhance their own legitimacy. Although such maneuvers were 
largely uncoordinated, they nonetheless culminated in an expanding collective action.  
During the first data crowdsourcing run in May 2013, CS received increasing interest from 
politicians and the media. For example, the Swedish infrastructure minister stated: “We need to 
investigate the matter [cabotage] to address the issues. I myself downloaded the application and 
used it.” The minister also called for the creation of a committee to reexamine Regulation 
1072/2009’s impact. At the same time, reports on CS began appearing on national news coverage, 
including a featured story on the primetime evening news broadcast. Further, politicians opposing 
rapid EU expansion began citing CS to bolster their legitimacy with potential backers and voters 
during the 2014 Swedish Parliamentary elections. The high-ranking politician we interviewed 
stated that CS provided an “important window to the larger issue of the impact of EU rapid 
expansion on blue-collar labor in Sweden.”  
As the publicity of CS grew, major transport buyers began paying greater attention to their 
transportation sourcing practices, and some even allied themselves with CS—presumably to 
bolster their own legitimacy. For instance, following the first data crowdsourcing run, one of 
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Sweden’s largest retailers released its data logs to the production team. This data was instrumental 
for determining the environmental impact of the transportation fleet, which further bolstered the 
cognitive legitimacy of CS. In our interview, the transportation boss of the retailor praised CS for 
“raising the awareness of the issue of exploitation of East European drivers and rampant law 
breaking.” Public opinion pressure following the explosion of the issue in the media and political 
arena likely pressured the retailer to release the data logs.  
In September 2013, following CS’s initial success, the Union provided additional funding. When 
a second data crowdsourcing run was launched in October 2013, the response from the crowd was 
even stronger, and for the first time CS surpassed a thousand daily app users (Figure 3.3). This 
time around, it took only four weeks to gather enough observations to gain meaningful 
triangulation of movement patterns. The second data crowdsourcing run’s success spurred 
additional media coverage and political posturing, and some haulers began seeing the value in 
being associated with the increasingly high-profile study. Three haulers opened their data logs to 
the producer’s team. In exchange for the data, the haulers asked for a certification for being honest 
players, presumably to improve their legitimacy. Gaining access to the haulers’ data further 
increased the cognitive legitimacy of the crowdsourced data; the production team could now 
clearly show that the crowdsourced observation closely aligned with haulers GPS logs. Even the 
mathematician was somewhat surprised by how well the data was aligned.  
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Figure 3.3 Second Crowdsourcing Run, October–November 2013 
 
While the attention CS received helped enhance its legitimacy and impact in the institutional field, 
it also began attracting attacks from institutional actors who supported Regulation 1072/2009 as 
well as further deregulations. Such opponents often criticized the cognitive legitimacy of the data 
collection method by questioning the notions that isolated field observations could be used to map 
truck movements across a distance or that the CS algorithm could say anything about the 
environmental impact of East European trucks. Opponents also questioned the moral legitimacy 
of CS by repeatedly pointing to the xenophobic sentiments it was steering during the election 
season. Detractors opposed CS for various reasons. The former legal counsel for a major 
Forwarders’ Association openly admitted opposing CS initially because it reduced his client’s 
ability to be “flexible” with transportation labor costs. He also cited various other legal and 
ideological objections to CS.  
In summary, the digital activism’s success motivated attacks on its cognitive legitimacy from 
established interests (Table 3.4). However, early success also expanded shared accountability 
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across the institutional field, and other actors supplied additional data that helped to stabilize the 
cognitive legitimacy of the digital activism.  
3.5.6 Avoiding Provider Rebellion (November 2014–December 2014) 
When an East European trucker was arrested for driving with fake documents and released with 
no charges in the end of 2014, frustrations with the status-quo among Swedish truckers reached a 
boiling point. Some truckers began discussing roadside protests across the country, including 
calling for synchronized 15-minute traffic blockades on a newly created Facebook page (Figure 
3.4). Many of the participants in this new protest movement—called HÄR STANNAR SVERIGE! 
(Sweden comes to a halt!)—were information providers in the crowdsourcing project who met 
through the CS Facebook page. One trucker urged his peers to engage in protests on the newly 
created Facebook page: “Enough with tagging [data collection]; it is time for action.” 
Now that the initial objective—revealing the movement patterns of foreign trucks—was achieved, 
perceptions of CS’s overarching goal began to diverge. The producer’s team focused on further 
validating the findings and analyzing their implications. At the same time, an increasing proportion 
of information providers became impatient with the pace of change. After creating its own 
Facebook page, the new movement launched its own application to coordinate and trace roadside 
protests.  
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Figure 3.4 The “Sweden Comes to a Halt!” Movement Called on West European Truck Drivers to Stop 
        for 15 Minutes, twice ad, for a Month to Protest Cabotage Laws 
The producer was concerned that the aggressive tactics that disrupt traffic could backfire and 
turn public opinion against the truckers, subsequently reducing political support for change. He 
urged truckers to avoid roadside protest, warning them that: “You are going to undermine 
everything we worked for and achieve nothing.” Many truckers shared those concerns and were 
reluctant to join the rebellion. Although attempts to disrupt traffic did not gain critical mass 
support and essentially failed, the rift in the CS community suggested that many truckers were no 
longer interested in participating in the next scheduled crowdsourcing run. To save CS, the 
producer have initiated contact with the leaders of the new movement, many of whom were the 
same skeptical online opinion leaders he had previously engaged to secure support for the initial 
crowdsourcing run. Through a series of online communications and offline meetings, the 
producer convinced most of the detractors that antagonistic tactics would likely result in loss of 
the legitimacy they had painstakingly gained since the study began. The producer—by now 
perceived as “one of us” by the truckers—used his social capital to secure most detractors’ 
verbal commitment to not engage in road blockades, but instead to recommit to CS.  
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Coincidently, as the protest movement was disintegrating, new stricter laws against cabotage 
were passed (see the “Institutional Change” section below for more details). Although the laws 
had little to do with the protests—and were initiated several months before they occurred—
following validation of the crowdsourced data, the rebellion leaders took credit for the 
toughening laws, while also reasserting their reengagement in CS. The last crowdsourcing run 
took place in May 2015 and was even more successful than the previous two in terms of speed, 
number of participants and total observations (Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5 Third Data Crowdsourcing Run, May–June 2015 
 
In summary, dissatisfied activists decide to move from tagging data to launching roadside 
protests—a move that had the potential to hurt the CS’s pragmatic and moral legitimacy (Table 
3.4). Direct talks with and recognition of core providers reduced the rebellion’s intensity, and most 
of the opinion leaders in the trucker community recommitted to data crowdsourcing. This 
subsequently stabilized the pragmatic and moral legitimacy of the digital activism. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of the Case Study Analysis 
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• Attacks: Supporters 
of Policy 1072/2009 
question the study’s 
cognitive and moral 
legitimacy  
 
• Shared Accountability: 
Additional institutional actors 
join the study and provide 
data; a large retailer in 
Sweden and three haulage 
firms share data 
 
• Cognitive Legitimacy: 
Increases as new data from 
industry actors enhances the 
study’s factual accuracy; as a 
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• Rebellion: 
Dissatisfied truckers 
abandon the study 
and initiate road-side 
protests 
• Provider Recognition: The 
principle producer personally 
engages protestors to 
convince them to abandon 
road-side protests in favor of 
data crowdsourcing 
• Pragmatic legitimacy- 
Stabilizes as truckers 
recommit to data collection 
•  Moral Legitimacy: Stable, 
as roadside protests do not 
get out of hand 
• Institutional Practices: A 
protest movement 
emerges  
 
 
3.5.7 Institutional Change 
More than three years after CS launch, we can see its institutional impact on both the regulatory 
and practice levels. Some of those changes occurred earlier on, while others are still unfolding. In 
response to the new revelations that CS brought to light, the Swedish Parliament passed new laws 
targeting violators of haulage regulations. The new provisions substantially increased the authority 
of Swedish traffic police to stop and inspect suspicious trucks, as well as to issue fines on the spot 
outside the regular legal due process. So, instead of issuing a ticket and setting a court date, the 
new provisions let police boot the trucks violating the law, immobilizing them on the roadside 
until the fines were paid. The fines also were increased: violations that were previously 3,000 SEK 
(approximately $350 USD) were increased to 40,000 SEK (approximately $5,000 USD). Haulers 
caught breaking the law also were fined heavily and potentially faced revocation of their business 
licenses. Similar fines and violator crackdowns were introduced in neighboring Denmark, Norway, 
and Finland. In our interviews with Union leaders and the high-ranking politician, we also learned 
that additional regulations are being initiated and discussed in the legislature; those regulations 
include better mechanisms for inspections, increases in booting times, and a provision making 
transport buyers legally liable for their subcontractors’ offenses. 
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Prior to CS, Swedish political parties were split between those supporting further EU deregulations 
of cross-border transport and those opposing them. Following CS, however, all major Swedish 
parties vehemently opposed further EU cabotage deregulation. The Swedish representatives in the 
EU parliament built a coalition of West European countries to halt scheduled deregulations. Now, 
in 2018, previously scheduled deregulations are on hold, and the EU committee of cross-border 
commerce is currently engaging in a debate—with West European countries on one side, East 
European countries on the other—about increasing the regulations on working conditions and 
requiring safe-driving training of all truck drivers across the EU. The committee is tasked with 
redefining cabotage and suggesting a sensible way to regulate it.  
The biggest practical impact of CS cited by all actors we interviewed was on public awareness. A 
little-known problem affecting an industry that few people think about became a central issue on 
the evening news and in the political arena on both national and international levels. CS brought 
to light the ugly unintended consequences of EU cross-border deregulations—rampant 
exploitation of East European labor (modern day “slaves” according to many of the people we 
interviewed), broken laws, safety issues associated with poorly trained truck drivers, an increase 
in CO2 emissions, and adverse effects on Swedish labor. The issue’s visibility caused many actors 
in the institutional field to alter their practices. Several retail companies and other transport buyers 
began openly questioning haulage companies about their practices to ensure that those companies 
were not breaking the law. For instance, ICA, Sweden’s largest retailer, and Elgiganten, its largest 
home electronics retailer, began requiring in their transport purchase agreements that all drivers 
be paid in accordance with the level of the Swedish Transport Union collective bargaining 
agreement. Other industry executives we spoke with advocated for improving working conditions 
for East European drivers, even if it meant increase their transportation costs. Reacting to pressure 
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from transport buyers, some haulage companies began cleaning house to reform their exploitative 
practices. The increase in enforcement and fines caused small East European haulage operators to 
leave Sweden and go elsewhere in the EU. Although many East European trucks continue 
operating in Sweden and Denmark, they typically belong to large haulage firms based in East 
Europe, which are less likely to break cabotage regulations than small-time independent truckers.  
Finally—and somewhat unexpectedly—the attitude of Swedish drivers toward their East European 
counterparts has drastically shifted over the past few years. The initial resentment and calls for 
tougher punishments gradually turned to sympathy and calls for equal conditions. All truck drivers 
we spoke to expressed sympathy for the situation of East European drivers, many of whom they 
have come to know on a personal level.  
3.6 Discussion and Theory Development  
Using collective action as a shared perspective, we merged PIC theory (Mindel et al. 2018) and 
theory of institutional change (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002) to advance 
knowledge on the mutually constitutive duality (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones et al. 2004) 
between digital activism and the institutional context it aims to change. In addition, we drew on 
institutional theory on legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002) to propose that 
digital activism’s success in institutional fields depends on its capacity to drive legitimate 
collective action. As the empirical foundation for our theorizing, we examined the CS case, in 
which actors harnessed social media and smartphone-based crowdsourcing to mobilize and drive 
collective action that successfully caused institutional change. The theoretical framing we adopted 
let us zoom in on the processes of and the relationships between establishing legitimacy, 
mobilizing collective action, and changing institutions through digital activism; it also let us focus 
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on how digital activism overcomes the degenerative collective-action threats that often arise. As 
Figure 6 shows, our work builds on PIC and institutional theories, the case study breakdown, and 
prior digital activism literature to develop a conceptual model and related propositions that explain 
how polycentric governance practices reduce collective-action threats to legitimate digital activism 
aimed at changing the institutional field.  
Prior research asserts that the greater the legitimacy of an institutional order, the harder it is for a 
collective action to bring about change (Thomas et al. 1986; Walker et al. 1988). Our case study 
expands this theoretical insight by demonstrating how digitally enabled collective action 
undermined the legitimacy of an established intuitional order. As our analysis revealed, this 
happened through a mutually constitutive process (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones et al. 
2004) in which the digital activism established its own legitimacy, while at the same time eroding 
the legitimacy of the institutional order. Furthermore, the more the institutional order’s legitimacy 
eroded, the more the digital activism’s legitimacy grew. Hence, while CS was struggling to 
establish and maintain its legitimacy, once it secured that requisite pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
legitimacy it was able to erode the legitimacy of the previous institutional order set by Regulation 
1072/2009. 
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Figure 3.6 Conceptual Model 
 
As the case demonstrates, it is difficult for digital activism—with its online and offline 
components—to establish and sustain legitimacy within an institutional field. The opportunity cost 
of participating in online activism is substantially lower in comparison. However, its pragmatic 
legitimacy often dissipates because it is hard for campaigns to remain continuously relevant in the 
fast-paced online environment, which has numerous competing causes and other attention-
grabbing stimulations (Wasik 2009). At best, and however welcomed they might be, online 
campaigns are perceived as short-lived pushes to achieve a predefined goal—such as obtaining 
signatures or raising funds—rather than as long-term solutions (Kosinski 2014).  
Where digital online activism is disadvantaged because of its focus on narrow goals, offline 
activism is disadvantaged because it often lacks focus (Indiviglio 2011). Digital offline activism 
typically aims to alter deep-rooted social, political, and economic institutions, and is therefore less 
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focused on specifics. Further, the fact that offline movements often lack a centralized voice—and 
various participants often demand different things—makes them seem naive or lacking a solid 
intellectual argument (Bhagwati 2004; Friedersdorf 2015; Indiviglio 2011). So, where online 
activism is often perceived as an exercise in clicktivism and therefore suffers from low moral 
legitimacy, offline activism suffers a similar fate because it trends toward echo-chamber effects 
and violent eruptions (White 2016). 
Against these schisms, the CS case illustrates how digital activism online can usefully mix with 
and support offline activism. Without having recruited core participants through Facebook in the 
days prior to its first crowdsourcing run, CS would likely have failed to obtain the needed 
pragmatic legitimacy. As the validity of the data collected by the crowds increased over time, 
public support for the cause of addressing the problems created by Regulation 1072/2009 grew, 
increasing the moral legitimacy of the digital activism offline carried out through data 
crowdsourcing. In turn, CS’s increased public awareness and moral legitimacy—playing out in the 
media and the political arena—fueled participation online and offline, which stabilized the 
campaign’s pragmatic legitimacy. During its two-plus years, CS had only three relatively short 
data crowdsourcing runs—of six, four, and two weeks, respectively—but the results were 
impactful enough to sustain adequate activity online. Thus, when the next offline push was needed, 
activists were ready. In a sense, the online activities were the continuous, low-burning flame that 
could be turned up for short bursts of intense offline activity. Likewise, the offline activism’s 
success helped ensure the online flame continued burning. Hence, we propose:  
 
Proposition 1a: Digital activism will more likely achieve institutional change 
when it is pragmatically, morally, and cognitively legitimate. 
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Proposition 1b: Online and offline digital activism reinforce each other’s 
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy.  
 
Digital activism’s openness is simultaneously a source of strength and of weakness. On one hand, 
the aggregate effect of collective action carried out by many dispersed, loosely coordinated 
individuals can generate remarkable and significant outcomes. On the other hand, within the 
parameters of the primary collective action, other forms of degenerative collective actions may 
emerge (Mindel et al. 2018). Seo and Creed (2002) address the importance of establishing 
legitimacy for change, but they do not detail the process through which that legitimacy is 
established. The CS case expands their theoretical proposition by illustrating digital activism’s 
potential role in establishing legitimacy for mobilizing collective action, and by zeroing in how 
Suchman’s three forms of legitimacy (1995) stabilize in the face of emerging collective-action 
threats caused by the open-access nature of digital activism.  
Information pollution is increasingly recognized as characteristic of information commons online 
that primarily depend on anonymous amateurs for content and information (Mindel et al. 2018). 
When data pollution emerged in CS, its cognitive legitimacy was seriously jeopardized as 
supporters of Regulation 1072/2009 who opposed CS questioned the data’s validity in an effort to 
undermine the study. However, information pollution was not the only problem arising that 
challenged the CS effort’s legitimacy. Given the crowdsourcing initiative’s early success, the study 
website suffered from congestion and repeatedly crashed due to high-volume information 
appropriation traffic. Later, when various violations such as xenophobic posts and harassments 
emerged online, CS’s moral legitimacy was at risk, as supporters of Regulation 1072/2009 
attempted to discredit the activist movement by questioning the motivations of study participants 
and other institutional actors associated with CS. 
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In-fighting can also weaken activism, and prior research finds that competition for resources 
among activist movements addressing similar issues hurts the overall cause (Zald and McCarthy 
1979). In the CS case, many of the truckers decided to quit and form their own activist group 
because they were dissatisfied with the pace and magnitude of change; as a result, the study’s 
foundational support was on shaky ground, undermining its pragmatic legitimacy. While CS’s 
openness to anyone willing to participate helped it to achieve a remarkable feat—mapping the 
movement of mobile targets on an unprecedented geographical scale—this openness also created 
the conditions for sudden dropout when this trucker rebellion created a competing movement. 
Besides the risk that road blockades might alienate the public, producers of CS were concerned 
that there were not enough resources in terms of committed time and energy to support two 
separate movements. All in all, this case study shows that digital activism’s open nature created 
the conditions for individual level actions that, when aggregated, could undermine the legitimacy 
of CS. Drawing on these insights, we propose: 
Proposition 2: Collective-action threats of congestion, pollution, violation, and 
rebellion will likely reduce the legitimacy of digital activism. 
 
Although the producer’s team did not necessarily see it at the time, in retrospect, adopting 
polycentric governance principles (Mindel et al. 2018) was crucial for CS success. Research is 
conflicted on the question of whether setting boundaries on anonymity is beneficial; some studies 
find that registration requirements do not necessarily increase content quality and credibility (Fogg 
et al. 2001), while other research shows that it clearly helps to reduce vandalism (Van Oorschot 
and Stubblebine 2006). Other work asserts that the overarching goal of the information commons 
should determine the boundaries on anonymity (Ren et al. 2007). In this case, requiring users to 
register to participate in the crowdsourcing initiatives substantially reduced information pollution 
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and let the producers flag suspicious tags, which further helped calibrate the data analysis 
algorithm.  
On the question of incremental versus rapid innovation and system design, the literature is split 
(Norman and Verganti 2014). We observe that incremental adaptation of the CS app and associated 
website, as well as a stepwise approach to adjusting community governance practices on the 
Facebook page, effectively balanced the need for improvements and the danger of alienating 
participants. Changes made to the app, such as adding a registration requirement, were introduced 
gradually and in response to information pollution. Even then, however, the producers did not 
immediately ban suspicious taggers; instead, they used the contaminated data to their advantage, 
improving the triangulation algorithm.  
Shared accountability helped CS improve its moral legitimacy. In line with previous findings on 
the role of peer monitoring in information commons (Chua et al. 2007; Williams and Cothrel 2000; 
Wise et al. 2006), the emergence of shared accountability on the study’s Facebook page helped to 
significantly reduce harassment and xenophobic posts. Peer drivers reprimanded posters who 
crossed the line, and volunteer page monitors quickly identified and promptly removed posts that 
might undermine the study’s moral legitimacy.  
Prior research finds that attention and recognition through direct feedback, “likes,” followers, 
icons, avatars, and other status symbols often motivates engagement in information commons, 
whether in social media, crowdsourcing, or online communities (Huberman et al. 2009; Lampel 
and Bhalla 2007; Moon and Sproull 2008). Our interviews showed us how much the hundreds of 
encouraging posts, the ranking system of top taggers, and the personal messages from the producer 
team helped to keep the drivers motivated. Similarly, posts and messages online and offline 
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between information providers—mostly drivers—helped to maintain a robust core of participants 
who recruited others, giving CS the momentum it needed during the crowdsourcing phases. 
Provider recognition also served to create relationships and a sense of trust among providers 
toward the producer, who later used this social capital created overtime to convince drivers not to 
quit CS. Drawing on these insights, we propose: 
Proposition 3: Polycentric governance practices of boundary regulation, 
incremental adaptation, shared accountability, and provider recognition will 
likely lessen collective-action threats and increase the legitimacy of digital 
activism. 
Changes caused by introducing new technologies into an environment are likely to create feedback 
effects on the technology’s trajectory (Orlikowski 2007) as expressions of a mutually constitutive 
duality (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones et al. 2004). Similarly, the CS case study shows that, 
as digital activism impacted change in the institutional field, it was also impacted by the events it 
helped to set in motion. For instance, the attention CS received from the media and politicians 
motivated information providers to keep tagging, which increased the study’s pragmatic 
legitimacy; however, this increased attention simultaneously prompted an increase in the intensity 
of xenophobic sentiments expressed online, which reduced the study’s moral legitimacy. The 
decrease in moral legitimacy made many supporters uncomfortable, which prompted the “we need 
to do something about it” discussions that caused the production team to adjust the polycentric 
practices of CS. On the other hand, the more the CS legitimacy stabilized, and institutional 
regulations and practices were set in motion, the less concerned the production team was about 
adjusting polycentric practices. For instance, when the political establishment embraced CS and 
began using it to promote the legislative agenda, producers became less concerned with adjusting 
the app and less occupied with the Facebook page, and instead shifted their focus to further 
disseminating the data. However, when the protest movement began brewing, the principle 
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producer acted quickly to secure the commitment of truckers for the next CS crowdsourcing run. 
Observing how developments in the institutional field informed the adjustments to the app and the 
Facebook page activities, we propose: 
Proposition 4: Polycentric governance practices will more likely be effective if 
they are adjusted in response to changes in institutional regulations and 
practices. 
 
Institutions are reluctant to change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and, when challenged, vested 
interests are likely to fight back to undermine the challenger and preserve their position (Seo and 
Creed 2002). Prior research on online activism finds that powerful institutions may filter content 
and use surveillance to combat online activism that they perceive as threatening to their position 
(Ghobadi and Clegg 2015). The CS study also demonstrates how institutional actors may subtly 
exploit vulnerabilities to undermine digital activism. We find that the emergence of collective-
action threats due to digital activism’s openness was used as ammunition by opposition actors. 
Opponents of CS openly questioned the integrity of the data and its analysis, both publicly and in 
closed political circles. In some instances, opponents even engaged in deliberate data pollution to 
further reduce CS’s cognitive legitimacy. While information pollution does not necessarily hurt 
digital activism’s sustainability, it likely reduces its legitimacy and its ability to cause institutional 
change. In our interviews with the principle CS producer and a CS opponent, both mentioned the 
importance of establishing the credibility of CS to cause institutional change.  
Similarly, violations in the form of xenophobia, racism, and harassment on the CS Facebook page 
were used to discredit the digital activism’s moral legitimacy, as well as to endanger its pragmatic 
legitimacy and make institutional actors—including politicians, media, and corporations—
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disassociate themselves from CS. In our interviews with the Union leaders, industry actors, the 
high-ranking politician, and the CS producers, they all expressed those concerns.  
Some institutional opponents continue to work to reverse the legislations caused by CS. These 
opponents both challenge the legal standing of the new Swedish regulations and lobby the EU to 
intervene in Swedish legislation. Evidently, an impactful digital activism within an institutional 
field is bound to step on the toes of certain established institutional actors; they, in turn, are likely 
to resist it and its impact. Exploiting information commons’ vulnerabilities, which are inevitable 
due to their openness, is one tactic that opposing actors are likely to use to fight back when they 
feel threatened. Building on those insights, we propose:  
Proposition 5: Collective-action threats will likely strengthen institutional 
resistance toward digital activism through attacks on its legitimacy and related 
legal challenges. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
There is considerable interest in how online technologies enable collective action and change 
(Ghobadi and Clegg 2015; Kelly Garrett 2006; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010), with a focus on 
how social network connectivity supports communication and lubricates mobilization (Bennett 
and Segerberg 2012; Diani and McAdam 2003; Obar et al. 2012; Segerberg and Bennett 2011). 
We extend this existing research by examining in detail the constitutive duality between the 
collective action occurring at the digitally enabled social network level and the collective action 
occurring at the broader institutional field level. Specifically, we focus on the process of 
establishing legitimacy for impactful digital activism in the face of collective-action threats, which 
arise due to digital activism’s open nature and decrease its pragmatic, moral, and cognitive 
legitimacy. Building on PIC and institutional change theory, and informed by empirical 
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observations, we posit that incorporating polycentric governance practices reduces the prevalence 
of collective-action threats, which in turn leads to stronger digital activism legitimacy and a higher 
likelihood of impactful institutional change.  
In addition to contributing to digital activism literature, our CS case study advances PIC theory 
(Mindel et al. 2018). At present, PIC theory is a general framework for examining the impact of 
collective-action threats on information commons’ sustainability and how polycentric governance 
practices can reduce those threats. Mindel et al. acknowledge the need for greater nuance for 
studying different types of information commons with specific and varying objectives. By 
conceptualizing digital activism as a type of information commons, we add to PIC theory, 
examining how collective-action threats playout in this context and how polycentric governance 
practices help stabilize digital activism allowing it to reach its objective of shaking the status quo 
within an institutional field. The resulting hybrid model of PIC and institutional legitimacy theories 
(Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6) was instrumental in providing a unique perspective on the question of 
how digital activism could be harnessed for promoting institutional change.  
The CS case study provides important practical lessons for those who wish to use digital activism 
to promote change. Our findings suggest that it is not enough to tap into digitally enabled social 
networks to support communication for collective action and mobilize accordingly. The key for 
successful digital activism, we assert, is to continuously establish its pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive legitimacy within an institutional field. To improve the odds of establishing legitimacy, 
digital activism must combat congestion, pollution, violations, and user rebellion. Further, we find 
that polycentric online and offline digital activism reinforce each other’s legitimacy when 
incorporated under an overarching institutional change goal. Finally, we find that institutional 
actors who oppose that change are likely to exploit vulnerabilities that arise from digital activism’s 
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openness to actively undermine the effort’s legitimacy. Although it by no means ensures success, 
incorporating polycentric governance practices can help stabilize digital activism’s legitimacy and 
thereby increase the likelihood of impactful institutional change.  
Although we aim for our theorizing to apply across different forms of digital activism and different 
types of institutional fields, generalizability from a single case study is limited and additional 
research is needed to reinforce and refine the theory. As such, we hope that the new perspective 
we introduce will spur additional research into this increasingly important issue.  
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CHAPTER 4: POLYCENTRIC RESOLUTION OF INFORMATION 
POLLUTION IN OPEN COLLABORATION SYSTEMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The impact of open collaboration (OC) systems online is widespread, touching many individuals 
and institutions in society. At the same time, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that OC 
systems can be contaminated with low-quality, biased, unintentionally misleading, and even 
deliberately manipulated content. While prior research has examined how different organizational 
mechanisms relate to the quality of final or mature OC outputs, we know little about how OC 
systems address information pollution problems as they arise during output development. Against 
this backdrop, we draw on polycentric information commons (PIC) theory to offer a detailed 
analysis of how information pollution is resolved in Wikipedia articles. The result is two 
contributions to theory. First, we advance knowledge on information pollution as an inherent threat 
to OC systems and on how these systems can successfully address pollution through polycentric 
practices. Second, we offer empirical validation of PIC theory and extend it with new insights into 
how polycentric principles may be incorporated on the operational levels of governance. 
 
Key Words: Open collaboration, polycentric information commons, information pollution, 
quality management, Wikipedia 
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4.1 Information Pollution in Open Collaboration Systems Online 
Open-collaboration (OC) systems online—such as Wikis, open source software (OSS) 
development, crowdsourced innovation, and other online sociotechnical arrangements that rely 
mostly on self-selecting participants for creating value (Levine and Prietula 2013)—represent a 
novel production paradigm distinctively different from traditional business organizations (Benkler 
2006; Baldwin and Von Hippel 2011; Von Hippel and Von Krogh 2003). Prior organization 
research on OC systems has examined their emerging structures (Baldwin and Von Hippel 201; 
Kittur et al. 2009), dynamics (Kane and Ransbotham 2016; Ransbotham and Kane 2011), 
procedures (Faraj et al. 2011; Levine and Prietula 2013; Viégas et al. 2007), and governance 
(Aaltonen and Lanzara 2015; Forte et al. 2009; Markus 2007; Shah 2006), and how these different 
mechanisms relate to the quality of final or mature outputs15 (Aberdour 2007; Wilkinson and 
Huberman 2007). However, our understanding of how OC systems address quality issues as they 
arise remains limited. Drawing on polycentric information commons (PIC) theory (Mindel et al. 
2018), we conceptualize arising quality issues as “information pollution” events to examine how 
polycentric governance helps resolve pollution in OC systems.  
It is hardly surprising that open-access platforms—including social media, media-sharing 
websites, blogs, peer-to-peer networks, and online-review platforms—can become inundated with 
polluted content (Clauson et al. 2008; Gyimothy et al. 2005; Mayzlin et al. 2014). The pollution 
spectrum ranges from unintentionally misleading or deliberately manipulated information to 
disturbingly gruesome content. For instance, reports indicate that Facebook and Twitter are 
flooded with false rumors, fake news stories, and other polluted content (Allcott and Gentzkow 
                                                          
15 Output of OC systems, whether code or information, is constantly updated and refined. Prior research has 
typically relied on the quality scores assigned by the contributor community or outside experts after the output is 
mature and relatively stable.  
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2017). Daily, an army of moderators in these companies work “to soak up the worst of humanity 
in order to protect the rest of us” (Chen 2014), taking down racist, masochistic, violence-inciting 
posts, as well as shocking images and videos of animal cruelty, beheadings, and child pornography 
(Kanter 2018). Facebook and Twitter concede that they are overwhelmed, despite constantly 
increasing the number of monitors (Kanter 2018). By comparison, most open-access platforms 
have far fewer resources to combat the problem. 
An examination of prominent OSS development platforms finds a high prevalence of defunct, dirty 
data (Howison and Crowston 2004). Moreover, OSS (like all software) may contain bugs 
(Gyimothy et al. 2005; Stamelos et al. 2002) and is vulnerable to misuse by actors that deliberately 
insert malicious code (Ransbotham 2010). Similarly, Wikis may contain incomplete, biased, 
manipulated, and erroneous information (Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; 
Lavasa et al. 2011). Given that virtually everyone, from students (Haigh 2011; Lim 2009) to 
professionals (Brokowski and Sheehan 2009; Miller and Murray 2010; Peoples 2009), turn to 
Wikis for information, frequent and persisting low-quality information is likely to spillover and 
impact society as whole.16 In addition, frequent and persisting low-quality information is likely to 
reduce the trust we put in OC systems. Hence, the question of how these systems address pollution 
quickly before it spills over and causes mistrust is crucial to the lasting viability of the novel and 
innovative OC mode. Although extant research provides important empirical findings on some 
factors associated with OC system quality (Arazy et al. 2011; Arazy and Nov 2010; Kittur and 
Kraut 2008), it provides little theoretical insight on which OC governance practices best achieve 
timely resolution of quality issues as they arise.  
                                                          
16 For instance, false information on vaccinations adversely impacts the public health, while false information used 
in litigation may create bad precedence.  
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PIC theory builds on the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) and collective-action paradigms 
(Ostrom 1990, 2000) to conceptualize online systems characterized by low barriers to participation 
as information commons. Defined as highly accessible, self-rising information systems in which 
stakeholders share an overarching goal (Mindel et al. 2018, pp. 609), information commons, more 
so than traditional centralized systems, are susceptible to information pollution and other 
collective-action threats because of their openness (Mindel et al. 2018). PIC theory asserts that one 
way to address these collective-action threats is by incorporating polycentric principles into the 
system’s governance practices and technical features (Mindel et al. 2018).  
To advance our understanding of how OC systems can effectively resolve pollution, we draw on 
PIC theory to examine how polycentric practices—shared accountability through work 
distribution, boundary regulation on content, incremental adaptation of the information, and 
recognition of peer contributions—impact resolution of pollution events in Wikipedia. We identify 
the posting of a cleanup template and collective actions toward its removal as an information 
pollution event on an article. Because pollution in the physical world as well as in the information 
world may spread outside of its immediate boundaries, it is important to resolve it effectively in 
an expedient manner. Using pollution events as the unit of analysis, we therefore zoom-in on the 
relationship between polycentric practices during the event and the time it takes to resolve the 
event as an indicator of the effectiveness of polycentric governance. As a result, our research 
advances knowledge on information pollution and how using polycentric practices in OC systems 
may successfully address it. In addition, our research contributes to PIC theory by empirically 
examining its propositions and by offering novel insights into how polycentric principles may be 
incorporated in governance at the operational level.  
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4.2 Addressing Information Pollution in Open Collaboration 
OC systems online, initially spearheaded by OSS development and wiki technologies, represent a 
novel model of organizing production that is distinctly different from traditional managerial 
settings (Aaltonen and Lanzara 2015; Benkler 2006; Forte and Lampe 2013; Levine and Prietula 
2014). OC systems are defined as an “online environment that supports the collective production 
of an artifact through a technologically mediated collaboration platform that presents a low 
barrier to entry and exit and supports the emergence of persistent but malleable social structures” 
(Forte and Lampe 2013, p. 57). These systems generate value by broadly inviting people to 
participate in the production of a common good and allowing them to build relatively freely on 
each other’s work (Kumar et al. 2011; Levine and Prietula 2014).  
Research on OC systems provides various insights into tensions underlying their operation. 
Although low barriers to participation create conditions for fast growth, they also may spur rapid 
decline when participants suddenly disengage (Ransbotham and Kane 2011). This tension between 
freedom of entry and exit in OC systems introduces a source of volatility that is largely non-
existent in traditional organizations. In fact, research has found that most participants contribute 
only once and never return (Anthony et al. 2009; Panciera et al. 2009; Shah 2006). Most of the 
work is subsequently shouldered by a relatively small group of dedicated core participants 
(Panciera et al. 2009; Shah 2006) who may also exit at any time. Thus, it is often essential in OC 
systems to continuously attract new contributors to replace those who leave (Ransbotham and 
Kane 2011) and to inject renewed energy, perspectives, and ideas to the system (Morgan et al. 
2013). Revitalization of content and participants is essential for the long-term prospects of OC 
systems.  
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The need to attract and retain new participants gives rise to another tension—that between long-
time and new participants. While most organizations experience the challenge of incorporating 
new members (Allen and Meyer 1990), the challenge can be even more pronounced in OC systems 
that lack dedicated human resource managers, new employee orientation programs, or clear 
incentive structures. Further, research shows that veteran participants can be impatient with 
newcomers who are not familiar with task requirements or the system’s established operational 
norms (Halfaker et al. 2013; Suh et al. 2009). Research has also found that participants in OC 
systems are often driven by a combination of needs for both personal and social fulfillment (Hertel 
et al. 2003; Morgan et al. 2013), and that the rejection of newcomers by veterans reduces 
motivation, causing many to leave (Halfaker et al. 2013). It is therefore critical for OC systems to 
resolve such tensions between veteran and new providers in a constructive manner.  
Work in OC systems is typically self-selected rather than assigned (Crowston et al. 2005; Kittur 
and Kraut 2008; Stvilia et al. 2007). This freedom of choice is a major catalyst of creativity 
(Benkler 2006), but it also may cause bottlenecks in production, inefficiencies, and conflict (Kittur 
and Kraut 2010; Mishra et al. 2002; Yasseri et al. 2012). Specifically, the increasing empirical and 
anecdotal evidence of low-quality and manipulated content in OC systems (Gyimothy et al. 2005; 
Hafner 2007; Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011) suggests that the low barriers to 
participation amplify the systems’ vulnerability to misuse in comparison to traditional closed 
systems. To manage quality, OC systems typically adopt various governance mechanisms that seek 
to strike a balance between necessary controls and inherent openness, typically by including 
elements of bureaucracy, democratic procedures, and mechanisms that facilitate independent 
participation. Different OC systems often include some combination of communication 
mechanisms (Gutwin et al. 2004, Viegas et al. 2007), formal and informal rules (Butler et al. 2008; 
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Scacchi 2007), and soft hierarchies (Crowston and Howison 2006; Cabunducan et al. 2011) to 
improve coordination and overall performance.  
To understand how current research addresses the relation between these different organizational 
mechanisms and the quality of outputs, Table 4.1 offers an overview of OC system quality 
research. It is important to note that the intangible nature of outputs—that is, content, code, and 
ideas—and the fact that outputs constantly change through updates and edits, make substantive 
quality a moving target. Many researchers therefore rely on small-scale qualitative assessments 
(Arazy and Nov 2010; Chesney 2006; Giles 2005) to determine quality. Other researchers turn to 
internal rating schemes created in OC systems to examine which factors are associated with quality 
(Blumenstock 2008; Kane 2010; Kittur and Kraut 2008; Wöhner and Peters 2009) or use proxy 
metrics such as contribution retention rate in relation to output lifetime as a quality indicator 
(Anthony et al. 2007). Other approaches include using automated tools to detect errors in code 
(Stamelos et al. 2002) and using quality indicators in Wikipedia articles (Dalip et al. 2009). 
Although each of these studies provides important insights, the difference between methods and 
units of analysis makes it difficult to compare and consolidate findings. Moreover, current research 
focuses on factors associated with the quality of final or mature outputs rather than on the 
mechanisms used to resolve quality issues as they arise during development of these outputs. 
Table 4.1 Overview of OC Research Related to Pollution in OC Systems  
Study 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method 
and data 
Unit of 
analysis 
Findings 
and insights 
Anderka et 
al. 2011 
Inductive machine-
learning-based 
prediction model of 
quality problems; no 
specific hypotheses 
Machine-learning 
density estimation with 
class probability 
estimation 
10,000 Wikipedia 
articles with one or 
more out of 10 
types of cleanup 
templates 
1. Method for mining and extracting 
cleanup templates 
2. The algorithm successfully 
predicted quality issues 
associated with 4 out of 10 
templates 
Anthony et 
al. 2007 
Deductive 
hypothesis 
development 
Examination of the 
effect of contributor 
anonymity and edit 
Quality of 
contributions 
measured as the 
1. Registered users’ quality 
increases with more contributions 
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partially based on 
previous empirical 
findings 
history on quality of 
contributions in 
Wikipedia  
rate of each 
contributor’s 
content retained in 
the current version 
2. Large number of high-quality 
contributions come from 
anonymous contributors who 
contribute only once  
Arazy and 
Nov 2010 
Deductive 
hypothesis 
development 
partially based on 
previous empirical 
findings 
Qualitative 
assessment of the 
accuracy and 
completeness of 50 
articles by “experts” 
 
Quantitative measures 
of editing activities on 
those articles 
Wikipedia article 
and editors 
1. Coordination positively impacts 
article quality 
2. Unequal contribution among 
editors on the article level is not 
associated with quality 
3. Unequal contribution among the 
same editors across Wikipedia is 
positively associated with quality 
4. Number of editors is not directly 
associated with quality  
Blumenstock 
2008 
None (no 
hypotheses) 
Comparison of length 
(word count) in 
Wikipedia’s featured 
articles and a random 
sample of other 
articles  
Wikipedia article 
word count 
1. Positive association between word 
count and designation of featured 
article status  
Chesney 
2006 
None (deductive 
hypothesis 
development) 
Survey-based 
assessment of the 
credibility of 30 
articles by experts, 24 
random-assignment to 
non-experts and 
Wikipedia as a whole 
 
Perception of the 
credibility of the 
Wikipedia article 
and editor 
1. Experts found articles to be more 
credible than non-experts 
2. 13% of articles were reported for 
mistakes 
De la 
Calzada and 
Dekhtyar 
2010 
None (exploratory 
hypothesis 
development) 
Comparison of two 
models of quality 
estimation of 50 stable 
and 29 controversial 
Wikipedia articles 
Article quality as 
assessed by 
students 
1. Quality of articles of different type 
should be computed using 
different means 
2. Methodological insights on using 
multiple amateur quality 
evaluators as opposed to 
individual experts 
Giles 2005 
None (no 
hypotheses) 
Blind comparison by 
experts of 42 science 
articles in Wikipedia 
and Encyclopedia 
Britannica 
Wikipedia articles 
1. Articles from both sources are 
found to contain a similar average 
number of errors 
Halfaker et 
al. 2008 
Collective effort 
model (no 
hypotheses) 
Examination of the 
dropout rate of editors 
in two sets of 200K 
edits, reverted and 
non-reverted  
Wikipedia edits; 
edits that remain 
untouched longer 
used as a proxy for 
quality of edit 
1. Reverts discourage contributions, 
especially reverts made by 
veteran providers of new providers 
2. Editors who continue to do work in 
Wikipedia after being reverted 
increase the quality of their work 
Hu et al. 
2007 
None (mathematical 
model development) 
Comparing the 
performance of 
measurement models 
through a series of 
experiments using 242 
Wikipedia articles 
about various 
countries 
Article quality as 
indicated by its 
links 
1. Authors with more authority 
produce higher quality edits 
2. Length of articles associated with 
their quality 
Javanmardi 
and Lopes 
2010 
None (no 
hypotheses; builds 
on previous 
research) 
Comparing the time 
featured and non-
featured articles are in 
a high-quality state 
 
Conceptualizing 
revisions that last 
longer as high quality 
Quality of featured 
and non-featured 
articles 
1. The average article quality 
increases with more edits 
2. Featured articles are of high 
quality 86% of the time, while non-
featured are high quality 74% of 
the time 
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Kane 2010 
None (deductive 
hypothesis 
development 
partially based on 
case study findings) 
Qualitative case study 
of editing a featured 
article 
 
Quantitative analysis 
of factors associated 
with the promotion of 
188 articles nominated 
to receive featured 
article status 
Wikipedia article 
promoted to 
receive featured 
article status 
 
Virginia Tech 
shooting article 
(editing case study) 
1. The number of edits and editors is 
not associated with article 
promotion  
2. The number of anonymous edits 
and breadth of top contributor 
experience negatively associated 
with article promotion 
3. Revisions and knowledge-depth of 
top contributors positively 
associated with article promotion 
Kittur and 
Kraut 2008 
Theories of group 
coordination (no 
hypotheses) 
Quantitative analysis 
of variables 
associated with 
23,619 articles with 
changing quality 
scores  
Wikipedia article 
quality score 
1. High concentration of the main 
work, with more contributors in 
supporting roles associated with 
change in quality score 
2. Equal work distribution and 
coordination on the talk page is 
not associated with quality scores  
Stvilia et al. 
2007 
None (grounded 
approach)  
Case study with 
qualitative and 
quantitative 
techniques 
Wikipedia editing 
activities across 
articles, talk, policy, 
and user pages 
1. When editors modify each other’s 
contributions, it implicitly or 
explicitly involves an evaluation of 
the quality of those contributions 
2. Self-selection allows significant 
savings in terms of selection and 
coordination costs 
Wilkinson 
and 
Huberman 
2007 
None (no 
hypotheses) 
Comparing editing 
activities in featured 
and none-featured 
Wikipedia articles  
 
Wikipedia featured 
article status as a 
proxy of quality  
1. Correlation found between the 
number of edits and distinct 
editors and quality  
Wöhner and 
Peters 2009 
None (no 
hypotheses) 
Algorithm-based 
comparison of the life 
cycles of 100 featured 
and good articles and 
100 articles nominated 
for deletion 
Wikipedia articles 
1. Identified 11 life-cycle metrics 
associated with quality used for 
the algorithm  
2. Length of articles and high 
intensity in contribution activity is 
most associated with quality score 
The overview in Table 4.1 also reveals a second shortcoming—namely, that current research on 
organizational mechanisms and quality in OC systems is not based on an integrative theoretical 
framework. With the exception of a few studies (Arazy et al. 2011; Arazy and Nov 2010; Kittur 
and Kraut 2008), almost all research examining quality in OC systems is exploratory in nature, 
rather than anchored in theory or based on theoretically informed hypothesis testing (Anderka et 
al. 2011; Blumenstock 2008; De la Calzada and Dekhtyar 2010; Halfaker et al. 2011; Hu et al. 
2007; Javanmardi and Lopes 2010; Wilkinson and Huberman 2007; Wöhner and Peters 2009). 
This lack of theoretical anchoring makes it difficult to know how mechanisms relate to outcomes 
and how to consolidate findings from different studies. As a result, prominent researchers in the 
field call for studies that are more theory-informed to build new theoretical knowledge on OC 
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system governance beyond what we can know through empirical work or research applying 
theories established long before OC systems emerged (Arazy et al. 2011; Majchrzak 2009; Von 
Krogh et al. 2012).  
To advance our understanding of quality management in OC systems, we draw on PIC theory 
(Mindel et al. 2018) to focus on resolution of content quality issues related to information 
pollution. The lens of PIC theory allows us to consolidate previous findings in the OC system 
quality literature under a single overarching theoretical framework. Moreover, zooming in on the 
information pollution issue promotes broader theoretical understanding of how systems 
characterized by low barriers to participation work to reduce errors, improve quality, and address 
biased as well as manipulated content.  
4.3 Information Pollution in Polycentric Information Commons 
Three decades ago, Orman (1984) identified information pollution as a major problem in the 
information age. Defined as the contamination of information supply with incomplete, inconsistent, 
or irrelevant information (pp. 64), Orman argued that information pollution will negatively impact 
organizations. This notion received initially little attention, yet there is a renewed theoretical 
interest in the phenomenon as it pertains to open-access platforms characterized by low barriers to 
participation such as social media, online communities and Wikis Drawing on the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin 1968) and collective-action paradigms related to the governance of common 
access resource systems in the physical world (Ostrom 1990), Mindel et al. (2018) conceptualize 
open-access platforms online as “information commons”, and theorize that their long-term 
sustainability is threatened by information pollution.  
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PIC theory posits that when an unlimited number of often-anonymous participants are free to 
upload content online, it is almost inevitable that some contributions will be polluted (Mindel et 
al. 2018). Previously researched phenomena exemplifying information pollution include 
manipulated online reviews (Mayzlin et al. 2014), fake and heavily biased news circulating on 
social media (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017), buggy code (Gyimothy et al. 205), and erroneous 
information uploaded to online forums and Wikis (Clauson et al. 2008; Kata 2012). Information 
pollution can be viewed as any type of content that is misaligned with the goal of the information 
commons (Mindel et al. 2018), including uploading factually accurate information about a certain 
topic to an information commons dedicated to an entirely different issue. Unchecked persistent 
pollution is likely to reduce the value of the information commons to those who appropriate its 
content; it can also discourage those who provide content from making further contributions. 
Because the long-term sustainability of information commons depends on the balance between 
continuous engagement and renewal of participants17 (Butler 2011; Ransbotham and Kane 2011), 
continuing pollution can potentially set in motion a downward spiral (Mindel et al. 2018).  
Typically, pollution of open-access systems—such as a contaminated lake or a littered park—is 
addressed by paid workers who are employed by the government or subcontracted through a 
private firm. Similarly, government and private resources are increasingly being deployed to 
monitor information pollution online (Chen 2014; Kanter 2018). Still, the sheer scale of the 
information uploaded online daily makes it impossible for content monitors to address it all in an 
effective manner. Information commons 18  such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube employ 
                                                          
17 PIC theory distinguishes between three broad categories of participant stakeholders: producers of the systems, 
providers of content, and appropriators of content.  
18 According to PIC theory, any system online that relies on self-selecting content contributors who are free to 
participate or exit at any time may be viewed as an information commons, regardless of its ownership structure.  
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thousands of dedicated content monitors, but even these resource-rich systems find it difficult to 
keep up with information pollution (Chen 2014; Kanter 2018). Inspired by research on bottom-up, 
polycentric governance of physical local resource systems (Ostrom 1990), PIC theory suggests 
providing the community of users with the power and the tools to monitor pollution and address it 
themselves on the local level of the information commons.19  
4.3.1 Operational Level of Governance 
PIC theory points out that polycentric principles manifest at three different but closely related 
levels of governance: constitutional, collective-choice, and operational (Table 4.2, Figure 4.1). 
Although the tiers are distinct, they build on each other and influence each other’s evolution 
through feedback loops. The constitutional level of governance defines the overarching goal20 of 
the system through basic guidelines, terms-of-use rules, and the technical features put in place. 
Constitutional rules are set by the system developers—that is, the producers of the information 
commons. Collective-choice is the level of governance where participants—that is, content 
providers—influence the adoption and development of rules and features. The degree of collective-
choice effectiveness depends on the system producers’ inclusivity and receptiveness to feedback. 
In most information commons, providers may petition producers to evolve and change rules and 
features. In some PICs, such as Wikipedia, providers may even devise certain rules and features. 
The rules and features determined on the constitutional and collective-choice levels directly impact 
how information providers operationally engage with the system day to day. In turn, problems and 
phenomenon encountered on the operational level may further inform action on the collective-
                                                          
19 We address the downsides of allowing participants more power to monitor each other in the “Discussion” section.  
20 Information pollution, according to PIC theory, is information that departs or conflicts with the information 
commons’ overarching goal. For example, uploading fiction to an information commons dedicated to creating 
encyclopedic information would be considered pollution.  
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choice level. In some cases, collective-choice may influence the adjustment of core constitutional 
policies and features (Mindel et al. 2018).  
Table 4.2 Polycentric Levels of Governance 
Level Definition Examples from Wikipedia 
Constitutional  
The core policies and technical features 
set by the information commons 
producers that create the conditions for 
polycentricity 
• The constant availability of live-editing function to 
all users 
• The five pillars (Wikipedia’s constitutional rules) 
Collective-choice 
The policies, rules, and technical 
features created or influenced by the 
information commons providers  
• Tens of key policies and guidelines set by 
Wikipedia’s providers21 
• Thousands of templates created to tag problems 
in articles 
• Arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes 
Operational 
The day-to-day information provision 
activities based on the rules and 
features set by producers on the 
constitutional level and by peer 
providers on the collective-choice level 
• Hundreds of millions of edits to articles 
• Hundreds of thousands of postings of template 
tags to indicate a problem with an article 
• Hundreds of thousands of postings of links to 
guidelines and policies in comments on edits 
In Wikipedia, the five fundamental pillar rules22 represent the constitutional level of polycentric 
governance granting the community of participants the freedom of collective-choice in 
determining the rules that govern most operational details. The collective-choice rules created by 
the community, in turn, directly and indirectly guide the everyday editing of articles and associated 
talk pages. An example of the nesting of polycentric governance is the constitutional rule, 
“Wikipedia is written from a neutral point of view,” which inspires the collective action 
responsible for creating templates for flagging biased content that, when posted, inspire 
operational actions such as deletion of biased content by self-directed providers. 
                                                          
21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_policies_and_guidelines 
22 (1) Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. (2) Wikipedia is written from a neutral point of view. (3) Wikipedia is free 
content that anyone can use, edit, and distribute. (4) Wikipedia’s editors should treat each other with respect and 
civility. (5) Wikipedia has no firm rules. (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Five_pillars) 
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Figure 4.1 Ostrom’s Levels of Governance23 
 
At present, PIC theory addresses the constitutional and collective-choice levels of polycentric 
governance of information commons by focusing on greater inclusivity in decision-making on 
rules and technical features for boundary setting, peer monitoring, modifications, and peer 
recognition. In our research, we draw on PIC theory and expand it to include the operational level 
of governance by examining how polycentricity impacts pollution resolution when it arises during 
content development.24  
4.3.2 Polycentric Principles  
Polycentric governance evolves incrementally through collective-choice processes; this contrasts 
starkly with traditional organization governance, which is deployed top-down on subjects at lower 
levels of the hierarchy. A high degree of collective-choice—the notion that the community sets the 
rules through consensus—is found to be associated with the long-term success of local 
arrangements governing shared resource systems such as grazing grounds, fisheries, and forests 
                                                          
23 Adapted from Ostrom et al (1994, p. 47).  
24 “Action Situation” on the operational level.  
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(Ostrom 1990). Correspondingly, PIC theory asserts that a multitude of independent centers of 
decision-making operating within the frame of an overarching goal is the key to the long-term 
sustainability of information commons (Mindel et al. 2018). The theory also asserts that open 
content provision is a double-edged sword—potentially generative and degenerative at the same 
time—and that an information commons should ideally incorporate four polycentric principles in 
its governance to reduce the prevalence and impact of threats arising from the system’s open 
nature.  
First, an information commons should not solely rely on paid outsiders for monitoring, but rather 
should allow the community to police itself as much as possible. Defined as “the extent to which 
rules and features afford peer monitoring and gradual sanctioning to support appropriate 
behavior and dispute resolution in an information commons” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the 
principle of shared accountability aims to create a sense of ownership toward the information 
commons among participants. The principle of shared accountability suggests that the more the 
community actively monitors against those who break the information commons boundaries, the 
more it will be able to serve its overarching goal. Focusing on resolving information pollution on 
the operational level, shared accountability can manifest in different ways, including flagging of 
polluted content or disruptive users, direct removal of content, and community-based arbitration 
mechanisms to resolve disputes. Shared accountability works to reduce the cost of monitoring 
against information pollution and is predicated on the idea that, when participants in the 
information commons share the task of maintaining its integrity, they are more likely to resolve 
pollution effectively. 
Second, an information commons should allow participants a high degree of freedom in 
determining the rules on content and conduct boundaries. Defined as “the extent to which rules 
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and technical infrastructure features afford information provision and appropriation consistent 
with the information commons’ overarching goal” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the principle of 
boundary regulation helps address collective-action threats by increasing the community’s sense 
of the content and conduct that should characterize the information commons. Every information 
commons has a different overarching goal, which necessitates context-specific boundaries (Ren et 
al. 2007). The principle of boundary regulation suggests that a high degree of inclusion of 
participants in setting rules will lead to higher consensus and a greater likelihood that the 
boundaries will be accepted and followed. Resolving pollution on the operational level requires a 
certain level of awareness of the boundaries—that is, the rules on content and acceptable 
conduct—by participants. In most cases, boundary regulation occurs when participants simply 
communicate the rules to those who seem unaware of them; in Wikipedia, for instance, participants 
might ask someone not to post content about dogs in an article dedicated to cats, or cite the policy 
against original research in article editing when that issue arises. In other instances, core 
participants with administrative authority may issue more-official warnings and may even ban 
those who insist on ignoring the information commons’ boundaries.  
Third, an information commons should avoid sudden top-down dictated changes that might upset 
participants and instead incrementally adapt in a bottom-up fashion. Defined as “the extent to 
which changes in infrastructure and rules are gradually introduced and providers and 
appropriators are actively involved in shaping them” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the principle of 
incremental adaptation aims to strike a balance between the need to adapt and sensitivity to 
participants’ needs and opinions. The principle of incremental adaptation suggests that those who 
are most closely involved with the everyday operational dynamics of the information commons 
are also more likely to provide constructive feedback for its adaptation. Moreover, it suggests that 
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smaller changes are more likely to be positively received, as opposed to sudden extensive changes 
that may alienate many participants. Incremental adaptation also reduces the cost of experimenting 
with changes. If a certain change is only gradually different from the previous version and is well 
received, it can be quickly incorporated and further adapted. On the other hand, if it is not well 
received, it is easy to replace it with another incremental adaptation. On the operational level, 
incremental rather than extensive modification of OSS code or wiki content is more likely to lead 
to output that is more balanced, contains fewer errors, and gains more consensus.  
Lastly, because information commons depend on volunteers for content, they should create a 
positive environment for those actively participating. Defined as “the extent to which providers 
are acknowledged by peers, appropriators, and producers” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the 
principle of provider recognition aims to enhance the personal and social experience for 
participants. The provider recognition principle suggests that a volunteer workforce must be 
motivated to continuously engage with the information commons. On the operational level, 
provider recognition may be manifested in the form of direct recognition for high-quality work, as 
well as in the awarding of virtual status and popularity symbols such as avatars, icons, likes, smiley 
faces, and any other signal of positive acknowledgment. 
4.4 Study Design and Hypotheses 
In our research, we focus on pollution events in one of the most influential OC systems online: the 
English Wikipedia25 (Fallis 2008; Tapscott and Williams 2008). Wikipedia is an archetype of 
polycentricity as its governance has almost entirely been devised by its community members 
(Aaltonen and Lanzara 2015; Butler et al. 2008; Viegas et al. 2007). The website is a dynamic 
                                                          
25 Appendix A provides details on data. 
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information repository that is constantly updated and improved through the work of numerous 
volunteers operating independently outside of a centralized organizational order. Prior research 
shows that although Wikipedia contains inaccurate, vandalized, biased, and incomplete 
information (Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; Lavasa et al. 2011), it is for the 
most part considered to be a high-quality source of encyclopedic information (Brown 2011; 
Chesney 2006; Giles 2005). As such, it may provide important lessons regarding pollution 
resolution during content development for other information commons characterized by low 
barriers to participant entry and exit.  
4.4.1 Dependent Variable  
Wikipedia’s overarching goal is to provide encyclopedic information. The articles should be 
accurate, complete, relatively concise, and stick to reporting facts—any information that fails to 
align with these criteria and overall encyclopedic aims can be viewed as polluted. 
To govern article development, Wikipedia’s users have devised, through a process of collective-
choice, a multitude of templates that can be placed on article pages to signal to readers and the 
community of information providers that something is not right (Anderka et al. 2011). At present, 
Wikipedia has 195 such major templates and hundreds of subtemplates; one of the more familiar 
templates is the general cleanup template, which signals that an article is in suboptimal shape and 
needs intensive attention to resolve issues with its content (Figure 4.2). When an article is tagged 
for cleanup, a message box appears on the top of the article page stating that the article “may 
require cleanup to meet Wikipedia’s quality standards.”  
 
Figure 4.2 Wikipedia’s Cleanup Tag 
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The guidelines for cleanup template usage encourage those who post it to specify the parts of the 
article requiring attention, but often the posted templates are simply general notices that caution 
readers and serve as a call for action aimed at prompting potential providers to improve the state 
of the article. The posting of the cleanup template also automatically adds the article to a list on 
the “Wikiproject cleanup” page, where information providers interested in cleanup tasks can see 
it. Data shows that a cleanup template can remain on an article page for months and even years 
before an information provider makes the evaluation that it is no longer needed and removes it. 
Based on the premise that timely pollution resolution is important for stabilizing article quality 
while reducing its adverse impact on trust among appropriators, in our analysis, we focus on the 
period between the posting and removal of the general cleanup template. Hence, the unit of 
analysis is pollution event and the outcome variable of interest is the time to resolve the event as 
an indication of effective resolution of information pollution.  
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
PIC theory asserts that polycentric governance helps reduce pollution on average; the challenge is 
to identify how polycentricity manifests in the context of an individual information commons and 
how different polycentric governance principles work in detail (Mindel et al. 2018). Wikipedia is 
a behemoth encompassing multiple tiers of governance (Forte et al. 2009; Morgan and Zachry 
2010). However, because our objective is to identify polycentric governance on the operational 
level of article editing, we focus on identifying polycentric practices and examining their impact 
on resolution time during pollution events.  
The posting of a cleanup template represents an act of shared accountability in which an 
information commons member cares enough about the site’s overarching goal to take the extra 
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step to warn readers and spur action by the community. While in most information commons the 
act of shared accountability ends with flagging (after which an algorithm or an employed content 
monitor will address the issue), in Wikipedia, the community of participants determines the state 
of the content. Hence, shared accountability continues after the posting of a cleanup template 
through shared efforts to edit the article until the cleanup signal is deemed unnecessary. As such, 
we consider the work distribution during the pollution event to measure the extent to which the 
community shares the responsibility of resolving it. Prior research finds that relatively few 
providers are responsible for the bulk of the work in OC systems (Kittur and Kraut 2008; Von 
Krogh et al. 2013), and PIC theory suggest that too many participants active at the same time can 
create congestion (Mindel et al. 2018). Building on prior research and PIC theory, we therefore 
assert that the extent to which work is proportionally distributed among a few productive providers 
determines the speed with which pollution resolution is achieved. Hence, we hypothesize:  
H1: Shared accountability in terms of proportionate work distribution in relation 
to number of providers reduces the time it takes to resolve pollution events. 
Being an encyclopedia, each Wikipedia article is naturally bounded by its topic and the site’s 
overarching goal of producing accurate, complete, well written, relatively concise, and neutral 
information. Over the years, the Wikipedia community has devised multiple editorial policies to 
guide the boundary of articles (Butler et al. 2008; Morgan and Zachry 2010). Examples of these 
policies include guidelines calling for neutrality, verifiability, and avoiding the use of copyrighted 
material and original research. Prior examination of the prevalence of policy citations calls for 
more research on the relationship between evocation of policies and consequential collective 
actions in OC systems (Beschastnikh et al. 2008). As such, we draw on PIC theory to assert that 
policy citation in article editing represents an act of boundary regulation.  
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In the same way that evoking rules and policies in the physical world often represents an act of 
boundary regulation in a shared resource system (for instance, the highway patrol officer cites the 
law when enforcing the boundaries of acceptable conduct on the road), evoking policies in 
information commons represents an act of boundary regulation. In Wikipedia, we therefore 
consider the number of policies cited in edits during the pollution event to measure the level of 
boundary regulating practices. We expect increasing evocation of policies to initially slow down 
pollution resolution before speeding it up. We further explain why. Policies in Wikipedia are 
developed by self-selecting policymakers and determined through consensus on the collective-
choice level. Most Wikipedia editors do not take part in this process and are likely unaware of the 
policies guiding content boundaries. An initial increase in citation of rules during pollution events 
thus indicates misalignment between editing activities and the set standards and boundaries on 
content. However, as policies are continuously cited, editors—that is, information providers—
increasingly get on the “same page” which leads to pollution resolution.26 Drawing on PIC theory 
on the role of boundary regulation during pollution resolution, we predict that, after reaching a 
threshold, policy citation will help stabilize boundaries which, in turn, will help reach pollution 
resolution.  
H2: Boundary regulation through policy citations increases pollution resolution 
time up to a point and reduces it thereafter.  
Wiki technology predicates on the idea that unconstrained individual users can make numerous 
modifications conveniently through their web browsers (Leuf and Cunningham 2001). This 
opportunity to implement incremental changes gives rise to a constantly growing body of digital 
artifacts. As a result, every aspect of Wikipedia is modified in an incremental manner, including 
                                                          
26 This is a little like getting teenagers to clean after themselves through continuous reminders. At first, they might 
not listen and keep making a mess, but with enough nagging they are more likely to clean.  
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its rules and policies pages, templates, projects, and, of course, the article pages themselves. Each 
discrete edit is an adaptation that slightly modifies the article from its previous form. In our data, 
we measure the number of article revisions during the pollution event. Our expectation is that more 
revisions will lead to faster pollution resolution. Drawing on PIC theory, we hypothesize:  
H3: Incremental adaptation through revisions reduces the time it takes to resolve 
pollution events.  
Much has been written on what motivates Wikipedia participants to spend their time and energy 
editing articles for no pay. Researchers have identified diverse motivations that can be loosely 
grouped into reasons of personal and social fulfillment that are partially intrinsic and partially 
driven by peer recognition (Kuznetsov 2006; Nov 2007; Yang and Lai 2010). Wikipedia has a few 
mechanisms to signal peer recognition for work on the collective-choice level, including “barn 
stars”—virtual medals awarded by peers (Kriplean et al. 2008)—and assignment of administrator 
privileges (Burke and Kraut 2008). On the operational level of article editing, however, Wikipedia 
does not have a peer-recognition mechanism; that is, individual edits do not receive “likes” or 
“smiley faces.” On the other hand, there is a peer-rejection mechanism in place. 
As part of its effort to combat vandalism of articles, Wikipedia has a revert mechanism to restore 
the article to its previous, pre-vandalized form. While the revert mechanism has proven 
instrumental for quick resolution of vandalism (Priedhorsky et al. 2007), it is also known to be 
abused at times (Sumi and Yasseri 2011). Instead of reverting to the previous version to combat 
vandalism, some providers revert articles to a previous version simply because they like it better. 
By doing that, providers essentially disregard the effort of their peers. Thus, while we do not have 
a valid way to operationalize provider recognition, we suggest that reverts of multiple revisions 
represent a form of provider rejection. PIC theory asserts that provider recognition is positively 
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associated with pollution resolution. Using a reversed logic, we theorize that provider rejection is 
likely to have the opposite effect. Because the revert mechanism is intended to reverse vandalism 
and low-quality edits, its use is likely to be associated with faster pollution resolution at first. 
However, drawing on the logic of PIC theory, we hypothesize that persistent rejection of 
contributions is ultimately likely to lead to a slowdown in pollution resolution.  
H4: Provider rejection through multiple revision reverts reduces pollution 
resolution time up to a point and increases it thereafter. 
To recap, PIC theory predicts that the more that independent participants share the responsibility 
of incrementally adapting an article—while abiding by the community-set rules and avoiding 
rejecting each other’s efforts—the faster pollution will be addressed. Table 4.3 summarizes the 
main constructs and variable operationalization. 
Table 4.3 Variable Operationalization 
Construct Definition Variable Operationalization Unit 
Pollution  
The extent to which information fails 
to align with the overarching goal of 
the information commons 
Pollution 
resolution 
time 
(DV) 
The period between the 
posting of a cleanup 
template and its removal 
Days 
Shared 
Accountability 
The extent to which rules and 
features afford peer monitoring and 
gradual sanctioning to support 
appropriate behavior and dispute 
resolution 
Work 
distribution 
in relation to 
information 
providers 
(IV1) 
Work distribution 
equality between the 
posting of a cleanup 
template and its removal  
1 − 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼27
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
 
Boundary 
Regulation 
The extent to which rules and 
technical infrastructure features 
afford information provision and 
appropriation consistent with the 
information commons’ overarching 
goal 
Policy 
citations  
(IV2) 
Number of policies cited 
in edit comments 
between the posting of a 
cleanup template and its 
removal 
Links to 
policies 
                                                          
27 Measure of equality ranging from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates complete equal work distribution while 1 indicates a 
complete unequal work distribution. 
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Incremental 
Adaptation 
The extent to which changes in 
infrastructure and rules are gradually 
introduced and providers and 
appropriators are actively involved in 
shaping them 
Revisions 
(IV3) 
Number of edits made to 
the article between the 
posting of a cleanup 
template and its removal 
Discrete edits 
Provider 
Rejection 
 
The extent to which providers feel 
rejected by peers 
Reverted 
revisions 
(IV4)  
Number of reverts of 
revisions between the 
posting of a cleanup 
template and its removal 
Reverted 
revisions 
 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
Previous research assessing projects in OC systems typically controls for a project’s level of 
popularity and completeness (Ransbotham and Kane 2011). Mature projects or projects that 
naturally draw more participants are likely to exhibit different patterns and dynamics in 
comparison to other, less developed and more peripheral projects. In our analysis, we use five 
control variables indicative of article completeness and popularity among providers prior to the 
pollution event. We control for article maturity by accounting for its length in characters and its 
age prior to the posting of the cleanup template. We control for the level of the article popularity 
and activity by accounting for the number of unique providers making edits to it prior to the posting 
of the cleanup template. We control for the number of references an article has at the time when 
pollution event begins because it partially indicates the article maturity and quality state prior to 
the posting of the cleanup template. We control for the article history of explicit coordination 
(Kittur and Kraut 2008) by accounting for the number of unique participants on the talk page prior 
to the posting of the cleanup template.  
4.5 Dataset Construction 
We used a freely available English Wikipedia database dump from 1 January 2017. It would be 
computationally very demanding to sample pollution events directly from the dump; instead, we 
first took a large random sample of 340,000 articles and identified 5,487 pollution events in them 
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using regular expression patterns. The identified events appeared on 4,679 different articles; i.e. 
some articles contained more than one pollution event (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Pollution Event Length and Order Across Articles  
Number of pollution event N (pages) Mean (days) SD (days) Min (days) Max (days) 
1  4,020 520.66 718.98  028 3,896.59 
2 519 356.14 507.36 0 2,841.33 
3 or more 119 188.8 361.23 0.001 2,770.88 
Pollution event order 
First 4,679 478.12 689.85 0 3,896.59 
Second 639 421.9 563.4 0 2,841.33 
Third or more 169 274.37 457.47 0.001 2,770.88 
Because an event appears in exactly one article, every event has an equal probability of being 
sampled and our base sampling strategy is unbiased. There are, however, three potential sources 
of selection bias that emerged from the way we further processed the data.  
First, the current version of our Python tools could not process three very large articles (more than 
~2GB data); the article topics were “Barack Obama” (page id 534366), “Syrian Civil War” (page 
id 30741795), and “Adolf Hitler” (page id 2731583). Given the topics of the three omitted articles, 
it is not surprising that they had attracted many edits. Although these articles may also have 
contained pollution events, we expect the potential bias introduced by the omission of these articles 
to be negligible. If each omitted article contained 10 pollution events (vs. the maximum of 8 events 
per article in the remaining sample), we still would have omitted only 0.5 % of the randomly 
sampled events. 
                                                          
28 Some articles receive the cleanup template right at their birth to prompt providers to improve them.  
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Second, to reduce heterogeneity, we limited our analysis to 4,325 pollution events ranging in 
duration from 24 hours to 1,500 days.29 Cleanup templates that appear for less than 24 hours on an 
article either have a high likelihood of being posted by mistake or did not reach consensus for 
being required. At the other extreme, we find that exceptionally long pollution events lasting more 
than 1,500 days are mostly on outlier articles covering obscure topics. Such articles typically have 
low levels of editorial activity. 
Third, some articles contained more than one pollution event, which raised a question as to whether 
the two (or more) events on the same article were independent. To address this, we ran a series of 
robustness analyses in which we tested our model on articles with a varying number of pollution 
events and their varying order.  
We also retrieved data for 172,576 talk pages corresponding to article pages in the sample (though 
not all articles have a talk page) to examine communications and coordination activities during 
pollution event. However, due to the relatively low intensity of activity on talk pages during 
pollution events (addressed in the “Descriptive Statistics” section), we decided not to pursue this 
angle further. Appendix A offers more details about the data processing. 
4.6 Analysis Results 
 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
It takes a relatively long time to resolve an information pollution event in Wikipedia; the mean 
pollution event lasted 324 days (SD 370.2 days). Although some articles in Wikipedia are “classic” 
encyclopedic topics, most address topics that are less familiar to the general population, and thus 
                                                          
29We follow the logic of past researchers of Wikipedia article quality, who often bound the analysis to avoid 
comparing pages significantly different in their stage of development; some, for instance, removed “stub” pages 
(Wilkinson and Huberman 2007).  
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require the attention of specific editors knowledgeable about the subject. We believe that this 
disparity in topic familiarity and the number of potential contributors knowledgeable of it is behind 
the skewed distribution and the high standard deviation in pollution resolution time. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics (N=4,325) 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Pollution event length (days) 324 370.2 030 1,499.2 
Article length at start of pollution event (characters) 10,049.6 16,283.6 0 207762 
Article age when pollution event starts (days) 845.2 996 0 5,353.5 
Number of providers active before pollution event 43.1 108.4 3 2,160 
Number of providers active before pollution: talk page 5.8 17.8 0 640 
Number of providers active during the pollution event  13.3 19.4 1 301 
References before pollution event 4.9 18.4 0 485 
Article length change (characters) 2,662.3 6,424.7 0 151,191 
Policy citations during the pollution event 5.3 13.1 0 301 
Revisions 43.5 94.2 0 1,854 
Work distribution (GINI)  0.63 0.18 0 0.97 
Reverted revisions  6.7 25.5 0 656 
Edit distance (net of all added/subtracted characters) 8,290.7 20,582 2 456,359 
An average of 13.3 providers made 43.5 revisions on average during a pollution event. The 
providers added and deleted a net average of 8,290.7 characters, which ultimately resulted in a 
change of 2,662.3 characters before the event was resolved. An average of 5.3 revisions during the 
event contained a reference to Wikipedia policy. Consistent with previous findings (Kittur and 
Kraut 2008) work distribution is fairly concentrated with a GINI coefficient of 0.63. We calculated 
work concentration as each article’s proportion of edit-distance (total characters added or 
removed) by each unique editor during the pollution event. The high GINI score indicates that a 
disproportionate amount of work was carried by a small number of editors.  
Past studies of work dynamics in OC systems are conflicted on the importance of explicit 
coordination; researchers find evidence that explicit coordination helps to improve outcomes 
                                                          
30 Some articles receive the cleanup template right at birth to prompt providers to improve them.  
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(Arazy and Nov 2010), but also that a disproportionate amount of work is carried out independently 
without any back-and-forth communication among participants (Kittur and Kraut 2008). In our 
data, we find that almost all editing activities during pollution events are largely devoid of explicit 
coordination via Wikipedia’s talk pages. During the considered pollution events, an average of 
only 1.8 providers participated on the talk page, making 4.7 revisions to it and citing on average 
only 0.06 policies. 
Examination of pairwise correlations (Table 4.6) shows a close association between three of the 
four variables of polycentric practices: policy citations and revisions (r = .83), policy citations and 
reverted revisions (r = .87), and revisions and reverted revisions (r = .87). PIC theory asserts that, 
in an ideal scenario, polycentric governance practices complement each other (Mindel et al. 2018), 
and we are not surprised to see the strong correlation.  
Table 4.6 Correlations 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Pollution event length                          
2 Policy citations  .30**            
3 Policy citations (squared) .10** .82**           
4 Revisions .22** .83** .63**          
5 Reverted revisions  .13** .87** .76** .87**         
6 Work distribution (GINI)  .29** .32** .12** .41** .26**        
7 Edit distance  .12** .45** .28** .63** .42** .37**       
8 Article age .15** .26** .10** .20** .18** .17** .15**      
9 Length of article  .30** .30** .16** .36** .27** .26** .46** .42**     
10 Providers during pollution .30** .83** .56** .92** .81** .45** .55** .26** .33**    
11 Providers before pollution  .06** .35** .20** .35** .35** .19** .25** .50** .61** .38**   
12 Providers before: talk page -.05 .27** .16** .28** .27** .15** .24** .39** .56** .30** .87**  
13 References before pollution -.02 .19** .10** .17** .14** .11** .31** .29** .65** .17** .47** .45** 
 * p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
 
4.6.2 Model Specification and Analysis Procedures 
We specify our baseline model as follows: 
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PEL=β0+ β1Controls+ β3SHA+β4BR+ β5BR2+β6INA+ β7PRJ+β8PRJ2+ ε (Equation 1) 
In the model, PEL is the pollution event length, SHA is shared accountability, BR is boundary 
regulation, INA is incremental adaptation, and PRJ is provider rejection. Equation 1 includes the 
three polycentric practices (SHA, BR, and INA). However, we had to revise Equation 1’s 
specification because of the high colinearity between reverted revisions, policy citations, and 
revisions. Specifically, we follow a two-step process to estimate the unique portion of PRJ 
(U_PRJ) that is not overlapped with BR and INA. We first use Equation 2 to estimate the portion 
of PRJ that is overlapped with BR and INA (O_PRJ). We then use Equation 3 to compute the 
unique portion of PRJ (U_PRJ) that is not overlapped with BR and INA: 
O_PRJ = β0 + β1BR + β2INA (Equation 2) 
U_PRJ = PRJ – O_PRJ (Equation 3) 
Next, we replace PRJ with U_PRJ in Equation 1 to get the following model: 
PEL=β0+ β1Controls+ β3SHA+β4BR+ β5BR2+β6INA+ β7U_PRJ+β8U_PRJ2+ ε (Equation 4) 
We use hierarchical OLS regression analysis to estimate the model, adding variables in the 
following order: (1) the control variables, (2) shared accountability, (3) boundary regulation, (4) 
squared value of boundary regulation (BR2) to test for the hypothesized curvilinearity, (5) 
incremental adaptation, (6) standardized residual of provider rejection, and (7) standardized 
residual of provider rejection squared (PRJ2).  
4.6.3 Results 
Equation 1’s model explains 40.5% of the variance in pollution event length (where 11.9% is 
explained by the control variables). Each individually added polycentricity variable uniquely 
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contributes to the variance explained (Table 4.7). The variance inflation factor (VIF) values are 
less than 5, suggesting that multicolinearity is not a major issue. 
Table 4.7 Equation I Regressions Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .314*** .303*** .283*** .279*** .262*** .238*** .215*** 
Length of article  .065*** .007 -.088*** -.068*** -.052*** -.058*** -.065*** 
Providers before pollution event -.521*** -.550*** -.541*** -.650*** -.654*** -.600*** -.545*** 
Providers before: talk page .126*** .125*** .019 .100*** .109*** .109*** .029* 
References before pollution  -.025** .005 .075*** .054*** .043*** .030*** .055*** 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.274*** -.206*** -.161*** -.172*** -.187*** -.135*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .375*** .853*** .972*** .964*** 1.632*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    -.493*** -.500*** -.490*** -1.17*** 
Revisions (INA)     .262*** -.145*** -.148*** 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.241*** -.447*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       .347*** 
Model F 774*** 1,115*** 1,744*** 1,719*** 1,545*** 1,779*** 1,775*** 
F change  2,487*** 4,477*** 1,082*** 107*** 2,615*** 1,073*** 
Adj. R2 0.119 0.189 0.298 0.324 0.334 0.382 0.405 
ΔR2  0.07 0.109 0.025 0.01 0.056 0.022 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
H1, which predicted that shared accountability (proportionate work distribution in relation to 
number of providers) will reduce the length of pollution events, is supported (β = -.135, p < .0001). 
H2, which predicted that boundary regulation (policy citations) will be associated with a longer 
pollution event to a point and a quicker pollution resolution thereafter, is supported. Policy 
citations are associated with an increase in the length of pollution events (β = 1.632, p < .0001) 
and policy citations squared with a decrease in their length (β = -1.1705, p < .0001). H3, which 
predicts that incremental adaption (number of revisions) will decrease the length of pollution 
events, is supported (β = -.148, p < .0001). H4, which predicted that provider rejection (reverted 
revisions) will be associated with a shorter pollution event length to a point and a longer pollution 
event resolution thereafter, is supported.  
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We find all control variables to be significantly associated with pollution event length. We find 
that age of articles is associated with increased pollution event length (β = .215, p < .0001), and 
article length is associated with a decrease in pollution event length (β = -.065, p < .0001). The 
number of providers involved with an article prior to the posting of the cleanup template is 
associated with decreased pollution event length (β = -.545, p < .0001). The number of providers 
involved on the article talk page prior to the posting of the cleanup template is associated with 
increased pollution event length (β = .029, p < .05). The number of references prior to the posting 
of the pollution tag is associated with an increase in pollution event length (β = .055, p < .0001). 
These results suggest that more-mature articles with a history of high provider involvement are 
more likely to resolve any arising pollution faster.  
4.6.4. Robustness and Additional Analyses 
We conducted several robustness tests and additional analysis related to the impact of five key 
factors: the variance in the number of pollution events across articles, the variance in the order of 
pollution events, provider rejection, talk page activity, and veteran vs, new providers.  
Number of Pollution Events 
To test for the consistency of our hypothesized model across articles with a varying number of 
pollution events, we conducted three analyses. First, we tested the model with articles that had 
only a single pollution event (N=4,020). As Table B1 in Appendix B shows, the model results are 
consistent with our main analysis of pollution events from articles with varying numbers of 
pollution events. Second, we tested the model with articles that had two pollution events (519 
articles, N=1,038). As the model results (Table B2, Appendix B) show, incremental adaptation 
(revision) is no longer statistically significant in relation to pollution resolution time. Finally, we 
tested the model on articles containing three or more pollution events (119 articles, N=408). As 
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Table B3 in Appendix B shows, incremental adaption (revision) is positively associated with 
pollution event length, suggesting that it slows down pollution resolution. The results of these 
analyses suggest that incremental adaptation (revision) helps resolve pollution faster in articles 
with a single pollution event, but that this association reverses itself in articles with three or more 
pollution events.  
Order of Pollution Events 
To test for our hypothesized model’s consistency across pollution events based on their order, we 
conducted three analyses. First, we tested the model across all first events in our sample (N=4,679). 
As Table B4 in Appendix B shows, the direct relationship between boundary regulation and 
pollution resolution time is statistically insignificant. In all other respects, the model is consistent 
with the main model. Second, we tested the model across all second events (N=639). The model 
results (Table B5, Appendix B) are consistent with the main model, in which we do not distinguish 
between pollution event order. Finally, we tested the model across the third or more pollution event 
(N=169). As Table B6 in Appendix B shows, these results are inconsistent with our main model: 
(1) We detect no significant relationship between incremental adaptation and pollution resolution 
time. (2) We found no curvilinear relationship between provider rejection and pollution resolution 
time. This is slightly different from our research model findings. However, it is important to note 
that 97 percent of pollution events in the random sample has two or less pollution events; having 
a third or more pollution event is rather an atypical occurrence.  
Provider Rejection 
In the main specification, we incorporated U_PRJ and its squared term in the model specification 
(Equation 1), as PRJ is highly correlated with boundary regulation (policy citations) and 
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incremental adaptation (revision). By way of robustness, we evaluated a model with controls and 
only PRJ and SHA as per the following equation: 
PEL=β0+ β1Controls+ β2PRJ+β2PRJ2+ β3SHA+ ε 
We used a three-step hierarchical OLS regression analysis to estimate the equation, adding 
variables in the following order: 1) control variables, (2) provider rejection, and (3) squared value 
of provider rejection to test for the hypothesized curvilinearity. 
The model explains 24.3% of the variance in pollution event length (where 11.9% is explained by 
the control variables). The addition of provider rejection and provider rejection squared uniquely 
contributes to variance explained (Table 4.8). The VIF values are less than five, suggesting that 
multicolinearity is not a major issue.  
Table 4.8 Provider Rejection Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325)  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Article age .314*** .329*** .337*** .335*** 
Length of article .065*** -.023** -.020* -.109*** 
Providers before pollution event -.521*** -.536*** -.609*** -.549*** 
Providers before: talk page .126*** .046** .114*** .057*** 
References before pollution -.025** .046*** .029*** .061*** 
Reverted revisions (PRJ)  .274*** .528*** .263*** 
Reverted revissions2 (PRJ2)   -.274*** -.072*** 
Work distribution / providers (SHA)    -.276*** 
Model F 773.6 1,044.7 954.2 1,156.1 
F change  2,115.1 337.9 2,085.2 
Adj. R2 .119 .179 .19.8 .243 
ΔR2  .06 .019 .045 
     * p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
Our results also support H4, which predicted that provider rejection (reverted revisions) will 
reduce the length of pollution events to a point and increase it thereafter. Provider rejection is 
associated with an increase in pollution event length (β = .263, p < .0001), and provider rejection 
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squared is associated with a decrease in pollution event length (β = -.072, p < .0001). Apart from 
references before a pollution event, the control variables are statistically associated with pollution 
event length. 
Talk Pages 
Previous research shows mixed results regarding the importance of explicit coordination; 
researchers have found evidence that explicit coordination helps to improve outcomes (Arazy and 
Nov 2010; Viegas et al. 2007), but also that a disproportionate amount of work is carried out in 
relative isolation, without communication between contributors working on the same article 
(Kittur and Kraut 2008). In our data, we find that almost all editing activity during pollution events 
is devoid of explicit coordination through the talk page. An average of only 1.9 providers (SD 3.5) 
participated on the talk page during an event, making an average of four revisions (SD 16.9) to it 
and citing on average only 0.05 policies (SD 0.6). We performed a hierarchical OLS hierarchical 
analysis adding variables in the following order: (1) control variables, (2) polycentric governance 
variables, and (3) talk page variables (see Table B7, Appendix B). We find that the addition of talk 
page variables adds only modestly to variance explained (adjusted R2 changes only 1.7 %) and that 
our hypotheses still hold when we include the talk page variables. 
Veteran and New Providers 
We further examined how work distribution between veteran and new providers impacts pollution 
resolution. Consistent with previous research (Panciera et al. 2009; Shah 2006), we find that 
greater involvement of veterans is associated with faster pollution resolution. Interestingly, 
however, we find that most of the work during pollution events is shouldered by providers new to 
the article rather than by previous contributors to it. Approximately 85% of providers active during 
the pollution event were not active on the article prior to the cleanup template posting; further, 
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new providers were responsible for approximately three-fifths of the total aggregate edit distance 
during the pollution event. This indicates that the cleanup template acts as a call for action and is 
more effective at injecting new blood into the article than in rousing existing providers to improve 
their work. We again performed a hierarchical OLS analysis adding variables in the following 
order: (1) control variables, (2) polycentric governance variables, and (3) variable on veteran 
providers. The veteran provider variables are: (a) the ratio of editors who remain active (veteran 
editors of the article) in relation to all editors who were active before the pollution event; (b) the 
number of veterans; (c) the ratio of veterans to all editors active during the pollution event; and (d) 
the proportion, in characters, of the length change that veterans made As Table B8 in Appendix B 
shows, we find that the involvement of veteran providers reduces the length of pollution events, 
but including those variables adds only modestly to variance explained (adjusted R2 changes 
2.6%). Again, our hypotheses hold when considering veteran’s activities.  
4.7 Discussion 
Our empirical analysis supports the general assertion that polycentric governance practices 
influence pollution resolution in Wikipedia. Specifically, we find that shared accountability and 
incremental adaptation are linearly associated with faster pollution resolution, while boundary 
regulation and provider rejection have more complicated relationships. Based on these findings, 
we first bring together theoretical contributions to the literature on addressing quality in OC 
systems (Arazy and Nov 2010; Chesney 2006; Giles 2005; Kane 2010; Kittur and Kraut 2008; 
Wöhner and Peters 2009). We then move to discuss the findings in light of PIC theory (Mindel et 
al. 2018) and the implications of our findings for resolving pollution in OC systems and other 
online platforms with low barriers to participation. 
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4.7.1 Resolving Information Pollution in Open Collaboration Systems 
Our analysis shows how shared accountability, content boundary regulation, incremental 
adaptation of the output, and rejection of the work of peers affect the duration of pollution events. 
We thereby expand previous work on quality management (Halfaker et al. 2011) and other research 
on the importance of continuous, even mundane, contributions in OC systems (Beck et al. 2015). 
Our dependent variable, pollution event resolution time—as opposed to various article quality 
metrics that have been used in the past—provides new insights on quality management in OC 
systems such as Wikipedia when a local quality “crisis” arises. These insights concern the 
distribution and number of edits during the pollution event, as well as the use of policy citations 
as a governance mechanism at the operational level. 
Previous research on the connection between work distribution and quality in Wikipedia finds that 
unequal work distribution, where a limited number of participants do most of the work, is 
associated with higher quality of mature outputs (Kittur and Kraut 2008). Our findings add further 
insight by providing evidence on how work distribution across a limited number of participants 
impacts pollution resolution time. Consistent with previous work, we find that the limited number 
of participants is indeed positively associated with outcomes; however, we also find that the more 
equal the work distribution is across those participants, the faster the pollution resolution occurs. 
Future research should examine the optimal balance between number of participants and their work 
distribution in addressing quality problems as they arise.  
Previous research is mixed regarding the association between the number of edits and the final 
quality score of Wikipedia articles. Some studies find no relationship (Arazy and Nov 2010; Kane 
2010), while others detect a positive relationship (Javanmardi and Lopes 2010; Wilkinson and 
Huberman 2007). We find that, on the pollution event level, the number of edits is associated with 
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faster cleanup in articles with two or less pollution events, and that it becomes associated with 
slower pollution resolution in articles with three or more pollution events. This suggests that we 
need more research on how governance differences impact isolated and persistent pollution. 
Prior research provides insights into policy citations as a governance mechanism in Wikipedia 
(Beschastnikh et al. 2008), but it does not specify how these citations relate to quality management. 
Our findings suggest that policy citation—a mechanism for regulating article boundaries—at first 
slows down the cleanup but, after reaching a threshold, is associated with faster cleanup. We 
speculate that boundary regulation is initially likely to indicate confusion or disagreement 
regarding an article’s trajectory. However, consistent boundary regulation helps better align 
contributors on the article, which can stabilize its quality faster.  
Finally, prior research on the revert mechanism in Wikipedia finds it to be useful for combating 
vandalism (Priedhorsky et al. 2007) as a form of information pollution. However, researchers also 
find that the revert mechanism sometimes creates edit wars between providers with conflicting 
views on an article’s preferred trajectory (Yasseri et al. 2011). Other research finds that persistent 
rejection of contributions from new participants cause them to drop out, which is 
counterproductive for Wikipedia’s long-term sustainability (Halfaker et al. 2011,2013). We build 
on these insights and find that reverts of revisions between participating contributors (as opposed 
to individual reverts aimed at combatting attempts to presumably vandalize an article) are initially 
associated with faster pollution resolution, while persistent rejection of peer work slows it down. 
This suggests that the revert mechanism is effective initially for removing low-quality 
contributions but, when continuously used, it discourages participants from continuing to help 
clean up the article. This is consistent with past findings, yet the conceptualization of revision 
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reverts as indicating peer rejection gives us better theoretical insight into their negative association 
with quality management.  
4.7.2 Contribution to PIC Theory 
PIC outlines a multifaceted theoretical argument on how collective-action threats negatively 
impact the sustainability of online systems characterized by low barriers to participation. The 
theory argues that, to address collective-action threats and improve the odds of sustainability, these 
systems must create the conditions for free, unstructured participation in determining the system’s 
trajectory by incorporating polycentric governance practices in their design of rules and technical 
features. In other words, PIC theory asserts that users should be given more freedoms and face less 
restrictions in setting the boundaries, monitoring against rule violators, and gradually impacting 
the adjustment of system rules and features. The argument is based on Ostrom’s (1990) 
observations that polycentric governance is more effective than centralized control at sustaining 
shared resource systems in the physical world. However, adapting polycentric governance from 
the physical to the virtual realm is not straightforward and to date remains purely theoretical. By 
examining a specific part of the theory—the relationship between the four polycentric governance 
principles and the resolution of information pollution as one of five collective-action threats31—
we confirm the relationship between polycentric governance and pollution resolution and provide 
some important new insights currently not addressed in PIC theory.  
While we find shared accountability and incremental adaption to be directly associated with 
pollution resolution as predicted in PIC theory, we find the association between boundary 
regulation and pollution to be curvilinear—initially associated with a slowdown in resolution, and 
                                                          
31 The others are: free-riding, congestion, violations, and rebellion (Mindel et al. 2018). 
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only after reaching a threshold associated with more expedient pollution resolution. Incremental 
adaptation was found to speed-up resolution only in articles with a single pollution event; in 
articles with three or more pollution events, incremental adaptation was found to be negatively 
associated with resolution time. We speculate that repeated pollution is indicative of a difficulty 
in reaching a consensus over an article’s form and content. In our random sample, only about 3% 
of articles have three or more pollution events. Nonetheless, we identify here an opportunity for 
future research to examine in more detail polycentric governance in the face of repeated pollution.  
PIC theory did not predict the initial worsening in pollution resolution because of boundary 
regulation, yet it makes intuitive sense after observing this empirically. Citing rules during a 
collaborative effort to maintain its boundaries indicates that the participants are not aligned, but 
after the rules have been expressed enough times, the workflow becomes smoother and faster. This 
is what we believe happens during resolution of information pollution in Wikipedia—the initial 
increase in policy citations indicates a state of flux, yet persistent reminders about the article’s 
boundary help to get all participants aligned.  
Finally, PIC theory asserts that to keep the community members engaged, they should receive 
recognition for their efforts. Although Wikipedia has a couple of noteworthy provider recognition 
mechanisms, those mechanisms are expressed only on the collective-choice level in the 
background of article editing; no provider recognition mechanisms exist on the operational level, 
where the actual provision work takes place. For that reason, we could not directly examine how 
provider recognition positively relates to pollution resolution, but instead had to rely on the reverse 
logic that “provider rejection”—persistent rejection of peer contributions—is likely to negatively 
relate to pollution resolution. Although Wikipedia’s revert mechanism was adapted to combat 
vandalism and has proven effective for that, it also has the unintended consequence of becoming 
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a tool for edit wars and is used by editors with diverging views on an article’s trajectory to 
undermine each other’s work. Though we have no way to know for sure, we speculate that the 
negative impact of persistent rejection on pollution resolution is the combination of two factors: 
multiple rejections of contributions slows down the progress of cleaning; it also discourages those 
editors whose contributions were rejected from meaningfully participating in the cleaning of 
pollution.  
Our research also contributes to PIC theory by extending it to the operational level of polycentric 
governance. In Ostrom’s (1990) seminal work, she identifies three interrelated levels of 
governance: (1) constitutional, (2) collective-choice, and (3) operational. As Figure 4.2 shows, the 
three levels of governance, though distinct, are very much interrelated through permeable links of 
rules, policies, and feedback loops. In our research, we focus on the operational level, where 
policies and rules determined on the levels of constitutional and collective-choice inform the 
operational, day-to-day activities of contributors in the face of pollution. 
At present, PIC theory, while mentioning the three levels, does not directly address the distinction 
between levels. Better distinction between the levels of governance in the analysis of rules and 
technical features, however, provides more nuance as to how polycentric practices are incorporated 
in a system. In our research, we find that, while article governance hinges on the rules and technical 
features determined on the constitutional and collective-choice levels, conceptualizing 
polycentricity on the operational level is far from straight forward.  
The principle of shared accountability refers to the general desirability of having the community 
of providers participate together in governing the information commons (Mindel et al. 2018). 
However, logic and past research tell us that it is impractical and counterproductive to have 
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everyone participate (Kittur and Kraut 2008). Polycentricity is not about equal participation, but 
rather is about the spontaneous emergence and disappearance of independent centers of influence. 
We find that, in relation to pollution resolution on the operational level, it is desirable to have a 
limited number of providers, yet the more equally the workload is spread among them, the better 
the outcome. Thus, shared accountability on the operational level is not about how many people 
show up to help, but more about how the few that self-select to show up share the workload.  
Incremental adaptation is another abstract principle that appertains to the general desirability of 
having the information commons gradually adapt so as to avoid “rocking the boat” too much and 
also preserve the benefit of having multiple perspectives that build on previous foundations. As 
such, all of Wikipedia’s guidelines and templates are continuously generated in a gradual manner 
through continuous collective-choice processes. On the operational level, each single edit 
represents a pattern of incremental adaptation. In our research, we examined how such adaptation 
affects resolution of pollution events and find that there is a limit to how effective it can be. That 
is, we find that incremental adaptation on the operational level, though helpful in most cases 
(which have a single pollution event), is also associated with slower pollution resolution in articles 
with persistent pollution (three or more instances).  
The rules and policies, as well as the revert mechanism, which were developed in Wikipedia 
through collective-choice processes over time to improve article quality and contribute to the 
overarching goal of producing encyclopedic information, do not directly alleviate pollution when 
employed on the operational level. Here, citation of policies determined on the collective-choice 
level for regulating article boundaries slowdown pollution resolution before alleviating it, 
suggesting a lag effect between the enforcement of boundaries and the redirection of an article’s 
trajectory.  
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Because some information commons do not have an explicit provider recognition mechanism on 
the operational level, researchers must be creative in examining other factors that impact provider 
motivation. Consistent with previous research (Halfaker et al. 2011,2013), we find that persistent 
provider rejection through reverts of revisions slows down pollution resolution. This finding is 
theoretically consistent with the notion introduced in PIC theory on the positive impact of provider 
recognition, yet it also differs in two key respects: (1) Rejection has an initial positive impact on 
pollution resolution time, which suggests that it—at least initially—acts as a boundary regulation 
mechanism. (2) We can only speculate as to whether persistent rejection reduces the effectiveness 
of pollution resolution because it slows down the cleaning process or because it causes providers 
trying to help to quit. Previous research finds that rejection causes demotivation, but we suspect 
that contributors might quit simply because they are frustrated with having to start over. There is 
an opportunity for future research to zoom in on this question.  
4.7.3 Practical Implications 
Our research has implications for the management of OC systems and other online platforms with 
low barriers to participation. The openness of various OC systems makes them a fertile ground for 
information pollution, ranging from low-quality and erroneous information to incidental and 
deliberate misinformation to uploads of disturbingly gruesome content (Chen 2014; Holman 
Rector 2008; Kanter 2018; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; Lavasa et al. 2011). Further, the increase 
in information pollution reduces public trust in the systems, and there have been calls to impose 
more traditional regulations on them (Barrett 2018). In short, information pollution can jeopardize 
the long-term viability and independence of OC systems characterized by low barriers to 
participation. 
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In response to such threats, systems are spending an increasing portion of their resources to employ 
professional moderators to identify and remove polluted content, but even so they often concede 
that it is difficult to keep up with the flood of content (Chen 2014; Kanter 2018). Moreover, many 
systems do not have the means to employ content moderators and are even more vulnerable to 
degeneration because of pollution.  
Our findings suggest that online systems characterized by low barriers to participation should adapt 
mechanisms and rules that facilitate participation in the governance of those systems. This may 
often seem managerially counterintuitive, as systems under threat tend to close themselves and 
seek control rather than further opening for participation. Facebook’s recent decisions to invest 
greater resources into controlling and monitoring content illustrate this instinct (Kanter 2018). By 
contrast, building on our insights and PIC theory, we assert that systems with low barriers to 
participation may need to allow more of their users greater freedom at setting boundaries and 
monitoring and adjusting the system. For instance, most open-access systems already incorporate 
various flagging mechanisms that let users identify bad content; we assert that the producers of 
these systems should consider going further and give some editorial privileges to trusted users. As 
our findings indicate, shared accountability is not about having everyone participating, but more 
about getting the right people to share the burden.  
Instead of relying only on professional monitors, systems such as Facebook should find inspiration 
in the polycentric Wikipedia model and experiment with ways in which the community of users 
can discuss and agree on article boundaries; monitor, identify, and help remove polluted content; 
and suggest new mechanisms for maintaining the system’s information integrity. There is no 
general recipe for how open-access systems online should do it, but if those systems find ways to 
tap into their user base—not just for participation in content provision and exchange, but also for 
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monitoring and removing pollution—they will likely resolve pollution events in a more efficient 
and cost-effective manner.  
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Appendix A: Dataset Construction 
Wikimedia Foundation makes data underpinning different Wikipedia sites freely available at 
https://dumps.wikimedia.org. We downloaded a data dump for the English Wikipedia on 1 January 
2017 and transformed it into a tabulated dataset following a similar approach applied in Aaltonen 
and Lanzara (2015) and Aaltonen and Seiler (2015). 
According to ‘enwiki-20170101-site_stats.sql’ file in the data dump, the raw data contains the full 
text of 867,033,963 article revisions to 41,099,459 articles since January 2001. 5,321,706 of these 
articles represent encyclopedia articles, while the rest of the articles are lists, redirects, portal pages 
and other means of organizing the content, user profiles, help pages and pages that support 
administrative and editorial functions such as Wikipedia policies and guidelines, categories, 
templates, and more. Each article may be accompanied by a talk page that allow users to discuss 
its content. 
The downloaded data contains XML-formatted page records that encapsulate revision records that 
is, individual edits to the page. The page record contains a header section with the page title, 
namespace, id and some optional tags such as “redirect” in the example below. The header section 
is followed by revision records. Each revision record contains an id, timestamp, contributor record, 
the full text of the revision and some optional tags such as “comment” that is a summary of the 
edit (not to be confused with talk page comments). Below is an example of page record. Note that 
we have truncated the record to show only the first revision of the page and slightly altered 
indentation to make it easy to perceive the XML structure. 
<page> 
 <title>AccessibleComputing</title> 
 <ns>0</ns> 
 <id>10</id> 
 <redirect title=“Computer accessibility” /> 
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 <revision> 
 <id>233192</id> 
 <timestamp>2001-01-21T02:12:21Z</timestamp> 
 <contributor> 
 <username>RoseParks</username> 
 <id>99</id> 
 </contributor> 
 <comment>*</comment> 
 <model>wikitext</model> 
 <format>text/x-wiki</format> 
 <text xml:space=“preserve”>This subject covers 
 
 * AssistiveTechnology 
 
 * AccessibleSoftware 
 
 * AccessibleWeb 
 
 * LegalIssuesInAccessibleComputing 
 
 </text> 
 <sha1>8kul9tlwjm9oxgvqzbwuegt9b2830vw</sha1> 
 </revision> 
 . 
 . 
 . 
<page> 
An exact graphical depiction of the pipeline that was used to transform the can be found in Figure 
A1, together with a brief explanation of each step in Table A1. The following is a narrative 
overview of the process. 
We take a random sample of 340,000 articles and associated 172,576 talk pages (not all articles 
have a talk page) and transform their XML records into an initial tabulated dataset using a purpose-
built Python script (Step 5, 6, 7, 8). Due to a technical limitation of our processing environment 
we have dropped 5 pages from further processing due to their large size (over ~2 GB). The 
transformation process stores page title and id, revision id, timestamp, user id and name, and lots 
of other information for each sampled page revision. Each revision is represented by a row in the 
initial dataset (output from Step 8). During the initial transformation, we also calculate a number 
of further metrics such as the Levenshtein edit distance between consecutive page revisions to 
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estimate the amount of content change or effort put into each revision. We also analyze the content 
of each revision by matching a number of regular expression patterns against the revision content, 
creating a variable for each matched pattern. 
We then identified 4,924 articles with the presence of a cleanup template at some point in their 
history (Step 9, 10). We further removed pages with intractable revert patterns during pollution 
events to arrive at a sample of 4,679 articles and 5,487 pollution events as some articles contain 
more than one event, that is, a cleanup template appears on them more than once. 
Table A1 Data Pipeline Steps 
Step Label Description 
1 enwiki-20170101 Data dump download from https://dumps.wikimedia.org 
2 20170216-enwiki-20170101-filenames Creation of a list of filenames in the data dump 
3 20170303-one-id Creation of a dummy file required by the processing script 
4 20170303-enwiki-20170101-page-ids Creation of a list of page ids 
5 20170703-random-sample-ids Random sampling of article pages and their talk pages (ids) 
6 20180422-enwiki-user-groups Identification of users that belong to a particular user group  
7 20180422-enwiki-regexp-analyses Creations of regular expression patterns to analyze page and 
edit summary content 
8 20180501-article-sample-with-talk-pages Transformation of XML records for the sampled pages into a 
tabulated dataset 
9 20180505-revision-dataset-per-polluted 
page 
Creation of a separate datasets that combines both page and 
talk page revisions for each page with the presence of 
Cleanup or Cleanup rewrite template. 
10 20180507-pollution-events-dataset Creation of an aggregated dataset with one row per observed 
pollution event. 
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Figure A1. Data Pipeline Graph 
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Appendix B: Robustness Analysis 
 
Table B1. Articles with Single Pollution Event Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,020) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .144*** .106*** .097*** .076*** .057*** .059*** .060*** 
Length of article  .015 -.033 -.068** -.095*** -.061** -.067** -.069** 
Providers before pollution event -.116** -.167*** -.317*** -.393*** -.346*** -.319*** -.307*** 
Providers before: talk page .066 .103** .142*** .225*** .201*** .174*** .173*** 
References before pollution  -.025 -.014 -.023 -.020 -.043* -.058** -.058** 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.458*** -.357*** -.273*** -.289*** -.261*** -.259*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .392*** .796*** .964*** 1.051*** 1.080*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    -.466*** -.425*** -.350*** -.429*** 
Revisions (INA)     -.256*** -.235*** -.207*** 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.395*** -.502*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       .134** 
Model F 10.1*** 129.3*** 200.3*** 241*** 229.3*** 236.9*** 216.9*** 
F change  712.2*** 487.8*** 347.6*** 79.7*** 174.1*** 9.7** 
Adj. R2 0.016 0.22 0.338 0.413 0.429 0.463 0.465 
ΔR2  0.203 0.118 0.075 0.017 0.034 0.002 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
 
Table B2. Articles with Two Pollution Events Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=1038) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .314*** .246*** .210*** .174*** .153*** .149*** .132*** 
Length of article  -.028 -.082 -.090* -.102* -.065 -.097* -.111* 
Providers before pollution event -.423*** -.467*** -.639*** -.619*** -.615*** -.540*** -.458*** 
Providers before: talk page .232** .261*** .374*** .373*** .375*** .342*** .301*** 
References before pollution  -.017 .035 .049 .042 .020 .015 .012 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.370*** -.270*** -.205*** -.220*** -.208*** -.208*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .376*** .796*** .914*** 1.003*** 1.235*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    -.441*** -.440*** -.352*** -.618*** 
Revisions (INA)     -.155** .048 .098 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.395*** -.830*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       .447*** 
Model F 16.6*** 42.7*** 66.3*** 68.2*** 62.6*** 63.7*** 63.6*** 
F change  159.4*** 165.6*** 55.6*** 12.1** 47.3.1**
* 
38.6** 
Adj. R2 0.077 0.201 0.315 0.350 0.358 0.386 0.409 
ΔR2  0.128 0.114 0.036 0.008 0.029 0.023 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
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Table B3. Articles with Three or More Pollution Events Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=408) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .352*** .316*** .281*** .255*** .240*** .216*** .187*** 
Length of article  .015 -.044 -.067 -.048 -.030 -.083 -.091 
Providers before pollution event -.329** -.321** -.336** -.392*** -.403*** -.305** -.266** 
Providers before: talk page .020 .020 .002 .029 .035 .027 .013 
References before pollution  .056 .078 .064 .045 .040 .028 .034 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.314*** -.252*** -.187*** -.205*** -.185*** -.183*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .327*** .905*** 1.124*** 1.274*** 1.886*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    -.605*** .240*** -.541*** -1.22*** 
Revisions (INA)     -.030 .245 .365** 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.712*** -1.51*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       .771*** 
Model F 8.1*** 14.8*** 21.4*** 24.1*** 22*** 24.6*** 26.3*** 
F change  43.8*** 49.4*** 31.3*** 3.8 31.4*** 26.4** 
Adj. R2 0.085 0.178 0.272 0.326 0.332 0.382 0.421 
ΔR2  0.094 0.094 0.055 0.007 0.051 0.040 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
 
Table B4. First Pollution Event Only, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,679) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .170*** .094*** .094*** .095*** .099*** .101*** .095*** 
Length of article  -.018 -.073*** -.073*** -.072*** -.124*** -.135*** -.130*** 
Providers before pollution event -.171*** -.162*** -.162*** -.176*** -.209*** -.184*** -.189*** 
Providers before: talk page .055 .050 .050 .049 .047 .036 .026 
References before pollution  .017 .040* .040* .037* .064* .061*** .059*** 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.428*** -.428*** -.424*** -.372*** -.364*** -.360*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .094 -.005 -.009 -.009 -.006 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    .094*** .077** .057** .226*** 
Revisions (INA)     -.223*** -.366*** -.301*** 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.215*** -.148*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       .273*** 
Model F 21.4*** 184.8*** 158.4*** 146.2*** 152.5*** 144*** 135*** 
F change  978.5*** 0.023 48.6*** 162*** 52*** 34.4** 
Adj. R2 0.023 0.196 0.196 0.204 0.232 0.24 0.246 
ΔR2  0.174 0.000 0.009 0.028 0.009 0.006 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
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Table B5. Seconds Pollution Event Only, DV: Event Length Time (N=639) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .226*** .198*** .182*** .150*** .121** .100* .088* 
Length of article  -.081 -.135* -.130* -.141** -.100 -.123* -.128* 
Providers before pollution event -.381*** -.388*** -.527*** -.526*** -.511*** -.412*** -.399*** 
Providers before: talk page .192* .182* .258*** .271*** .268*** .236** .227** 
References before pollution  .007 .070 .091 .083 .057 .030 .041 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.332*** -.247*** -.185*** -.206*** -.181*** -.174*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .296*** .706*** .902*** 1.060*** 1.320*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    -.432*** -.396*** -.363*** -.695*** 
Revisions (INA)     -.275*** -.237*** -.221*** 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.527*** -1.13*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       .536*** 
Model F 9.2*** 21.8*** 28.8*** 30*** 29*** 31*** 32.3*** 
F change  78.7*** 58.8*** 28.6*** 15.3*** 34.8*** 29.9*** 
Adj. R2 0.063 0.169 0.242 0.275 0.292 0.329 0.360 
ΔR2  0.107 0.073 0.034 0.018 0.038 0.031 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
 
Table B6. Third or More Pollution Events, DV: Event Length Time (N=169) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Article age .283** .251** .226** .198** .191* .180* .184* 
Length of article  -.066 -.064 -.008 .058 .058 .078 .074 
Providers before pollution event -.320** -.346** -.377*** -.414*** -.413*** -.427*** -.423*** 
Providers before: talk page .261** .188* -.025 -.143 -.127 -.129 -.141 
References before pollution  .040 .025 .014 -.038 -.036 -.034 -.037 
Work distribution / providers 
(SHA) 
 -.298*** -.289*** -.229*** -.234*** -.224*** -.222** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)   .301** 1.147*** 1.217*** 1.486*** 1.385*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)    -.803*** -.804*** -.875*** -.773** 
Revisions (INA)     -.087 -.062 .024 
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)      -.267* -.255* 
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)       -.094 
Model F 5.6*** 7.7*** 8.4*** 10*** 8.9*** 8.7*** 7.8*** 
F change  15.5*** 10.2*** 15.5*** .19 4.8*** .2* 
Adj. R2 0.125 0.201 0.246 0.312 0.318 0.335 0.352 
ΔR2  0.078 0.049 0.067 0.006 0.018 0.017 
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
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Table B7. Talk Page Variables Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Article age .314*** .223*** .206*** 
Length of article  .065** -.083*** -.124*** 
Providers before pollution event -.521*** -.534*** -.447*** 
Providers before: talk page .126*** .024* -.044*** 
References before pollution  -.025** .053*** .074*** 
Work distribution / providers (SHA)  -.162*** -.167*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)  1.824*** 1.897*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)  -1.127*** -1.118*** 
Revisions (INA)  -.307*** -.128*** 
Reverted Revisions (PRJ)  -1.420*** -1.338*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (PRJ2)  .738*** .719*** 
Number of editors on talk page   .189*** 
Policies cited in talk pages   .047*** 
Policies cited in talk pages2   -.002*** 
Talk page revisions   .005*** 
Reverted revision talk page   -.267*** 
Reverted revision talk page2   .129 
Model F 773.6 1749.2 1213.6 
F change  2258.2 139.1 
Adj. R2 .119 .401 .418 
ΔR2  .283 .017 
    * p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
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Table B8. Veterans and New Provider Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Article age .152*** .022 .061*** 
Length of article  -.028 -.103*** -.047* 
Providers before pollution event -.230*** -.236*** -.191*** 
Providers before: talk page .087* .115*** .114*** 
References before pollution  .019 -.010 -.006*** 
Work distribution / providers (SHA)  -.226*** -.201*** 
Policies cited in revisions (BR)  1.335*** 1.272*** 
Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)  -.699*** -.661*** 
Revisions (INA)  .041 -.121*** 
Reverted Revisions (PRJ)  -.890*** -.839*** 
Reverted Revisions2 (PRJ2)  .429*** .383*** 
Ratio of remaining veterans to previously engaged editors   .042** 
Number of veterans   -.106*** 
Ratio of veteran during pollution event   -.132*** 
Proportion of length change by veterans   .014 
Veteran’s edit distance during pollution event   -.070*** 
Proportion of Veteran’s edit distance during pollution event   -.006 
Model F 21 254.4 182.9 
F change  437.5 31 
Adj. R2 .024 .408 .434 
ΔR2  .385 .026 
    * p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
